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Refugees from
Laos: Historical Background and Causes
(By
Gary Yia Lee, PH D)
Original article based
on research on the impact of the Indochina War on Laos conducted in
1971-72, with supplementary field research in refugee camps in
Thailand during 1985. The latter was made possible by an Indochina
Studies grant from the American Social Science Research Council
(NY), which is here gratefully acknowledged. Revised in 1992,
updated 2008.
Contents
1
Introduction
2
Early
history
3
French domination
4
The
Indochina war
5
North Vietnamese and American involvement
6
Deepening civil war
7
American bombing
8
Peace
settlement
9
Communist rule
10
Resistance and refugees
11
Conclusion
12
References
Introduction
The
only land-locked country in South-East Asia, Laos covers an area of
235,800 square kilometres with an estimated population of 3,600,000
before 1975. It has border with China in the North, Vietnam in the
East, Cambodia in the South and Thailand and Burma in the West. As a
country with many neighbours, Laos has often witnessed population
movements across its borders at different stages of its history.
These have usually been in the form of migration by farmers in
search of new lands, or refugees fleeing political persecution from
countries such as China or Vietnam. In Laos itself, internal
migration by farmers and people affected by war or economic
recession has also frequently occurred.
However, at no times had these population movements been so massive,
involving tens of thousands of people, as has been the case of
refugees during the Indochina War which ended with the communist
victory in 1975. Modern warfare, continuous antagonism between
dissenting political groups, fear of reprisals against those on the
losing side of the war and many other factors contributed to make
people seek freedom both within and outside Laos. When peace
negotiations began in 1973 between the Lao warring factions 750,000
of its 3,000,000 population had become displaced by the war. Since
1975, more than 300,000 Lao had sought asylum in Thai refugee camps.
Although 25,000 have been repatriated to Laos, most of these
refugees had been resettled in other countries – with an estimated
200,000 in the USA; 25,000 in France; 5,000 in Canada; 1,600 in
Australia and smaller numbers in Germany, Argentina, New Zealand,
Japan and other countries, while more than 40,000 remained scattered
in different parts of Thailand.
This pattern of population displacement arising from foreign
interference, internal power struggles and animosities between
neighbouring groups has persisted over the centuries in Laos. An
examination of the past may, thus, help us to better understand one
of the tragic consequences of this unyielding power play, the
country's recurrent refugee problem during the last 30 years.
The
Lao are believed to have migrated from South China some time in the
thirteenth century A.D. and established themselves along the Mekong
and Me Nam Rivers where Thailand and Laos stand today. Legend has it
that the first Lao King, Khun Borom, descended from heaven and had
seven sons, each of whom was given a portion of this occupied
territory.
In
1353, Fa Ngum, a Lao prince exiled to the Court of Angkor (Cambodia)
and a convert to Buddhism, returned to Laos with a small army and
fought his way up the Mekong river. He established his court at
Muong Swa on Upper Mekong, which he later named Luang Prabang (city
of the Golden Buddha) after the name of a golden Buddha statue,
Prabang, brought by Fa Ngum from Angkor. In the following years, he
conquered the neighbouring principalities, consolidating them into
the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Million Elephants), with Luang Prabang as
capital and Buddhism the official religion. This kingdom extended
beyond today's Laos to include the western province of Vietnam and
northeast Thailand where Lao place names and Lao-speaking
inhabitants can still be found today.
Fa
Ngum was succeeded in 1373 by his son, Sam Sen Thai, whose reign was
marked by the building of many Buddhist temples and the creation of
a new system of local governments, under which local administrators
were selected by the King or a council of notables, with power being
centralized in an army of 150,000 men supported by a supply corps of
20,000 persons (Dommen, 1964:6). After the death of Sam Sen Thai in
1416, the kingdom became prey to internal dissension and foreign
incursions. Vietnamese troops invaded Lan Xang in 1478 and captured
the capital of Luang Prabang, but were later pushed back. There were
also other incursions from the Burmese and the Thai from the West,
which forced the capital to be moved from Luang Prabang to Vientiane
in order to avoid capture by Burmese troops.
The
first Westerners to arrive in Lan Xang were missionaries and
traders, who saw little prospects for commerce or evangelical work
during the care-free reign of Souligna Vongsa in the mid-seventeenth
century. Souligna Vongsa died in 1694, following which internal
dissension brought about a split of the country into three separate
kingdoms Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champassak. Each of the
kingdoms were intermittently invaded by neighbouring Siam
(Thailand), Burma and Annam (Vietnam). After several years of war,
the kingdom of Vientiane became a tributary state to Siam, and was
annexed by the latter in 1825 following an unsuccessful uprising by
its ruler Chao Anou.
As
a result, tens of thousands of Lao were forced to move from Laos to
settle along the west bank of the Mekong for easier control by the
Thai. Today, there are more Lao-speaking people in north eastern
Thailand than in Laos. In 1832, Annam annexed the principality of
Xieng Khouang in north eastern Laos, and Siam took control of the
Kingdom of Champassak in the South. All that was left of Lan Xang
was Luang Prabang, which was by then paying tribute to Siam but
claimed as a tributary state by Annam.
