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Tribal
Socio-economic Change: Dream and Reality
(By Dr Gary Lee )
Contents
1
Acknowledgement
2
Project
impact
3 Persistent
patterns
4 Constraints
and prospects
5 Conclusion
6 Footnotes
7 References
Acknowledgement: The research on which this
paper is based was made possible by financial assistance from the
Wenner-Gren Foundation, New York, U.S.A.; and from the Greenwell
Bequest of the University of Sydney, Australia. My thanks go to all
officials and the Hmong villagers in Thailand who helped me in
various ways during the course of my field work, and to Professor
W.R. Geddes, Department of Anthropology, Sydney University, for his
comments on an early draft of this article.
During the last few
years, there have been official attempts to reduce or
eliminate poppy in the highlands of Thailand. The best known
of these efforts is probably the Crop
Replacement and Community Development project of the United Nations
Programme for Drug Abuse Control (UNPDAC). This was established in
September 1972, following an agreement signed between the Royal Thai
Government and the U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs in Geneva,
Switzerland. The background to this project has been well documented
elsewhere (Geddes, 1972: 224-233: United Nations Reports, 1967 and
1970; and UNPDAC First Progress Report, July 1973). Because of this,
I will confine my discussion to the results of its implementation at
Khun Wang, one of the project's "key" White Hmong villages where the
research for this article was carried out in 1977.
Project Impact
Aiming to explore the
feasibility of replacing opium with other crops and economic
enterprises, the UN project was initiated at Khun Wang in April
1973, with the installation of a crop trial station, a team of 3
extension workers and a number of labourers to carry out its various
activities. Since then, it has undertaken crop trials and
demonstrations as well as community development in the forms of
education and medical assistance. In its extension work between 1973
and 1977, the following items have been loaned or made available to
the tribal people for experimentation in their farms: 16 litres of
sesame seeds, 12 tangs (1) of castor beans, 54 tangs of red-kidney
beans; 1,420 kilos of fertiliser for use with coffee trees and dry
rice fields, 8,900 coffee seedlings: 64 kilos of onion and garlic
seeds, 7 kilos of insecticide; and 66 apricot and persimmon trees.
These are figures given by the villagers. Official sources reveal: 2
tangs of castor beans, 514 kilos of seed potatoes; 15,350 coffee
seedlings; 30 apricot and persimmon trees; 165 kilos of rice seeds,
and 260 young peach trees. Land ploughed by the project's tractor
for the farmers covers: 6.4 hectare for red-kidney beans in 1975;
and 33.4 hectares for dry rice in 1975 and 1976 at the main village
(2 ). About 300 fish were also given to two families to breed in
their fish ponds. At the end of 1977, the four households of Upper
Khun Wang were loaned 40 cattle to graze of 16 hectares of improved
pastures to encourage cattle raising and modern animal husbandry as
an alternative to opium growing, with the village people being
responsible for maintaining the pastures and cattle until the latter
are all repaid to the project with offsprings of the herd's cows
over a number of years.
It can be seen that the figures
maintained by project personnel and those obtained verbally from the
farmers contradict one another. There is no way to verify this,
because written records are not kept on every item handed out to the
villagers. On the face of this, it is not possible to use these
figures as accurate indication of aid extended to the opium growers.
In any case, what is loaned or given does not always bring returns,
and in the long run the success of the project can only be judged by
the types and amounts of replacement crops or economic activities
the Hmong have adopted profitably as viable alternatives to poppy,
and the reduction of opium cultivation in the area.
The results of my survey with
all 30 households in the Khun Wang complex show only one family to
have earned any income from replacement crops introduced by the UN
project. This consists of 2,000 Baht in 1976 and 3,200 Baht in 1977
from coffee, and 4,000 Baht for peaches in 1976, all sold with the
assistance of project workers. Other households also experimented
with various crops and fruit trees, but these failed or are
abandoned through poor soil, heavy rains, lack of maintenance and
knowledge, or insufficient official assistance. In the first two
years of the project, households in the main village and Upper Khun
Wang were eager to join in these crop experiments so much so that
not enough seeds could be secured for them. Some were loaned sesame
seeds on the understanding that these seeds would be returned to the
project at 15% interest if the crop grew successfully. This
condition also applied to other crop seeds. The yields of potatoes
and castor beans were very good, but sesame and red-kidney beans
failed due to heavy frost. However, the people could not sell any of
the successful crops to the project, despite its original agreement
to buy them and even to compensate the growers at the rate of 800
Baht per rai (1,600 square metres) in the event of failure from
natural causes.
