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The
Hmong of Laos:
Overview of their Transnational Adaptation
The first international
workshop on the Hmong/Miao in Asia 11-13 September 1998,
Aix-en-Provence, France
Theme 4: Transnationality,
Social Change and Adaptation
Contents
1
Acknowledgement
2
Introduction
3 Demography and economy
4
Issues in transnational adaptation
5 Education and employment
6 Economic change
7
Political adaptation
8 Resistance to change
9 Conclusion
10
References
Acknowledgement: information for
this paper was gained from many sources, including written
documents, newspaper reports, the Internet and interviews with Hmong
and non-Hmong in Laos and elsewhere. To all those who gave me help,
I would like to thank them sincerely and to state that I am
alone responsible for the interpretations and opinions expressed in
this paper.
This paper is a brief
examination of the Hmong of Laos and their adaptation to a new
political order since the formation of the Lao People's Democratic
Republic (Lao PDR) in 1975. It begins with a short history of Hmong
settlement, and goes on to examine their current socio-economic
situation, their participation in the Lao nation's social and
political life, as well as raising some contentious issues which
need to be addressed both by the Hmong themselves and by the central
government in regard to their full integration in the Lao
nation state.
The
paper argues that the Hmong in Laos have taken two roads of
transnational adaptation to the new order. One path leads the
majority to acceptance and support of the new regime, and the order
leads scattered little groups to resistance, isolation, and a
self-destructive life in inaccessible no man's land enclaves,
sometimes aided and abetted by Hmong expatriates in Western
countries. It is proposed that unless the Lao PDR Government
and Hmong leaders in the diaspora change their respective approach
towards the Hmong of Laos, the latter will continue to suffer from
distrust and political exploitation, and will find it difficult to
integrate fully, despite only a very small number being involved in
armed resistance.
Introduction
Yang Dao
(1972: 6) situated the Hmong’s first arrival in Laos between 1810
and 1820, although it is not known exactly when they first settled
there. By the time of French domination of Laos in 1893, there were
enough Hmong for the French to impose taxes and other obligations on
them, subsequently leading to minor revolts in 1886 and 1919.
By 1937, the Hmong population for all of French Indochina was
estimated to be 100,000 (Leroi et al, 1953: 647, quoted in Yang Dao,
op.cit.: 27). The Lao civil war from 1949 to 1973
also prevented any official counting, although figures for the Hmong
were variously given for 1968 as: 60,000 (Morechand, 1968: 60);
150,000 (Lemoine, 1968, quoted in Yang Dao, op.cit.:28); and
300,000 (Yang Dao, op.cit.: 30).
Following WWII, the Hmong became involved in the civil war of
Laos which saw them divided into two camps: those who
supported the Pathet Lao under the leadership of Faydang Lobliayao
and those who sided with the Royal Lao Government under Touby
Lyfoung and later Gen. Vang Pao. Following the establishment
of the Lao PDR in 1975, close to 200,000 Hmong fled to refugee
camps in Thailand and were later resettled in various countries in
the West such the United States (with an estimated 150,000),
France (7,000), French Guyana (2,000), Australia (1,600), Canada
(600) and Argentina (500). These consisted mainly of families
of Hmong military personnel who served as Royal Lao Army troops or
as members of the so-called CIA secret army. A further 30,000
remain in Thailand today as illegal residents or Thai citizens.
Those
who stayed on in Laos after 1975 consisted of three groups. The
first were those who lived in territories occupied by the Lao
revolutionary forces, and are usually known as "thirty-years Hmong",
meaning that they were supporters of the 30-year revolutionary
struggle of the Pathet Lao. The second group comprised of
former soldiers or refugees on the side of the Royal Lao Government
and who were unable to leave Laos or who decided not to. This groups
is sometimes referred to as "Vang Pao Hmong" or former supporters of
Gen. Vang Pao. The third smaller component of the current
Hmong population in Laos consists of small resistance groups, known
as "Chao Fa" (or followers of the Lord of the Sky). They are
commonly labelled "bandits", and are found in inaccessible and
rugged mountain areas, numbering probably no more than 500 to 1000
today. Some build make-shift houses hidden deep in the foliage of
tropical forests while others reportedly live openly in traditional
Hmong villages and practise normal subsistence farming.