The
French made their first colonial trust into Indochina in 1862, with
the armed occupation of the western provinces of Cochin China,
today's South Vietnam on the pretext of protecting French
missionaries. They pushed towards Cambodia the following year,
leaving Laos alone until after their conquest of Vietnam and
Cambodia. In 1885, Siam felt threatened by the setting up of French
military outposts along the Annamite Mountains overlooking Laos, and
decided to send troops to occupy the Plain of Jars in central
northern Laos. Thai officials were then dispatched to Luang Prabang
to supervise the Kingdom's affairs, whereupon the French sent a
warning note from Hanoi to Bangkok and asked for joint supervision
of the Luang Prabang Kingdom, claiming that the latter and Xieng
Khouang were originally under the sovereignty of the Court of Hue,
now a French protectorate. Siam agreed for France to post a
vice-consult to Luang Prabang. August Pavie arrived in Luang Prabang
in 1887 and, as Wilfred Burchett (1970: 69) put it, "started the
long process of intrigues and demonstration of force by which France
gradually positioned herself for the complete take-over of Laos."
French rule from 1893 to 1949 saw the split of Laos in two: the
Kingdom of Luang Prabang and the Kingdom of Champassak.
According to a treaty signed by Siam with France on October 1893 all
of Laos east of the Mekong was to be ceded to France while that
along the west bank remained with Siam. Subsequently certain regions
west of the river in the South and on the North were also
transferred to France giving Laos its present shape and size. The
French established the new colony's administrative centre in
Vientiane maintaining Luang Prabang as the royal capital with King
Sisavang Vong on the throne and as the Head of all Laos. The French
controlled all the Lao principalities and kingdoms of Luang Prabang,
Xieng Khouang, Vientiane and Champassak by 1905 thereby giving them
the name of Laos or many Lao. French control also put an end to
incursions from Siam, Annam and Burma.
Internally the French had to cope with revolts among the tribes
sparked by French taxation and interference in tribal affairs. The
Kha rebellion in 1901 took six years to stop and was led by a Kha
chief in the Bolovem Plateau in southern Laos, Kommadam whose
surviving sons later joined the communist Pathet Lao In 1945
(Burchett op.cit.: 70-71). The second insurrection by Tai tribes in
Phong Saly Province took place in 1914 and the Hmong started another
uprising in Sam Neua in 1919 both of which took two years to settle
and cost many lives.
Because Laos was believed to offer little short-term economic gains,
the French did not attempt to introduce economic changes to the
country. They relied on existing systems of local government and
avoided upsetting Lao traditions by manifesting their presence
mainly in fiscal control judicial organization and education. French
became the accepted language in administration and among the middle
and upper classes in Lao society. Most of today's older generation
Lao elite received their education in France. By the late 1930s
about 600 French officials were looking after the welfare of more
than one million natives in Laos (Dommen op.cit.: 12-13).
The
French began losing control over Indochina in 1940 when France fell
to Germany and agreed for Japan to station troops in Indochina in
exchange for the safe return of its resident citizens. This
agreement was ruptured by the Japanese in March 1945 after they
imprisoned French troops and declared an end to French rule in
Indochina. In Laos, the Japanese persuaded King Sisavang Vong and
Prince Phetsarat, Premier and Viceroy to proclaim the independence
of the Kingdom of Luang Prabang on April 1945.
After
the surrender of the Japanese in August, Phetsarat announced the
reunification of Luang Prabang and Champassak into one Laos and
asked Allied Powers to recognize its independence. However a handful
of French officers managed to return to Luang Prabang and requested
the King to dismiss Phetsarat. The former Viceroy then formed a
resistance group with other young Lao nationalists known as Lao
Issara or the Free Lao movement. This group denounced all treaties
with France, deposed the King for his continued submission to French
rule and put up Phetsarat as head of a Provisional Government whose
Defence Minister was Phetsarat's half-brother Prince Souphanouvong.
In October 1945, they further signed a treaty of friendship and
alliance with North Vietnam (NV). However French troops re-occupied
Laos in early 1946 after defeating small armed resistance units
organized by the Lao Issara with NV assistance. Phetsarat and his
followers fled to Bangkok, Thailand where they set up a government
in exile (Adams, 1970: 100-120).
Supported by French, King Sisavang Vong and his son, Crown Prince
Savang Vathana formed a new cabinet known as the Royal Lao
Government (RLG). An agreement was signed in August 1946 merging the
rest of Laos with Luang Prabang under King Sisavang Vong. A
constitution was proclaimed in 1947 to give Laos a parliamentary
system of government with a popularity elected National Assembly. By
July 1949 Laos was given the status of an independent state within
the French Union. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong's
half-brother and 25 other members of the Bangkok government in exile
decided to compromise with the French and returned to Laos to join
the RLG. Phetsarat and Souphanouvong disagreed on this arrangement
and remained in Thailand, preferring complete independence from
France even at the expense of a shift to the left in order to fight
the French with the support of Ho Chi Minh, the NV communist leader.
In
February 1950 France transferred sovereignty to Laos which was by
then also recognized by Great Britain and the United States. Another
treaty with France in 1954 made Laos a fully independent state. By
the end of 1954 all French administrative and military power was
relinquished to the Lao authorities.
In
1950, Souphanouvong left Thailand for northeast Laos where he
established a resistance government under the control of his newly
formed left-wing political organization, the Pathet Lao (PL) or Lao
State. To broaden support for his resistance activities, he formed
alliance with NV and Cambodian liberation groups. With the help of
NV troops and tribal leaders already in opposition to the RLG,
Souphanouvong was able to expand guerrilla activities along the
entire border of Laos and Vietnam, from Phongsaly Province in the
north to the Bolovens Plateau in the south.