After many unsuccessful
attempts to sell castor beans and potatoes to the UN project, the
farmers became discouraged and gave up further experimentations. The
project did not buy these crops to sell at the city markets on the
pretext that the prices they would fetch were too low to compensate
for the costs involved in their purchase and transportation. Between
1972 and 1978, the UN Crop Replacement Project absorbed US
$3,447,800 in expenditures for all of Thailand, and it has reserved
$40,000 annually specifically for the provision of incentives and
guarantee for village farmers who agree to take part in the project.
Yet, when it comes to buying the Hmong's experimental crops as part
of its incentive scheme, the project has not lived up to its verbal
promises to them and to its own written guidelines. Nearly all its
expenditures have gone toward salaries and official liabilities,
leaving only US $580,400 (or 18%) for general operations (Report to
the 1978 Session, U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs : 21).
After five years of
implementation, it is clear that as far as Khun Wang is concerned,
United Nations substitute crops have made very little headway to
replace opium. Few farmers are growing them on any significant level
or have seen their potential as possible means of making a living in
the highlands. A detailed counting and measurement in 1977 show only
14 households with a total of 1,445 coffee trees; 17 with 107 castor
bean trees, 12 with a total of 4.710 square metres of red-kidney
beans; 6 with 16 apricot trees and 33 persimmon trees; 3 with 511
peach trees; 1 with 401 square metres of strawberries, and 1 with
303 square metres of soya beans. Peach and coffee trees planted in
1973 have been giving fruit since 1976, and apricot trees flowered
for the first time in 1977. Castor bean trees are now only
maintained for shade or left to survive in the wild
A more meaningful aspect of the
problems encountered by the UNPDAC project is that opium land-use
has remained more or less at the same level as in the years before
the initiation of the project in 1973. The land under poppy at Khun
Wang was reported as being 1.65 hectares per household in 1972
(Roth, 1974:.33). It still stood at 1.66 hectares in 1976. From my
opinion survey of the Khun Wang villagers, 35% of all households
agreed that the ploughing of dry rice fields for them by the project
was the most significant undertaking, while 65% said that not much
had been achieved, apart from assistance with medicine, educational
facilities and the construction of the village piped water system.
These figures and opinions not
withstanding, an evaluation team commissioned by the United Nations
to review the project's progress in 1975 stated that since the
project began, opium production in the key experimental villages
"has been reduced by about one half, and in some cases by more" (UNPDAC,
Sixth Progress Report, 1976: Annex I, p. 9). This impression of
dedicated work and success has been repeated in later official UN
reports as testimony of the project's fulfilment of its objective in
replacing poppy with other cash crops (UN PDAC, Reports to the
United Nations commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1977 and 1978
Sessions).
It is obvious that these claims
must have been made in complete disregard to the project's lack of
progress at Khun Wang and other villages. The mind boggles to think
that project workers have been able to persuade the hill tribes to
grow so much strawberries and kidney beans that opium farmers now
earn two to three times more incomes per annum than when they
cultivate poppy, as was once reported by the Thai Director of the UN
project (Bangkok Post, 14/9/77, p. 3). Yet, it was recently
estimated by some officials that opium growing in the hills of
Northern Thailand had increased from previous years to 200,000 acres
in 1976, and "the hill tribe economy remains as dependent on opium
sales as the junkie is on his next heroin fix (Asian Wall Street
Journal, 1/4/77, p. 1).
The Hmong grow poppy not only
for the cash they can earn from its sale, but also because they
resort to it for many other uses. This fact has been well
appreciated in Thailand and elsewhere. In the old days before cash
has become common, opium used to be the main currency for exchange
in remote areas, especially cash since they buy most of what they
need from shops in the city.