If we
accept that there were 300,000 Hmong in Laos in the early 1970’s and
that 200,000 escaped to Thailand, we would have about 100,000 Hmong
left in Laos in 1975. It is estimated that half of this number
were "thirty-years Hmong". Twenty years later when the
Lao PDR Government carried out a comprehensive population census in
1995, the Hmong still formed almost 6.9 per cent or 315,465 of the
total population of 4,574,848. Of more than 47 ethnic groups in
Laos, they are now the fourth largest, after the Lao (52.5%), Phutai
(10.3%) and Khmu (11%). They are found in all of Northern Laos
from Phongsali down to Borikhamxay, with the majority living in
Xieng Khuang province.
The
Hmong in Laos are still found predominantly in the highlands, their
traditional place of dwelling. During the late 1970's and throughout
the 1980's, many families escaped their jungle hide-outs to the
Hmong settlement at Kilometre 52 on the road linking Viengtiane and
Muong Phon Hong. However, most only used this as an escape
route to the refugee camps in Thailand. Others Hmong moved to
establish villages around the Nam Ngum Dam in Vientiane province and
are still there in great numbers today. There are also Hmong living
in Vientiance municipality, but they are mainly public servants,
students or factory workers.
Overall,
they continue to do swidden farming, with some hunting, fishing and
gathering. These subsistence economic activities are sometimes
supplemented by vegetable selling at the local markets for those who
have access to such cash-earning facilities. The 1996 Labour
Force statistics of the Lao PDR shows that 85.5% of the 2,166,501
working age general population (those aged between 10 and 65) were
engaged in agriculture and fishery (State Planning Committee, 1997:
87). For the Hmong living mainly in rural areas, this figure
would be expected to be even higher, perhaps close to 98 per cent.
The 1995 census shows that of the 177 492 Hmong aged 10 years and
over, 75% are employed, 1.4% unemployed and 23.6% economically
inactive (too young, at school or too old to work). This
compares with the national figures of 68.6% being employed for a
total working age population of 3 157 417 people, 1.7 unemployed and
29.6% economically inactive (State Planning Committee, op.cit.:
53).
One
aspect of Hmong economic organisation in Laos is the small kin-based
overseas trading and personal remittances that take place between
the Hmong in Laos and their relatives in other countries. Items
traded include Lao costumes, Hmong head-bands, silver ornaments,
silver bars, herbal medicine, dry mushroom, videos and song
cassettes. A number of Hmong in Laos have been able to supplement
their farming or incomes through such trading whereby they would
send tradeable items to relatives in America or France. These
relatives will then sell the items among other Hmong there and send
back the money to the people in Laos. This trading along with
remittances from relatives overseas would easily bring several
million kips annually to the Hmong in Laos, particularly those with
access to modern postal services.
There
have also been very enterprising young Hmong who make feature movies
in Hmong or record Hmong singing on video and audio cassettes, send
master copies to America for commercial duplication and sale
distribution around the world by Hmong video and audio production
companies. More than half of the four or five feature films in Hmong
are produced each year in this way, with the remainder being
produced and shot in Thailand or America. The recording
of popular modern Hmong songs - in the style of Lao, Thai, Indian,
Japanese or Chinese songs - has opened up an international market,
contributing much to the spending pattern of Hmong in different
countries. Many young Hmong singers and bands, some based in
Laos, now sell their recordings world-wide. A few have
even developed Hmong rap music, and tour the US to give concerts to
Hmong audiences. In a way, it can be said that the Hmong
have undergone much social and cultural changes through these local
and international contacts or business undertakings.
There are many ways of measuring a group's adaptation to their
socio-economic and political environment, their changing identity
and the constant need to shift and maintain their ethnic boundaries.
Being a minority, the Hmong are well accustomed to adjusting to the
political and economic demands made on them by those in power. A
group's adaptability and social position in society are often judged
by its members' occupations and residential locations. A
preference for rural and remote upland residence is usually seen as
belonging to a community which is backward, traditional and poor, in
contrast to urban, modern living. On this score, the
Hmong of Laos are obviously located among the lowest scale of the
Lao social ladder.
Given
that there are many factors we can examine, I will confine my
discussion to three major areas for the purpose of this paper: (1)
educational achievements and public employment which can bring about
modernisation in outlooks and social mobility; (2)
economic development which may achieve a better standard of living;
and (3) political alignment and adaptation which would allow
participation in national decision-making and social integration.