In
March 1953, Vietminh forces swept into northern Laos, and occupied
the province capital of Sam Neua, making it henceforth the PL
headquarters. Alarmed by the Vietnamese offensive in the direction
of the Mekong, Thailand tried to call for United Nations
intervention, as happened in South Korea in 1950, but this was not
supported by the United States. President Eisenhower, seeking to
draw Laos into a military alliance, preferred to press France to
give full independence to the country while continuing to assist
financially French military activities against Indochinese
anti-colonial guerrillas.
The
Viet Minh incursion into north and south Laos were stopped by
December 1953. In the spring of 1954, however, General Giap's Viet
Minh troops moved west again, threatening the town of Luang Prabang
and helping the Pathet Lao to enlarge further their liberated zones
in the north-east and other areas along the Mekong in Laos (Devillers,
1970: 41).
The
advance of the Viet Minh and their PL counterparts allowed the
guerrillas to spread propaganda and greatly extend their
territories. This situation was made all the more possible by the
battle of Dien Bien Phu, North Vietnam which called for France to
commit its finest soldiers to defend a position far removed from
Laos. The Viet Minh won this most decisive battle and did not,
therefore, hesitate to continue their military involvement with the
Pathet Lao in north-eastern Laos in order to liberate all of
Indochina from foreign domination.
Following the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, an
international conference to end the First Indochina War was held in
1954 in Geneva, Switzerland, jointly chaired by Great Britain and
the Soviet Union, and attended by the United States, China,
Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos. Among other things,
the Geneva agreements called for an end to hostilities in the
Indochinese states, and gave the RLG sovereignty over the whole of
Laos. The Pathet Lao were, however, allowed temporary control of two
north-eastern provinces, Sam Neua and Phong Saly, to be used for
regrouping its forces, pending its integration with the RLG through
general elections. All foreign troops were to be withdrawn from the
country, except for a small French mission to assist the RLG with
its military training. A permanent International Control Commission
consisting of Indian, Canadian and Polish representatives was
created and charged with supervising the cease-fire and the
neutrality of Laos.
In
1950 when France withdrew its troops from Lao, to defend the Viet
Minh's attacks from North Vietnam, Laos had to form its own army to
counter PL and NV offensives. The Royal Lao Army (RLA) was, thus,
organized under French instructions and with funds supplied to
France mainly by the US. Since 1949 American policy-makers believing
that Chinese communist expansion in Southeast Asia must be stopped,
had been helping the French and Indochinese anti-Communist groups in
their fight against left-wing guerrillas (Foreign Area Studies 1967:
31).
Despite negotiation attempts by the US, French authorities would
only allow direct economic assistance in the form of material grants
to Indochina, assuring American negotiators that the war would be
brought to a successful conclusion if only the United States
furnished France with the wherewithal" (Dommen op.cit.: 35). In
September 1951, the US signed an economic assistance agreement with
the Pro-French RGL headed by Phoui Sananikone, an agreement which
was to remain the basis for American aid to Laos for the years to
come.
The
cost of fighting the independence war against French colonial rule
in Indochina was estimated to be US$ 954 millions most off which
went to help meet the needs of French military requirements towards
the end of the Indochina War. By September 1953, the US was believed
to be paying for fully 70 per cent of the cost of the war, mostly in
the forms of ammunitions, vehicles, naval crafts, planes, and small
arms (Dommen, op.cit.: 46). Two hundred American ground personnel
were also stationed in Indochina to assist the French with the
repair and maintenance of aircraft in January 1954.
Because of this massive support, American leaders were deeply
disturbed when French forces were defeated at their last stand in
Dien Bien Phu. When the Geneva agreements were signed in July 1954,
American military and economic aid worth US$ 25 million was aboard
ships bound for Indochina. At the Geneva Conference, John Foster
Dulles, the American Secretary of State, suspicious oft the
communists not adhering to the agreements, stated that his country
did not consider itself bound by them, thus opening the way for
further American intervention in the region (Dommen, op.cit.: 56).
The
French withdrawal from Indochina after the Geneva cease-fire was
seen to leave it and the rest of Southeast Asia unprotected against
communist invasions. The US, therefore, stepped in by offering
collective security through the formation of the South-East Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 with Britain, France,
Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand as
members. The Treaty, signed in Manila, would guarantee South-East
Asian countries of speedy SEATO and American intervention in the
event of any military threat from China. Despite the fact that Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam were declared neutral by the Geneva agreements,
SEATO nevertheless extended its protection to the three Indochina
states, thereby involving them directly in the cold war between
communist and the Free World superpowers.
Soon after SEATO was formed, the Lao cabinet suffered a severe
crisis, following the assassination of its Defence Minister who was
a strong advocate of the Geneva Accords. The Lao government which
was headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma, another advocate of the
neutrality of Laos, resigned due to "foreign interference" (Thee,
1970: 129). A new cabinet was formed in November 1954 under Katay
Don Sasorith, a SEATO supporter. This was followed by the opening of
the United States Operation Mission in Vientiane on 1 January 1955,
to channel American aid directly into Laos. American advisers were
sent to put in place the necessary arrangement for the US to use its
foreign assistance to expand the size of the RLA into 25,000 men.
These Lao troops would act as the first line of defence against
possible communist incursions long enough to allow intervention by
SEATO members (Cousins and McCoy, 1970: 340).