Altogether, the socio-economic
obligations of the Khun Wang villagers entailed an annual
expenditure with a cash value of 434,241 Baht in 1976 and 254,927
Baht in 1977, of which 93,051 Baht (21-4%) and 32,365 Baht (12.7%)
for both years involved opium as a means of exchange. The single
biggest source of incomes is the sale of opium produced by the
village people, amounting to 422,120 Baht (85.8%) out of a total
income of 492,230 Baht for 1976, and 189,630 Baht (72%) of a total
of 263,078 Baht in 1977. Taking away the total expenditures from the
annual incomes for these years leaves a yearly surplus of 57,989
Baht for 1976 and 4,079 Baht for 1977, or 1,933 Baht and 136 Baht
per household respectively. For each of the 30 households, the gross
annual income from opium as well as other sources averages 16,407.6
Baht in 1976 and 8,769.3 Baht in 1977.
It can be inferred that these
income figures are well above the annual wages of 5,200 Baht (at 20
Baht a day for 5 working days per week) for the lowest paid menial
worker in Thailand. However, this is the earning of one person,
whereas the Hmong's figure is for a household. For each of the 1212
Hmong workers involved in poppy cultivation at Khun Wang, the gross
annual income would be 4,068 Baht in 1976 and 2,174.2 Baht in 1977.
In addition, hired workers cost 58,846 Baht in cash terms in 1976
and 224,075 Baht in 1977. This gives us a net income from opium sale
of 363,274 Baht and 165,555 Baht respectively or 3,002 Baht and
1,368.2 Baht per family worker for both these two years. It is
evident that this is well below the annual wages of a Thai menial
labourer. Even assuming that a Hmong spends only an average of 215
days fully occupied in agricultural activities each year, a daily
income of 20 Baht would give him an annual gross of 4,300 Baht,
which is still higher than what he actually obtains from his farm
work.
Therefore, it cannot be
concluded that Hmong opium growers are comparatively better off than
other low-income earners, especially when more than half of the
households do not produce enough for their needs. In 1976, for
instance, 14 of the 30 households in Khun Wang had a total deficit
of 61,011 Baht or 4,358 Baht per household, and 18 of these
households in 1977 overspent by 44,870 Baht or 2,493 Baht per
household. This resulted in many of them being forced to borrow from
relatives or traders in order to sustain themselves until the next
crop harvest.
In general, the biggest need is
rice, since it absorbs the highest expenditures with a total money
value of 125,606 Baht in 1976 and 85,013 Baht in 1977, representing
28.9% and 33.3% of all expenditures respectively. This is despite
the fact that rice production in Khun Wang totalled 40,359.2 kilos
in 1967 in unmilled form and 42,219 kilos for these years. The
amount of paddy purchased to supplement home-grown rice is 29.582.4
kilos in 1967 and 21,253.25 kilos in 1977. This means that 42% of
rice consumed in 1976 and 33% in 1977 had to be bought to meet the
villagers' requirements. This is because some of this rice was also
used for domestic animals, due to insufficient maize production. In
1976, the maize yield was 13,050 kilograms for all 30 households, of
which 1,000 kilos were sold for 1,600 Baht. The remaining 12,050
kilos were kept as animal feeds. With an average daily consumption
of 60 kilos of maize by the village pigs and chickens, some
households had enough maize to last till the following year while
the majority had to substitute rice as fodder when their maize run
out, often within 2 months following harvest.
With such demand made on rice
by both domestic animals and people, it is not surprising that the
Hmong cannot produce enough paddy to last a whole year. The
situation is made worse by the lack of land for rice growing as Khun
Wang is at too high an altitude for rice to grow well. To complicate
matters further, the incomes of the opium farmers are always in a
precarious position, depending on the fluctuation in opium price and
their in times of low yields.