Education and employment
By all
accounts, there has been a huge growth in educational facilities in
the Lao PDR in the last 20 years, judging from information provided
by Hmong villagers and visitors to Hmong areas. This would
have at least improved the literacy rate of tribal minorities, as
there are now many primary schools of at least up to Grade 3
available in the bigger settlements along major arterial roads. Like
the rest of the population, the older Hmong have not benefited much
from modern education, due to the lack of access to schooling during
their childhood and the remoteness of their villages. Equally,
women may not have gained much from the new education system,
despite government introduction of gender equality as a policy, due
mainly to the Hmong's patrilineal family values which favour sons
over daughters or which tie daughters to household chores rather
than sending them to school.
1995 Population Census on School
Attendance for the Top 8 ethnic groups in Laos:
|
|
Population aged
6+ |
Never
been
(%) |
At school
(%) |
Left school
(%) |
|
Total |
3,700,913 |
37.6 |
25.1 |
37.3 |
|
Lao |
1,966,222 |
23.1 |
30.0 |
46.9 |
|
Phutai |
334,496 |
34.3 |
27.1 |
38.6 |
|
Khmu |
383,067 |
56.4 |
18.6
|
24.9 |
|
Hmong |
246,381 |
67.2 |
18.1 |
14.7
|
|
Leu |
84,280 |
36.0 |
28.4 |
35.4 |
|
Katang |
72,407 |
67.1 |
12.3 |
20.6
|
|
Makong |
43,489 |
75.7 |
9.4
|
14.9
|
|
Kor |
47,313
|
94.3 |
3.1 |
2.4 |
Females
|
Total |
1,881,057 |
47.1 |
21.4 |
31.5 |
|
Lao |
999,957 |
30.3 |
26.6 |
43.1 |
|
Phutai |
171,368 |
43.9 |
23.5 |
32.6 |
|
Khmu |
195,875 |
71.1 |
14.2 |
14.6 |
|
Hmong |
123,834 |
83.7 |
10.7 |
5.6 |
|
Leu |
43,132 |
45.0 |
25.5 |
29.3 |
|
Katang |
37,137 |
81.6 |
8.4 |
10.0 |
|
Makong |
22,227 |
86.7 |
6.1 |
7.3 |
|
Kor
|
23,658 |
98.0 |
1.2 |
0.5 |
Source:
State Planning Committee, Lao Census 1995 Country Report,
1997, p. 34
Figures
from the above table show that the number of Hmong who have never
been to school is nearly twice (67.2%) the national average
(37.6%), and is the third highest after the Makong (75.7%) and the
Kor (94.3%). Only 18.1% of Hmong aged 6 years and over
were attending schools in 1995, and 14.7% had left school, compared
to 25.1% and 37.3% respectively for the whole population. For
Hmong women, the number was even lower: 83.7% never received any
formal education, 10.7% were still at school, and 5.6% had left
school - compared to the national figures of 47.1%, 21.4% and 31.5%.
Again, the Hmong have the third highest number of women without any
schooling, after the Makong (86.7%) and the Kor (98%).
These figures suggest that schooling achievements by the Hmong are
still comparatively low, similar to other remote ethnic
minorities or rural lowland Lao.
According to statistics provided by the Lao PDR National Statistical
Centre, the number of education establishments in Laos has
grown from a total of 4,527 in 1976 to 8,632 in 1996. Of this
total, 7,789 were primary schools, 713 were lower secondary schools
and 130 higher secondary schools. There were only 3
unversities and 12 tertiary techincal or vocational institutes.
In terms of students, the number has grown from 346,300 in 1976 to
930,700 bu 1996 (Commitee for Planning and Co-operation, 1995: 153;
and State Planning Committee, 1997: 109 and 110). Thus,
there has been a huge growth of educational provisions, doubling the
number of educational establishments (4,527 to 8,632) and nearly
tripling the number of students (346,300 to 93,700) from 19976 to
1996. If this is the case, why only 18.1% Hmong
are attending school in 1995, compared to 25.1% for the whole
nation? The literacy rate for Hmong aged 15 years and over
(137 774) is 26.5% (with 45.7% for males and 8.1% for females)
compared to the national figure of 60.2% (with 73.5% for males and
47.9% for females). Like the school attendance rate, litracy
rate appears to be low: 54.3% of Hmong men and 91.9% of Hmong
women are illiterate (State Planning Committee, Lao Census
1995, op.cit. : 41).