In
the meantime, the PL were maintaining a tight grip on the two
north-eastern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, expanding its
army with the assistance of NV military and political cadres, who
replaced the Viet Minh soldiers fighting in Laos prior to the Geneva
Conference. The RLG, with encouragement from American advisers, sent
troops into PL zones and frequent military clashes occurred between
the two sides (Langer and Zasloff, 1970: 62). Under these
circumstances, negotiations for national integration between the RLG
and the PL often resulted in dead-lock. The RLG wanted to integrate
PL armed forces into the RLA first, while the Pathet Lao insisted on
military integration only after a political compromise had been
reached.
The
general elections for national consolidation scheduled by the Geneva
agreements for August 1955 took place in December without the
involvement of the PL. The results however showed a strong
neutralist majority and Prince Souvanna Phouma the neutralist leader
resumed office as Prime Minister in Vientiane. He again tried to
negotiate with the PL pledging to work for national unity and
friendly relations with all countries including North Vietnam and
other communist states.
In
July 1956 Laos was formally recognized by the Soviet Union. After
talks between the Royal Lao Government and the newly formed PL
Patriotic Front or Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) in August, Souvanna Phouma
and Souphanouvong decided on a Government of National Union with PL
representatives. This government would adhere to the five principles
of peaceful co-existence, the pursuit of a neutralist foreign
policy, the prohibition of military alliances and the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Laos. By November 1957, Souphanouvong agreed to
transfer the two northern provinces under his control to the Kingdom
of Laos, in return for which he and another Pathet Lao members,
Phoumi Vongvichit, were admitted as cabinet ministers in the RLG.
At
the elections held in May 1958, the Neo Lao Hak Sat and its allies
won 13 of the 21 contested seats in the National Assembly.
Souphanouvong became Minister of Economic Affairs in the new
government. This re-alignment of political power was seen as a
threat to the privileged positions of American-supported politicians
and the new class of wealthy officials and businessmen. They
therefore decided to form a political pressure group, the Committee
for the Defence of National Interest (CDNI) reputed to have the
backing of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Ackland
1970:149). The US in turn stopped all payments to the RLG, a hard
blow to an economy that had come to rely heavily on American aid.
On
July Souvanna Phouma lost a vote of confidence in the National
Assembly and was forced to resign. He was succeeded by Phoui
Sananikone, who formed a new cabinet with the support of CDNI
members. The Pathet Lao were no longer represented in the new
pro-American government. After taking up office, Phoui Sananikone
and his ministers shifted Lao policy to the right dissolved the
National Assembly and denounced the 1954 Geneva truce. Attempts were
also made to disperse and neutralize PL soldiers who had been
integrated into the RLA a few months earlier. However the last PL
battalion which was still awaiting integration managed to escape and
recapture Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces, their former
strongholds.
The
elections of April 1960 resulted in all 59 seats in the National
Assembly going to right-wing candidates. This was followed by the
arrest of Souphanouvong and his deputies but they subsequently
escaped from jail a month later and went back to Sam Neua. Civil war
was thus resumed between the RLG and the PL with the former charging
North Vietnam with aggression against Laos through its military
assistance to PL and the latter denouncing supporters of US
imperialism. Phoui Sananikone resigned under right-wing military
pressure and handed all power to General Phoumi Nosavan, the head of
the RLA.
In
August 1960, a neutralist Lao army captain Kong Le dissatisfied with
this pro-American stance overthrew the Nosavan government and
re-instated Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. Nosavan and his
supporters fled to southern Laos to set up their own government in
Savannakhet under Prince Boun Oum Na Champassak. Backed by U.S. aid,
Nosavan soon launched a military attack on the neutralist government
of Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane, forcing the latter to accept aid
from the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960, Nosavan forces were able
to recapture Vientiane and the right-wing Boun Oum government was
transferred there. Kong Le and his neutralist forces retreated north
and joined forces with the PL, further exacerbating military clashes
between Neutralist-PL forces and Nosavan troops.
In
order to settle the conflict an international conference was again
convened in Geneva, Switzerland in May 196l. After much negotiations
all three parties (leftist, neutralist and rightist) agreed on the
formation of a coalition government with Souvanna Phouma as Prime
Minister. However, troops of the three factions still continued
fighting one another, ignoring the directives of the re-activated
International Control Commission first set up to supervise the 1954
Geneva agreements. Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum and Souphanouvong
undertook a new series of talks in Laos in June 1962 and again
decided to form a coalition government. A Lao delegation with
representatives from all three factions was sent to Geneva in July
1962 to attend another International conference on the cease-fire
and neutralism in Laos. A neutrality declaration was issued and
agreed to by all interested parties, including the US, the Soviet
Union, China and Great Britain.
Despite this new progress towards peace, the idea of a neutralist
coalition government did not work when Laos continued to be the
buffer zone between communist North Vietnam and pro-American
Thailand (Toye, 1968). Right-wing politicians on the RLG side were
not prepared to cooperate with the Neutralist or the Pathet Lao.
Each side maintained its own soldiers in the areas under its
control. Relations between the three groups deteriorated and
military incidents went on the increase.
In
an attempt to reach a compromise in their political differences, the
leaders of the three factions met once more in April 1964 on the
Plain of Jars which had been under Neutralist forces but now
controlled by the PL. The meeting failed to produce the desired
result, and Souvanna Phouma resigned as head of the government but
was asked to take office again a few months later when no other
suitable leader could be found. During August and September, another
meeting was held in Paris, but it also failed to bring about
national unity to Laos. By then, civil war prevailed throughout the
country, with the PL receiving large amount of military aid and
troops from North Vietnam while the anti-communist RLA was given
substantial financial and material assistance from the United
States. The PL and the RLG each now controlled haft of the country
with Neutralist forces occupying small pockets of northern Laos.