It has been said the one of the
reasons for the continuing cultivation of poppy in the hills is the
farmers' indebtedness to lowland or local shopkeepers. In times of
economic hardship, a farmer is forced to seek loans which he will
repay in opium that credit operators later sell at lucrative prices
to heroin dealers. Interest on these loans is often at the rate of
200 per cent a year. If the farmer cannot settle his debts
immediately, they are carried over to the following years for at
least three years. This may tie him to his opium fields until he can
produce enough to satisfy his creditors. In 1976, the Hmong of Khun
Wang repaid debts totalling 39,316 Baht of which 27,516 (70%) were
in opium. In 1977, their debt repayment amounted to 18,310 Baht of
which 14,320 Baht (78.2%) were paid in opium (1). It is obvious that
many farmers paid their credit agents with opium, either by choice
or compulsion. However, as Geddes points out, it is probably
exaggerating "to say that these ties to agents who are primarily
interested in obtaining opium actually stimulate production, because
there are other reasons why the people at present want to grow it,
but they would tend to make it more difficult to abandon production"
(Geddes, 1976; 225).
Another reason for the Hmong's
opium cultivation is the need to provide for their family addicts.
Without incomes, those who are dependent on opium for smoking cannot
buy it from other growers so that they or their families have to
produce it themselves. Khun Wang has 26 addicts of whom 19
(including 5 couples) have economically active household members who
grow enough poppy for them to have opium for use throughout the year
before the next harvest. Those without such labour resources do not
have enough to smoke for a year and have to borrow or earn opium
from hiring their labour to other households. Among the latter
group, one has enough opium for 7 months, four (2 couples) for 6
months, and two (a very destitute couple) for 2 months. The opium
reserved for smoking by village addicts or for home uses totals
137.16 kilograms worth 128,662 Baht in 1977 with a cash related
expense for analgesic powder (used to mix with opium) of 2,776 Baht.
The cash value of opium used by these addicts is so high as to be
second only to the total expenditure on rice.
The average length of addiction
for these 26 opium-dependent Hmong is 14.5 years, with an average
daily consumption of 7-75 grams per addict or 73.55 kilos a year tor
all addicts. This is well below the reserve figure of 137-16 kilos
for the whole village, but some households usually keep more opium
than they actually use in order to meet emergencies. Like their
expenditures this amount of opium fluctuates according to the level
of production: the more opium produced in any one year, the. more
opium is used or reserved for smoking and home consumption.
It is clear that one of the
main justification by the Hmong for their poppy cultivation is the
need to provide opium for their addicts. They may give up growing
poppy as a cash crop, but will not abandon it altogether because a
limited supply will always be required until the time when they have
no one dependent on it. At this stage, the tribal addicts are still
too reluctant to join the government's modest detoxification scheme
in the lowlands, explaining that it is difficult to give away their
habit now after such a long time on the drug. They realize the
futility of being successfully treated in the city only to return to
their isolated villages in the hills where the lack of medical
service will force many of them to take up opium smoking again as
the only alternative to alleviating any sickness.
Many hill people can today buy
medicine for their own use, supplemented by free medical assistance
from government or voluntary health officers who visit a few tribal
villages two or three times a year. However, this ad hoc visiting
means that highlanders have to resort to opium in case of serious
illness such as toothache, influenza and diarrhoea. This can be
either in the form of raw opium taken orally, or opium smoke inhaled
by the patients or blown at them under the cover of a blanket. In
1977, there were 147 incidences of diarrhoea in Khun Wang, 322 of
influenza and 272 of toothache, with 568 instances of less serious
stomach complaints for the total population of 254 persons. Cash
used to buy modern medicine amounts to 3,432 Baht and another 3,307
Baht (much of it in opium) were spent on curing rites. Of the 26
existing addicts, 24 (92.3%) give a major sickness as the cause of
their addiction. It is not possible to estimate the amount of opium
used for pain-relief, but there is no doubt that it is still being
resorted to widely among the highland villagers.
With some permanent health
service available, it is unlikely that the Hmong will depend on
opium in their illness to the extent of becoming addicted. The hill
farmers do not always have the fares to go to the city hospitals,
nor can they afford the time even when treatment for them is free.
So long as they rely on opium as pain-killer and so long as their
addicts are not rehabilitated, they will carry on producing opium,
irrespective of the government's decisions on its legal standing. An
integrated approach by many governments agencies providing major
services which cater for the farmers' needs in all areas is
required.