It is
obvious that the Lao Government has made great attempts to allocate
educational services to the general population, but still has not
reached all sections the community, especially those in rural and
remote mountain regions. Much of the growth in primary schooling has
taken place across the country up to Grade 3, but secondary and
tertiary education facilities still prevail mainly in urban and
provincial capitals. The majority of Hmong simply do not have the
means to send their children to pursue education in provincial
capitals or the city of Vientiane. Moreover, many parents with
subsistence farming background still see education as a luxury which
has little relevance to their urgent daily needs - the need for
immediate survival and family labour. As one government
official recently stated to me, the Government may build a school
and send a teacher to a remote settlement, but there is little point
when parents will not send their children to learn. This is
all the more true when education is not yet made compulsory in
the Lao PDR.
Despite
these cultural, economic and geographic barriers, many Hmong in Laos
have managed to gain education at various levels, with some even
completing tertiary studies from such countries as France, Germany,
Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, the former USSR,
Poland, China, Vietnam, USA, and Australia.
Currently, there are Hmong public servants on study tour with their
Lao colleagues in China, Thailand, Malaysia and India. It is also
estimated between 20 and 30 Hmong students going to Dong Dok
University and Preparatory College each year.
A
number of Hmong now live in urban centres or towns and occupy
various positions in the Lao public service, or in private
employment with 0non-government organisations and commercial
companies. A cursory counting of the number of Hmong public servants
in Laos shows that currently there are 16 Hmong working as division
heads or deputy heads in 10 public agencies, and 109 other Hmong of
various gradings scattered through 18 government departments.
There are about 50 Hmong doctors, with one working as the deputy
director of Mahosot Hospital. Hmong nurses and teachers across
the country are said to be too numerous to count. In the
various provincial Police and the Ministry of the Interior, 6
officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and 8 majors are Hmong.
The Revolutionary Army has 2 colonels and 7 lieutenant colonels.
Although no Hmong has yet raised to the rank of general in the Lao
PDR, the number of Hmong officers in the new Lao Police and Army is
still significant, given that those who chose to stay with the new
Lao Government are often believed to be small in number or
untrained. Overall, the number of Hmong in government
positions is probably higher today than it was the case under the
former Royalist regime.
Economic change
Lacking
the skills and capital to engage in business or other trades and
being generally adverse to doing paid labour for a living, the
majority of Hmong only have the choice of subsistence farming – with
only a very privileged few able to gain work with the Government.
Without rich and unlimited amount of land, subsistence farming
poses many dilemmas and problems. Although wet rice
farming is the preferred option, not many Hmong have the means to
purchase or to obtain wet rice paddy fields, especially in the
highlands where they traditionally live.
Ovesen (1995: 55) clearly identifies
this preference for wet rice cultivation among the Hmong at Phou
Khao Kouay, Vientiane Province, when they took it upon
themselves to pay for a tractor to level fields and build dykes for
rice terraces. They are said to know the advantages of paddy
fields in term of yields and labour demand, compared to swiddening.
The only drawback for them is the lack of money to hire or buy
sufficient buffaloes to plough and harrow the fields within the time
required. Clearly if land could be found for paddy development and
resettlement, many Hmong would be willing to settle in the lowlands
and to adopt permanent settlements. The Lao PDR Government
issued a decree on land tenure in 1994, but has found it difficult
to put the law into action.
The Lao
PDR Government has a policy of resettling hill tribespeople in
the lowlands in order to bring development to them more easily and
to avoid further forest and environmental destruction. It has not
tried to implement the policy vigorously, due to land tenure
problems in the lowlands and lack of space suitable for large scale
resettlement. A number of Hmong refugee families who returned
from Thailand were resettled in the lowland at Muong Phuong in
Vientane Province, but those Hmong who have always been in Laos have
not been moved from their highland settlements in any significant
scale. In the past five years, there has been much voluntrary
Hmong migration to Luangnamtha from other provinces, as large tracks
of lowland land were opened up for settlement. However, many
of the new migrants had met with disappointment when water shortage
did not allow them to transform the new land into paddy rice
terraces. Many have returned to dry rice farming and
gardening.
The
Lao PDR Government, through the UNDP and USAID, has initiated two
opium replacement projects with the Hmong: one in Vientiane
province (UNDP) and the other in Samneua (USAID). Three years
after it began in 1991, the UNPD project came to a complete
stop when road construction reached the site area in Pha Lavae
and project staff were unfortunately met with bullets instead of
welcome banquets. The Government blamed "Chao Fa bandits" for this
hostile reception, but other people suspected it was the deed of
heroin traffickers and opium lords who did not want to see the
source of their rich trade being tempered with. The Samneua
opium replacement project is said to be still going.