Between 1955 and 1963, American support for the Royal Lao Government
had been limited to development grants (totaling US $8 million),
government budget support (US S320 million), and military assistance
(US $152 million). According to Dommen (op.cit.: 104-105), this made
Laos the biggest foreign aid recipient in the world at the time in
terms of number of population (3,000,000). In 1964, this support was
extended to include "unarmed" reconnaissance flight by American
aircraft based in Udom Thani, Thailand, and in South Vietnam,
carried out to see whether NV troops and war materials were sent to
Laos.
As
American bombing raids on Vietcong supply routes increased in early
1965, North Vietnam began using the Ho Chi Minh trail linking North
and South Vietnam through Laos. PL forces sought to extend their
control over the areas along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and in doing so
clashed with RLA troops , American planes were then diverted to bomb
the trail, but the bombing was soon extended to PL controlled areas
in northern Laos, involving strikes at enemy supply routes and troop
concentrations and offering close tactical air support for RLA
troops during ground battles (Branfman, 1970: 231).
This pattern soon formed the normal military engagement in Laos:
government troops would move into an area only after it had been
cleared of enemy forces by American bombing. The result was that
Laos was subject to the most intense aerial bombardment, especially
in the northeast where most of the offensives took place. Large
areas became depopulated and scarred by bomb craters, and many
historical places such the provincial town of Xieng Khouang were for
ever obliterated. Unexploded ammunitions dropped by American planes
and mines planted by soldiers also littered the ground and continue
to kill or maim civilian population even today.
In
February 1965, General Phoumi Nosavan (Commander of the Royal Lao
Army) and General Siho (Head of the Lao National Police) led a coup
against the Souvanna government in Vientiane. They were unsuccessful
and fled to Thailand for political asylum. Again without the
participation of the PL, new elections were held in July and
Souvanna Phouma was returned to head the new government, now
consisting of many anti-communist members.
The
PL, with the backing of NV troops, attacked many RLA positions in
the north and the greatly outnumbered government troops were forced
to retreat. With American support, the Royal Lao Air Force was
reinforced with old American T-28 bombers and used in co-ordinate
ground-air operations against PL and NV forces. The PL announced in
October 1965 that it had decided to call its army the Lao People's
Liberation Army. They resolved to wage "an unflinching struggle
against U.S. imperialism" by launching a series of offensives
against RLG positions in southern Laos (FEER, 1966: 215).
In
September 1966, Souvanna Phouma's government suffered a budget
defeat. The National Assembly was dissolved and new elections were
scheduled for early 1967. The situation became further confused by
Air Force General Thao Ma, who sent 13 of his pilots to bomb army
headquarters in Vientiane after he was dismissed from his post of
commander of the Royal Lao Air Force. Thao Ma fled to Thailand for
political asylum. Late that year, Kong Le, Commander of the
Neutralist forces, also resigned in protest against the integration
of his troops into the rightist Royal Lao Army, and left Laos to
settle in France.
A
new National Assembly was set up, following the new elections of
January 1967. Again, Souvanna Phouma was asked to head the new
government. Insurgent activities intensified in response to
increased American bombing of PL territories, often averaging 100
strikes per day (FEER, 1967: 252). By the end of 1966, U.S.
personnel in Laos were estimated to be more than 200, with 30
reported killed or missing. Many of this personnel were attached to
the CIA and worked under code names as military advisers in civilian
clothes. By August 1967, pilots of the Royal Thai Air Force were
also flying bombing missions to Laos against PL and NV positions
which now included all of Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces, the
Plain of Jars and areas along the Vietnamese border in the south.
Towards the end of January 1968, RLG positions east and north-west
of Luang Prabang, the royal capital, were taken by PL forces. PL
offensives were also directed against the town of Lao Ngam on the
Bolovens Plateau, Saravane and Attopeu provinces. By July,
anti-government forces were estimated at 40,000 NV and 25,000 PL,
compared to the Royal Lao Army of some 50,000 men. Seven battalions
of Thai mercenaries were also reported to be fighting around the
Plain of Jars in support of the Special Forces of about 15,000 local
guerrillas supported by the CIA (FEER, 1969: 213-214).
Following President Johnson's announcement of American bombing halt
over North Vietnam in October 1968, U.S. aircraft switched their
targets to Laos, with between 17,000 to 27,000 sorties a month to
the PL zone (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 49). On
some days, 800 sorties were flown "dropping napalm, phosphorous and
antipersonnel bombs ... on everything, buffaloes, cows, schools,
temples, houses and people (Lewallen, 1971: 40). This increased
bombing only made the PL more determined to counter-attack on the
ground, resulting in many RLG strongholds being lost to them and
traffic cut off between many RLG areas along the Mekong River.
Most of these PL victories were, however, reversed in September by
U.S. bombing and counter-attacks from the Special forces, which
drove communist troops out of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars and
Muong Phone on the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Pathet Lao military
headquarters for southern Laos. Although the North Vietnamese
Ambassador to Laos had talks with the Lao King and the Prime
Minister, further attempts to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the
Lao conflict were dimmed by the escalation of military activities.
In America, the US war efforts in Laos which were so far hidden from
the world, received wide coverage in the media, leading to many
public protests and a US Senate Committee Inquiry in October 1969.