If the UNPDAC project has not
done much to decrease the Hmong's opium production in Thailand, the
Forestry Department of the Royal Thai Government certainly has made
its presence increasingly felt in the highlands. In order to prevent
erosion and further forest destruction by hill farmers, the Forestry
Department through its Watershed Management Division has undertaken
the reforestation of all denuded lands and fallows with no ongoing
farming. In the Khun Wang area, 663.68 hectares had been planted
with trees between 1975 and 1977, with 320 hectares planned for each
subsequent year. A farmer can apply to use his own fallows for crop
growing; but as soon as they are not under any crop, Forest
Department labourers plant trees on them. This even includes fruit
tree plantations which are not well maintained, and suspected of
being abandoned by their owners. Since there is no virgin forest
left to clear, all farming has to depend on fallows or old crop
fields. There is no doubt that the Hmong will not be able to grow
crops or graze their cattle as reforestation gradually takes place
on all uncultivated lands in the region. For the time being, they
can still rely on about 320 hectares of poppy fallows recently
abandoned by Northern Thai growers beyond the current boundaries of
the reforestation project, although these will not last them for
long.
One likely consequence of this
lack of agricultural land is that tribal opium production may stop
or diminish as the reforestation of the hills confines the farmers
to their existing poppy fields with no possibility of expansion
elsewhere. In a way, this is an indirect way of forcing the highland
settlers to adopt permanent methods of cultivation and give up their
traditional shifting agriculture or intermittent migration. The use
of force through law enforcement to put an end to poppy growing has
sometimes been suggested (UNPDAC, Sixth Progress Report, 1976: Annex
I, p. 8). The direct application of force, however, has not so far
been done by the Royal Thai Government as it may cause
socio-economic hardship to tribal communities which have yet to be
provided with viable alternatives to opium.
What has been attempted is the
suppression of opium trafficking in the country by imposing harsh
penalties and even death sentences on drug peddlers in the hope of
depriving poppy farmers of their market. This is a cautious and
politically expedient move, but it still does not prevent traders
from finding means to buy tribal opium in one way or another. It
merely changes the pattern: whereas before traders went together in
larger groups with guards and horses, they now make contact with
growers in small groups of two or four persons, usually working for
a big lowland dealer.
Except for the occasional
Hmong, the majority of opium traders are Northern Thai who are well
acquainted with tribal people and who know that the latter will not
inform the authorities on their illegal activities. In the course of
my research, I observed no less than 9 groups of these traders
totalling 32 persons travelling through Khun Wang at different times
in search of opium to buy. There could have been others, because
many only visited at night and could not be seen. Those who did come
during the day seldom make casual conversation with anyone and do
not take the trails frequently by ordinary travellers, preferring to
use by-ways known only to them. Despite such precautious measures on
their part, six Hmong traders were known to be apprehended in 1977
and given sentences ranging from 6 to 20 years in prison. However,
no Northern Thai traders were heard to have shared this fate.
The severe punishment handed
down to opium dealers may prove effective to a point in eliminating
markets for opium farmers and may prevent them from producing more
of the crop. Nevertheless, the use of the police to intercept
traders and to deter growers in the hills is not effective when all
the law-enforcement officers live in the lowlands and are only sent
to tribal villages for very short reconnaissance missions. No
surveillance has been undertaken on a permanent basis in accordance
with the Royal Thai Government's informal policy of not to enforce
the law to prohibit opium cultivation, as this may alienate
villagers from the formal leadership of the country. In 1977, two
groups of 18 policemen and members of the Thai border Patrol Police
visited Khun Wang to survey the Hmong's opium fields and to look for
traders. In order not to arouse suspicion, they informed the village
people that they were only there to find insurgents and some of the
policemen proceeded to search the Hmong's bedrooms for unregistered
rifles. On both occasions, no insurgents or traders were found.
At present, it would appear
that the opium economy of the hill settlers is in a precarious
position. Many forces are exerting their influence directly or
indirectly on its existence. The prospects for continuing dependence
on poppy as a major agricultural undertaking are now dim, especially
when reinforced by the scarcity of good quality lands and
overpopulation. We have seen the importance of rice for the Hmong
and their adoption of opium as a mean of exchange for rice. As
pointed out by McKennon, for the highlanders "it is rice that is
valued above all other crops... Rice is not only important as a food
crop set about by ritual, good harvests provide a household's
subsistence needs and grant an enviable degree of independence"
(1977: 5). Without wet rice terraces to produce paddy on a permanent
basis, the economy of the poppy farmers will greatly suffer unless
it can rely on other crops to sustain the people. So far, crops
introduced by the United Nations Crop Replacement Project have not
adapted well to the highlands or are without marketing outlets on
any meaningful scale. So long as this remains the case, opium seems
to be the only alternative for survival, despite the many
constraints against its production and the admission of the growers
themselves that they wish to give it up.