Another
small-scale development project which targeted the Hmong was the
Muong Hom catchment project run by the UNDP which aimed to encourage
better health care and education among the people living in the area
in 1989. After more than 5 years, however, it was found that
teachers were not receiving salaries, and the dispensaries had no
nurses or medicine. A consultant wrote in his draft
evaluation report that about 40 per cent of the target population
had benefited from the project, but when the report was published by
UNDP this figure became 90 per cent (J. Taylor, 1993, personal
communication).
As with
many of these local development projects, the people targeted do not
always benefit from them, but someone else when, for example,
materials and money intended to help rural people ended up in
Vientiane in the form of newly constructed villas used for renting
to foreign workers. For these and many other reasons, life for the
majority of Hmong in the highlands continues to be a gruelling chore
of seasonal farming, hunting and gathering. Their living
standard is now low, but will likely improve once the current
road infrastructures being put in place by the Lao PDR Government
are completed. Already, many Hmong villagers have managed to
build themselves dirt tracks to connect their villages to the main
road if the distance is not too great, thus allowing them to
transport some farm produce to the local markets. Thus, the
Government's road construction program remains the most positive
factor in bringing communication and economic improvement to the
highlanders. In 1976, there were only 11,462 kilometres of
roads of all categories in Laos, but this has increased to 22,321
kms by 1996 (Lao PDR Committee for Planning and Cooperation, 1995:
102; and 1997: 65).
Political
adaptation
As
stated by Stuart-Fox (1997: 79-80), the Pathet Lao revolutionary
movement relied on ethnic minorities for its initial support bases,
because it had "little opportunity to mobilize lowland Lao" which
was firmly controlled by the Royal Lao Government, its opponent.
Thus, the Pathet Lao, from the onset, had developed effective
egalitarian relations with ethnic nationalities, as well as adopting
well-defined policy regarding national identity and unity involving
all ethnic minorities. To inspire support, the movement
capitalised on the mythical exploits of national and tribal leaders
who resisted or led rebellions against domination by foreign powers
such as the Thai, Burmese or French. It also nominated
well-known ethnic leaders, such as Faydang Lobliayao in the case of
the Hmong, to be included as “Heroes of the Revolution”.
For
these reasons, the "thirty-years" Hmong under Faydang’s leadership
fought vigorously alongside other supporters of the Pathet Lao. When
victory came in 1975, the euphora was well justified not only
because peace was finally at hand but also because the promises of
the revolution would be realised in the form of better living
standards, or good positions in the new Government, the army or the
public service. The major stumbling block, however, was that "For
thirty years war had been the priority, but in 1975 the [Lao
People's Revolutionary] Party was faced with the task of governing a
modern state, complete with ministries, departments and technical
requirements... a challenge for the best-organised and most
far-sighted revolutionary movement" (Stuart-Fox, 1997: 171).
Most of
the "thirty-years" Hmong and other minorities did not have the
training and education to enter the public service of a nation
state. Those who were educated or experienced in public
offices were mostly on the Royal Government side, were considered
untrustworthy and had either fled Laos or were taken to "seminars"
in remote regions of the country. When the National
Congress of People's Representatives was formed in December 1975, it
was revealed that despite their thirty years of helping the Pathet
Lao, leaders of minority groups such as Faydang for the Hmong or
Sithon Kommadam for the Khmu were not represented on top level of
the Party's hierarchy. They were, however, given
positions as Vice-President of the interim National Assembly, with
Faydang's younger brother (Nhia Vu) heading the Council of the
Nationalities (the Government's agency which looks after ethnic
minorities at the time).
During
this initial period, those Hmong who completed studies in Communist
Block countries were slotted into positions in the various
Ministries of the new government. For the more
numerous Hmong who served in the Revolutionary Army and the Lao
Patriotic Front, however, peace presents a problem. Since
liberation, many were retired or demoted from service, due to their
lack of formal education. This trend seems to be continuing in
the face of the Government's emphasis on building infra-structure
and modernising the Lao economy, thus giving priority to technical
qualifications and higher studies. After thirty years as
the backbone of the Pathet Lao military, no Hmong has reached the
rank of a General – unlike the Khmu and the Leu. Currently,
there are two Hmong Colonels and 8 Hmong Lieutenant-Colonels in the
Lao PDR Army - with one being a doctor.