During the first two months of 1970, many of the important positions
captured by the Special Forces a few months earlier were lost again
to the enemy. Pathet Lao leaders then published a plan "for the
political solution to the Lao problem proposing the ending of U.S.
bombing, the withdrawal of pro-American troops from certain regions
of the country and the formation of a provisional coalition
government. In July, Souphanouvong, the PL leader, sent a member of
the NLHS Central Committee, Prince Souk Vongsak, to hold discussion
with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane. An agreement was
then reached for talks to begin officially between representatives
of both parties at the Plain of Jars. By September, however,
procedural difficulties had halted further negotiations for peace.
On
the military front, a new offensive by the Special Forces and the
Royal Lao army recaptured the former neutralist base of Moung Soui
near the Plain of Jars, while persistent U.S. bombing made Laos the
most heavily bombed country in the new Indochina War with more than
300 sorties a day. Early in 1971, a conspiracy in southern Laos to
overthrow the Vientiane government on behalf of rightist exiled
Phoumi Nosavan was discovered, and the conspiracy leader, Colonel
Bounleut Saikosy, fled to Thailand. The following April, the
government foiled another attempted coup by junior Lao military
officers, allegedly said to have the backing of conservative
strongmen in the Thai government.
Incursion by American and South Vietnamese troops into southern Laos
to search for NV arm caches in February 1971 drew only a mild
protest from Souvanna Phouma. The RLA took advantage of the occasion
to proclaim a nation-wide state of emergency. The North Vietnamese
retaliated by attacking Long Cheng which served as the base of CIA
Special Forces under General Vang Pao, the commander of the RLA
Second Military Region. In March, NV troops seized Attapeu in the
south of Laos, and also harassed Luang Prabang with rockets. By
mid-May, NV soldiers had overrun almost the entire southern Laos.
The
RLG counter attacked with Vang Pao's Special Forces against the
Plain of Jars in the north, and with Lao-Thai troops against the
Bolovens plateau in the south, driving most of the enemy from these
areas by September. With PL territories largely depopulated,
American bombing decreased to about haft of the previous year,
although an average of 300 sorties a day was still carried out
intermittently from Thailand throughout 1971. In August, the
American State Department announced that the United States
considered itself "entitled to withhold complete compliance" from
the 1962 Geneva agreements because of massive NV violations with
close to 60,000 troops engaged in active combats in Laos. It also
acknowledged the presence of Thai armed forces in the country but
did not mention that they were financed by the Central Intelligence
Agency (FEER, 1972: 226-227).
Peace negotiations were resumed during the summer of 1972. On the
military front, it was a bad year for the RLG: the enemy took more
of the initiative, their offensives lasted longer and that fighting
was more intense (Zasloff, 1973: 60).
NV
troops again forced the Special Forces off the Plain of Jars, after
continued fighting throughout most of the dry season. The Vietnamese
also seized more than 100 kilometres of highway territory between
Luang Prabang and Vientiane. In the south, most of the provinces of
Attapeu, Saravane, and Sedone were lost to the communists. Although
both sides suffered heavy casualties, the PL and their NV allies had
taken more territory than ever before from the RLG. There were also
renewed flows of refugees, mostly in the direction of RLG areas,
with many of them forcibly evacuated to prevent their control by the
PL. The military situation did not improved until the end of
October, the date set for the beginning of the Vietnam cease-fire
agreed to by Dr Kissinger and Le Duc To in their negotiation talks
in Paris. Laos also witnessed a significant political change in 1972
after the January elections brought 41 new members to the National
Assembly of 59, drawn mainly from lower socio-economic groups.
Voters seemed to prefer new candidates unconnected with those
responsible for prolonging the war: an indication of the general
dissatisfaction with a self-concerned antiquated leadership of the
past prevalent in the educated and politically entrenched upper
classes (Zasloft, 1973: 67).
Despite efforts by right-wingers on at least two occasions to topple
Souvanna Phouma, he was retained as Prime Minister. The United
States, the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, France and Britain
made known their preference for the government of Souvanna Phouma as
the only "neutralist" force capable of bringing peace to Laos. This
neutralist appearance notwithstanding, the RLG continued to survive
on foreign aid, particularly from the US which was spending about
ten times the Lao national budget on military and economic
activities in Laos (Zasloff, 1973: 69).
As
North Vietnam and the United States were moving towards
accommodation in South Vietnam, negotiations for peace in Laos were
resumed in Vientiane on 17 October 1972 with ten representatives on
each side. Despite many break-downs, the delegates were able to work
out a cease-fire (Brooke, 1973: 49-53). This was to be effective
from mid-night 21 February 1973, following which all American
bombing and foreign military activities were to stop. However, as in
South Vietnam, the cease-fire was not observed. Military clashes
continued to occur as a result of post-ceasefire offensives by the
PL, necessitating calls for American air strikes in retaliation from
Thailand.
The
US was, by now tired of the war in Indochina and threatened to
reduce aid to the RLG if peace could not be settled quickly with the
PL. The RLG was forced to make many concessions to its enemy without
reciprocal gains. These concessions included "giving the Pathet Lao
equal power in a new coalition government; allowing foreign troops
to remain on Laotian soil for 90 days after the ceasefire; referring
to American and Thai presence in Laos while not specifically
mentioning the North Vietnamese; and agreeing to the neutralisation
of both the administrative and royal capitals" (New Leader. 1973:
12).