Above all, what is most
urgently called for is the improvement of the people's existing rice
production and subsistence economy. As they are at present, tribal
development projects seem to regard traditional highland agriculture
as obsolete and ecologically destructive, thereby preferring to
introduce commercial agriculture to the hill tribes whose access to
modern marketing and agricultural methods need to be seriously
questioned. Because they are often based on naive assumptions,
official projects are mainly providing livelihood for bureaucrats
and academics to try out their pet ideas. They rarely meet the
farmers needs, with the result that the latter will continue with
opium production as the only viable means of making a living when
they have no other places to live.
Hill tribes people produce
opium in order to have a means of obtaining sufficient food since
they can only produce 60 per cent of their requirement, due to lack
of rice land. Moreover, opium plays an important role in the
alleviation of their illness. For these reasons, the Hmong have to
depend on poppy cultivation as the most practical way of surviving
in the highlands, despite their aversion to it. They would rather
own wet rice fields so that they can settle permanently in one place
than being forced to follow their present system of shifting
agriculture. Hmong opium production is a problem of multiple
dimensions, not only to governments but also to the growers
themselves. The highlands of Northern Thailand have proved
unsuitable for many crops introduced to replace poppy, and the lack
of markets makes many farmers reluctant to commit themselves to the
new crops. Unless means are found to increase their existing food
production, they have little alternative but to produce opium for a
living, especially when there is a scarcity of land for other crops.
It is not the lack of market alone which prevents hill farmers from
adopting legal cash crops in place of poppy, but also the problem of
landlessness. These are the main issues which should preoccupy poppy
replacement officials, instead of continuing doggedly with
experimentation on alternative inedible/nonmarketable crops and
making wild claims about their success with the farmers as they do
at present.
Footnotes
1. One tang is the
content of a kerosene drum with a capacity of 20 litres.
2. Although the official figure reported is 33.44 hectares, I took
measurement of these rice fields and found that they only amounted
to 15,9185 hectares (see UNPDAC, Monthly Extension Report, March
1976).
3. These figures refer only to debt repayments, and not the actual
amounts of outstanding debts which are very difficult to obtain
since the villagers would not disclose them in all cases.
References
Asian
Wall Street Journal: 1977.
"Poppycock: Thailand's Hill Tribes
Reject Major Efforts to Stop Opium output", 1 April:1.
Bangkok Post: 1977.
"Hill tribes Voluntarily Turning to 'Cash' Groups", 14 September :
3.
Geddes, W.R. : 1973. "The Opium Problem in Northern
Thailand". in Ho, R.and Chapman, E.C. (eds.) Studies in
Contemporary Thailand (Canberra: Research School of Pacific
Studies of the Australian National University).
1976. Migrants of the Mountains: the Cultural
Ecology of the Blue Miao (Hmong Njua) of Thailand" (Oxford:
Clarendon Press).
McKennon, J.: 1977. "The Jeremiab Incorporation? A
Discursive Interpretation of Problems in Contemporary History in the
Highlands of Northern Thailand" (Chiangmai: Tribal Research Centre).
Roth, A.: 1974. "Economic Survey Report on Eight
Project Villages" (Chiangmai: U.N. Programme for Drug Abuse
Control).
United Nations: 1967. "Report of the U.N. Survey
Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the Opium- producing Areas
in Thailand" (Bangkok: Government House Printing Office).
1970. "Report of the U.N. Project Preparation
Mission to Thailand in the Field of Narcotics Control" (New York:
U.N Technical Assistance Programme). TAO/THA/18.
United Nations/Thai Programme for Drug Abuse Control (UNPDAC):
1973. "First Progress Report " September 1972 - June 1973" (July).
1976 "Sixth Progress Report " July - December 1975"
(June). NAR/THA.
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