The
Hmong leadership appears to accept this adaptation to peace as a
matter of course. Some have continued their involvement in
various roles in the Party and the political system. For
example, after 1975, a few prominent Hmong Party cadres were given
positions as provincial or district committee chiefs or deputy
chiefs in a number of provinces in Northern Laos. Some
of these leaders have now become political players at the national
level. In the most recent round of elections in December 1997, seven
Hmong were elected to the National Assembly, representing the
provinces of Luang Prabang, Sayaboury, Houaphan, Xieng Khouang,
Vientiane and Borikhamsay. One of these Hmong deputies, Mr Saisengly
Tengblialee, was made Minister Assisting the Prime Minister after
the formation of the new Government in February 1998. No
Hmong, however, has been made Minister with a portfolio in the
numerous government reshuffles since 1975 – again unlike the Khmu,
Black Tai or Leu who have representatives in important positions in
the Lao cabinet.
When
compared to the old Royal Lao Government with only 2 Hmong deputies
in the National Assembly, the Lao PDR with its current 7 obviously
has more Hmong representation on the nation's law-making body.
But how representative are they of their Hmong constituents?
These deputies are elected by the people, but they have to be
approved by the Party as is the practice in Laos. The
Government's policy is that elected members of the National
Assembly have to maintain contacts and make regular visits to the
local communities they represent. For the Hmong
deputies, however, this policy is not easy to implement, due to: (1)
the inaccessibility and isolation of most Hmong settlements; and (2)
unsafe and dangerous travels to the highlands. For most
of their term in office, therefore, Hmong deputies seem to spend
time in Vientiane - rarely being heard or seen by their Hmong
people. They appear not only to be isolated from their
own constituents, but also from their lowland Lao counterparts.
Many of the latter have paid good will visits to foreign countries
as part of government delegations, but no Hmong or minority deputies
have had the privilege to see other lands and learn other ideas.
A more detached observer may see this as a sign of token minority
representation at the national level rather than real participation
in government affairs in the more inclusive sense.
Apart from their social and economic
development, the most troublesome issue facing the Hmong in Laos
today is their overall political integration.
Transnationality, the ability to belong to more than one nationality
or ethnic identity, has always been difficult - even back in
China where many fled Chinese domination in search of independence
and cultural survival. Unlike the Khmu and other tribal
minorities who easily adopt Lao names and can pass off as lowland
Lao, the Hmong seem to stand out with their Hmong names, their
lighter physical appearance, their language and their pride in their
own ethnicity, their desire for self-government, and the group image
given to them by other people. Many Hmong, of course, have
been accepted into the folds of the new regime, and have shown full
support for it, even though some are ambivalent about a
transnational identity.
As
I mentioned previously, however, a small number of them have been
adamant that they would not capitulate or give up their fear of the
unknown and their love of independence. This attitude of the "Chao
Fa" Hmong has made life rather difficult for the larger Hmong
population in the country. This resistance has its origin in
the history of the Lao civil war when Hmong were fighting on
different sides of the conflict. Like the Lao Patriotic
Front, some Hmong leaders drew inspirations from the mythical deeds
of messianic heroes - against the French, the Vietminh, the
calamitous power of Nature, or the forces of an unknown enemy.
After the Liberation in 1975, those Hmong on the Royal Lao
Government side who could not escape to Thailand fled to the
protective forests of Phu Bia from where they staged
their armed opposition to the new regime. Their
number soon spread to Phu Nhay south of Luang Prabang and to
Muong Mork near the Xieng Kouang-Vietnam border. In
their early years, these resistance groups, with many thousand
members, worked independently without much contacts or
co-ordination. The Government was able to mount military
operations against these recalcitrant groups on the ground or from
the air - often after dropping leaflets and unsuccessfully trying to
convince them to rally. During the 10 years of
suppression after 1975, more than 10,000 resistance Hmong were
killed or fled to Thailand as refugees.
In
the early 1980’s, support was obtained from refugee groups in
Thailand and other countries. The resistance movement became better
co-ordinated and even had regular radio communication contacts with
supporters in Thailand. However, this support was very ad hoc
and only exposed the resistance groups to greater danger of
discovery. When the Thai and Lao Governments started
negotiations on border security in July 1994, these resistance
support networks were dismantled and their members dispersed
or imprisoned. With the closing of the refugee camps in
Thailand, the resistance groups in Laos have been on their own
since 1993.