The
war also imposed heavy social and economic burden on the RLG and the
US which had to resettle and support 370,000 refugees displaced by
military activities in various parts of the country. The Hmong which
formed the backbone of the RLG defence in northern Laos, suffered
the most casualties. Although numbering about 300,000 at the time,
they made up 32% of this total refugee population, and 70% of the
155,000 displaced persons in Xieng Khouang province. More than
12,000 are said to have died fighting against the PL from 1962 to
1975 (Hamilton-Merritt, 1980: 36). This heavy toll was partly the
result of military conscription by the RLA in its efforts to
maintain military strength against PL and NV troops, and partly
voluntary enlistment because the war made it impossible to carry out
farming or to find other means of livelihood. Civilian casualties
and loss of lives were also high due to sickness, malnutrition and
military attacks on villages or refugee camps.
After the signing of the ceasefire, speculations circulated about a
possible coup by right-wing military men, many of whom were
dissatisfied with the RLG's handling of peace negotiations with the
communists. This coup did occur as predicted on 20 August 1973 when
exiled former General Thao Ma and Colonel Bounleut Saykosi returned
from Thailand and tried to overthrow Souvanna Phouma. However, RLG
troops who were expecting this turn of events, managed to arrest and
execute Thao Ma together with many of his 60 collaborators. Again,
the RLG was disturbed to learn that Thailand, fearing a communist
take-over of Laos, had been behind Thao Ma's move.
A
Government of National Union was to be set up 30 days after the
cease-fire, but disagreement on portfolio allocations between the
two sides delayed this until 14 September, when both finally signed
an agreement on a coalition government with 5 portfolios allocated
to the RLG, 5 to the PL and 2 to independent candidates. The
Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) was eventually
formed in early 1974, along with a National Political Consultative
Council (NPCC) to assist in the immediate political integration of
the country.
Despite this arrangement, it proved difficult to implement the
agreements. The National Assembly, the RLG Parliament in Vientiane,
had no left-wing representatives and was not recognised as a
legitimate body by the PL. In special circumstances, the King could
dissolve the National Assembly, but in such cases new elections must
be held within 90 days. However, it was not possible to do this with
such short notice when most of the 750,000 persons displaced by the
war continued to remain in RLG areas. Repatriation was slowed down
by procedural disagreements between the two sides. The PL insisted
that these internal refugees should be returned home permanently
while the RLG wanted them to have the freedom to choose whether to
be repatriated or to stay where they were (Brown and Zasloff, 1975:
179).
While this issue remained, members of the right-wing National
Assembly took to the streets to protest against the continued
presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos when Thai and American
military personnel had withdrawn according to the 1973 cease-fire
agreements. This public action prompted the PGNU Prime Minister,
Souvanna Phouma, to dismiss the National Assembly in July 1974, thus
further eroding the political strength of the right-wing faction. At
the end of 1974, the Special Forces were disbanded or merged with
RLA forces. At the same time, mass student protests by left-wing
political groups swept across the country against members of the old
RLG.
In
March 1975, armed clashes broke out between PL soldiers and Vang
Pao's RLA troops guarding the cease-fire line between Vientiane and
Luang Prabang, when PL units tried to advance towards Vientiane In
violation of the 1973 agreements which prohibited military
activities by the parties involved in the conflict. Vang Pao,
however, was told to retreat by the Prime Minister who preferred to
accommodate to the PL. Knowing that American military aid had been
stopped and that no further retreat was possible, Vang Pao resigned
his commission. On 14 May 1975, he left for Thailand where a few
days previously five members of the PGNU cabinet on the RLG side had
sought refuge, after their dismissal by Souvanna Phouma. They were
soon joined by two other key RLA generals, Kouprasit Abhay and
Thonglith Chokbengboun.
After the escape from Laos of Sisouk Na Champassak, the right-wing
Defence Minister, his post was assumed by the PL Deputy Minister,
General Kham Ouane Boupha. Kham Ouane gradually dissolved the mixed
RLA and PL police guarding Luang Prabang and Vientiane, slowly
opening the way for PL troops to enter areas under the Vientiane
side. RLA soldiers were disarmed, and new administrative committees
"elected" to replace the old system of village headmen, district
chiefs and provincial governors. Even before the PL take-over was
complete, indoctrination or "re-education" sessions were conducted
for public servants of all levels and for civilians who had not
traditionally been under the communists. These compulsory "seminars"
and the arbitrary arrests of influential people soon caused
thousands of refugees to flee to Thailand. Many refugees belonged to
the business community and minority groups, but the majority
consisted of RLG senior public servants, army personnel and their
families.
Although many Hmong soldiers had discarded their weapons, a few
still held on to their positions awaiting more instructions from the
new government. In May 1975, Colonel Kham Ai who was the PL
commander assigned to the Second Military Region arrived in Long
Cheng, Vang Pao's former headquarters. A fortnight later, he called
all former right-wing military officers to an assembly and disarmed
them because they "no longer had any war to fight and must now
participate fully in national reconstruction activities" (Yang Dao,
1978: 1213). In June, they were taken to "re-education" centres in
the Plain of Jars and later to Nong Het and Sam Neua where hard
labour was the order of the day. Anyone above the rank of lieutenant
was considered a major war criminal. They were told that their
"seminar" could last 30 days or 30 years, depending on the severity
of their crimes. Not only were military officers despatched to
"seminars", but also high ranking public servants and well-known
community leaders on the RLG side.
On
2 December 1975, the People's National Congress, formed by the
Pathet Lao a few months previously, decided to replace the PGNU and
the NPCC with a new Council of Ministers and a People's Supreme
Assembly. King Savang Vathana was forced to abdicate and the
monarchy abolished. With the advent of the People's Democratic
Republic of Laos, the Government now consisted of 12 ministries, one
Committee of Planning, one Committee of the Nationalities, a
National Bank and the Prime Minister's Office with four Ministers in
charge.