To
pacify the resistance Hmong, the Lao Government made
Saisomboun District (formerly known as Muong Cha) into a
Special Zone in 1994. This is the area closest to Phu Bia, the
base of most of the “Chao Fa” groups. The idea is
to make Saisomboun the centre for political and
economic development to attract resistance Hmong into the
folds of the authorities. The Government withdrew its
lowland Lao personnel from the area, and put Gen. Bounchane (a Khmu
who successfully suppressed many “Chao Fa” Hmong in the late
1970’s) as the local military commander, with Col. Lo Lu
Yang as deputy commander and Mr Siatou Yang (formerly the Chao
Muong at Moung Hom) as the unification coordinator. The
Special Zone covers the following districts: Muong Phoun,
Muong Hom, Muong Cha and Long San. The Hmong are now facing
each other trying to build bridge across a political
divide.
There is no doubt that the Government believes it is best to have
the Hmong deal with each other over this long-standing
political thorn. This does not seem, however, to
have assuaged the anger of the so-called Hmong “
bandits”. They continue to ambush army convoys and even
taxis travelling between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, or to and from
Muong Saisomboun. This has escalated since May 1998 into
free-for-all shooting by Hmong government troops against
“Chao Fa” villages, with the resultant armed retaliations on Muong
Saisomboun itself. The Hmong are now killing each other, and
it is said that many Hmong families have fled Saisomboun to
Kilometre 52 , the major Hmong settlement on the road linking
Vientiane to Muong Phon Haung.
In
December 1997, the “Chao Fa” are said to have eradicated all but one
member of a company of government troops near Khang Khai south
of the Plain of Jars. Hmong civilians are also targeted, and
many have died from attacks on villages or ambushes. Visitors
to Laos reported that the “Chao Fao” now claim to occupy the
following areas: (1) Muong Mai, Thasi, Pa Na, Nam Hia,
Na Kong, Phu Makthao, Chomthong and Muong Sa in Borikhamsay
Province; (2) Khang Khai, Tha Papang, Nam Tao Samseng,
Phu Bia, Muong Mork, Phu Nanon and Samthong in Xieng Lhouang
Province; and (3) Phu Kongkhao and Phu Nhay in Luang
Prabang Province. Hmong and other
inhabitants in these places are living in fear.
In
drawing attention to the problems posed by the Hmong resistance in
Laos, I wish to stress that I am not seeking publicity for the
movement, nor acting as any group’s spokesperson. All I
want to do here is to express concern about an issue that has been a
ongoing source of distrust and frustration for the Government and
the cause of death or injuries for many thousands of people,
Hmong and non-Hmong , for more than 20 years. It
is a major drain on government resources when the country needs
everything it has to bring modernisation and prosperity to its
four million people, most of whom are living below the poverty
level. For the Hmong who continue to resist government
control, more than ideological difference seems to be involved.
Also at stake are their group identity, cultural maintenance and
protection against perceived threats to their ethnic autonomy.
Observations by Stuart-Fox (1997: 40) can equally be used to
understand the reasons for Hmong resistance today when he explains
the Hmong and Khmu revolts against French colonialism in Laos
in the 1920's as stemming from:
".... their
opposition to changes introduced through new administrative controls
and increased taxes, which threatened traditional interests,
relationships, life styles and economies. All were reactions to the
disruptions caused by the initial intrusion of French imperialism.
[In these rebellions], strong messianic elements were present.
Resistance took forms sanctioned by traditional world views.
[The rebels] fought for more than independence from both French and
Lao. [They] also sought to maintain a way of life that closed
out the new forces of the modern world. They looked
backwards, in
other words, to discover the shape of the future."
The new Lao PDR Government whose
victory in the Lao civil war was built much on the use of these
anti-French rebellions, has not fully appreciated the causes of the
current disruptive activities of the Hmong in central northern Laos.
It has addressed the problem through military suppression rather
than attempting to allay the fears for changes, the fear for
the unknown, and the need to keep one's self-identity in the face of
overwhelming power and dominance by other groups. This fear
is sometimes reinforced by propaganda fed to them from other
countries, and by official acts which are seen as punitive and
genocidal. Many “Chao Fa” Hmong have rallied to the new
regime over the years, but many leaders who surrendered themselves
have met with imprisonment and even death.
A recent case involved Mr Vang Ku,
one of the resistance leaders in Muong Mork. He was
talked into rallying with his followers in 1997, and the Government
initially built him a villa costing 2 million Kip (about US$100).
It was not long, however, before he was put on trial and was
subsequently imprisoned indefinitely. The same fate
befell former Lt. Col. Bouachong Lee, the liberator of Luang Prabang
in 1975 for the new Government. Dissatisfied with his
demobilisation and fueled by foreign propaganda, he led a failed
rebellion against Government troops in Luang Prabang in 1996
and fled to Thailand. He was arrested on the way near
the Lao-Thai border and was later put in prison – again
indefinitely. The Government, of course, has the
authority to use whatever strategies it sees fit to deal with rebels
and political activists. The question is whether the strategy
used will improve or worsen the situation with the rest of the
resistance movement.
The
Hmong of Laos have seen war for far too long. Too many had
fought for thirty years during the Lao civil war, but some are
still fighting and dying in their own personal battles during
the last twenty years of resistance. Fifty years of
bearing arms and defending oneself is a long time. There is no doubt
that they wish for peace and economic prosperity like all Lao
citizens. Increasing overseas contacts and visits to
other countries to see expatriate relatives have also opened the
eyes of many Hmong to other political and economic systems, other
kinds of life styles and ideas. There are many signs for
optimism, but the hope for harmonious co-existence with other people
within the Lao nation state will only come true if full and
voluntary integration can be achieved.
Conclusion
By and
large, life remains at subsistence level for the Hmong in Laos as
for other inhabitants of the poorest country of Southeast Asia.
This can be seen not only by visits to the field but also by the
frequent requests for money received by relatives overseas and the
large amount of remittances sent by the latter to Laos. During
the past twenty years, land tenure and land redistribution remain an
urgent but highly problematic issue for the Lao PDR Government.
Until this is resolved, the Hmong have to cling to their traditional
highlands and their destructive swidenning farming. The
Government acknowledges this difficulty, but has not yet been able
to find a durable solution to this major issue in the face of other
more urgent national needs.
The most
contentious issue remains political: the dilemma faced by the Lao
PDR Government in dealing with Hmong expatriate leaders intent on
stirring up the Hmong inside Laos, and in addressing the integration
problem posed by the small pockets of Hmong who resist its rule deep
in the jungles of central Northern Laos. The “Chao Fa” Hmong,
despite being few in number, have continued their armed skirmishes,
and are creating problems for the majority of peace-loving Hmong in
the country. Although the nation’s leadership does not admit this,
the resistance movement has made the lowland Lao and the national
leaders deeply distrustful of the general Hmong population, thereby
making it difficult for the latter to gain offices beyond middle
management level in whatever areas of government services. The
Hmong, no matter what nomenclatures we give them, need to be given
the chance to find peace, to stop killing each other and to find
their trustworthy place in the Lao nation.
The
Government may need to consider a new alternative to its current
practice of talking Hmong resistance leaders into rallying with
attractive promises only to put them in prison later.
Thailand provides a good lesson when its “Red Hmong” rebels of the
1960’s finally rallied in 1982: all were processed and given
citizenship, and not one was imprisoned or punished These
Hmong are now loyal and law-abiding Thai subjects. The same could
happen in Laos. Continued disregard, distrust and punishment
will only make the resistance Hmong clinging to their disruptive
tactics and looking for outside assistance, for unfulfilled hopes
and messianic dreams.
References
Committee for Planning and Co-operation, 1975-95:
Basic Statistics about the Socio-economic
Development in the Lao PDR, Vientiane: National
Statistical Centre, 1995.
Ovesen, J. 1995, A Minority
Enters the Nation State: a Case Study of a Hmong Community in
Vientiane Province, Laos,
Department of Anthropology, Uppsala University
Singer
A, and Woodhead, L., 1988, Disappearing World ,
London: Boxtree
State Planning Committee, 1996: Basic Statistics about the
Socio-economic Development in the
Lao PDR, Vientiane: National Statistical Centre,
1997
State Planning Committee, Lao Census 1995: Country Report,
Vientiane: National Statistical Centre, 1997
Stuart-Fox, M., 1997, A History of
Laos,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Warner, R., 1995, Back Fire: the
CIA's Secreat War in
Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam,
New York: Simon and Schuster
Whitaker, J. et al., 1972, Area Handbook of
Laos,
Washington DC: US Government Printing
Service.
Yang Dao, 1972, Les Difficultes du Developpement
Economique et Social des
Populations Hmong du Laos,
These de Doctorat de 3e Cycle, Faculte des Lettres
et des Sciences Humaines, Universite de Paris.
_______________________________________________
Recently
published as “Transnational Adaptation: An Overview of
the Hmong of Laos” in
Hmong/Miao in Asia,
edited by Nicholas Tapp, Jean Michaud, Christian Culas, and Gary Yia
Lee (Chiangmai: Silkworms Bookd, 2004)
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