To
the surprise of most people, the post of Prime Minister went to
Kaysone Phomvihanh who was until then unknown outside the PL central
committee. He was allegedly put in power by North Vietnam because he
was half-Vietnamese and was thus more trustworthy, although he has
proved to be most able and charismatic in his own right.
Souphanouvong was made President, a nominal position which carries
little decision-making power.
Fearing retributions from the new regime after the PL control of
Laos, many former RLA Hmong soldiers and civilians who could not
flee to Thailand went into hiding with their families in
inaccessible mountain areas. They were joined by others who were
released or who escaped from "seminar" centres. From their jungle
hide-outs, small groups of these men first ambushed PL trucks
travelling between Vang Vieng and Vientiane in early 1976, but soon
included PL troops in their attacks. They repeatedly used arms and
ammunitions left hidden by Vang Pao’s supporters in Phu Bia or
collected from their dead victims.
Although American diplomats in Laos disclaimed any involvement with
these tribal dissidents, reports about their skirmishes filtered
through to the outside world throughout 1976. Armed resistance was
also reported in Sayaboury where refugees in Thailand were said to
return to Laos and carry out their separate campaign against PL and
Vietnamese soldiers (FEER, 13l2176: 32). Initial casualties on the
Government side were believed to include two Soviet helicopters and
crew, in addition to "serious losses" suffered by village militia
and local military personnel (FEER, 10/9/76: 13).
The
Government decided to send troops to the hills to crush this
resistance When they proved ineffective, four regiments of NV
soldiers were brought in from other parts of Laos. Many Hmong
settlements were burned to the ground, sometimes accompanied by mass
execution of their inhabitants. Aerial bombing was carried out along
with heavy artillery lifted to the highlands by helicopters.
Poisonous chemicals were alleged to have been dropped on civilians
hiding in the jungles and defoliants were sprayed on their crops.
Those who surrendered themselves to the authorities were taken to
"resettlement villages" in the lowlands where their leaders were
selected for "seminars", imprisonment or executions, depending on
the decisions of the military.
This pattern of resistance and government counter-attacks persists
even today, and was one the major causes of the refugee movement to
Thailand until the late 1980’s. The resistance has been further
fuelled by political groups formed by Lao refugees who have
resettled in the West, among which was the United Front for the
Liberation of Laos under Vang Pao's leadership. Border Thai
intelligence officers had also played an ongoing role in this
resistance by supplying small groups of refugees with arms and
sending them back to Laos to gather military information, thereby
putting into jeopardy the lives of villagers who come into contact
with these teams. The only recourse for such villagers is to escape
to Thailand with their families in order to avoid persecution by PL
officials.
Official estimates put the number of Hmong dissidents killed in the
military operations of 1977 at 1,300 and "thousands" captured in
"heavy fighting" (Asia Week, 16/12/79: 16). On his part, Vang Pao
alleged that 50,000 Hmong died from PL chemical poisoning between
1975 and 1978, while another 45,000 perished "form starvation and
diseases or were shot trying to escape to Thailand'' (Hamilton
Merritt, op.cit.: 37). Whatever the number of casualties, there is
no doubt that the campaign against Hmong and other dissidents had
significantly increased the number of people crossing to Thailand.
One group of 2,500 Hmong, for instance, arrived in Nong Khai refugee
camp in December 1977 (Asia Week, 10/3/78: 38). This was the biggest
single escape party which was said to number more than 8,000 members
when it first set out from Phu Bia, but a number of them changed
their mind and return to their jungle hide-outs while many others
were captured, died from exhaustion, shot by PL troops along the
escape route, or drowned trying to swim across the Mekong river.
Since 1980, some of these refugees have included people who had
traditionally aligned with the PL and many families which had been
living in the 'new liberated zone'. From the first group of 25,000
Hmong reaching Thailand in May 1975, the number had steadily
increased to 60,000 towards the end of 1979 when close to 3,000
persons crossed the Mekong a month. It is estimated that by 1990,
more than 90,000 Hmong refugees have gone to live in the United
States; 6,000 in France; and 3,000 in Canada, Australia, Argentina
and French Guyana. Another 60,000 lowland Lao have also been
resettled in the West, mostly in the United States (35,000); France
(16,000); Canada (4,000), an Australia (8,600). About 3,000 had
voluntarily been repatriated to Laos under UNHCR auspice, but some
are known to have escaped to Thailand again.
The
total number of Hmong refugees in Thai camps in March 1980 was
48,937 persons with 998 new arrivals during that month. Despite
departures for resettlement in other countries, there were still
46,218 Hmong registered for support by the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees in five camps in Northern Thailand in
February 1981 (UNHCR Monthly Statistics, March 1980 and February
1981). About 75,000 Lao refugees were known to be in Thailand in
1987, the largest group of Indochinese refugees under UNHCR
protection. Of this number, 54,095 were hill tribe people, mostly
Hmong being held at Ban Vinai and Chiang Kham camps (Feith, 1988
32). At the end of 1990, there were still 22, 000 lowland Lao
refugees in Ban Napho camp; 40,000 Hmong at Ban Vinai (including
10,000 unregistered new arrivals); 22,000 in Chiang Khan and another
5,000 awaiting to go to third countries in Phanat Nikhom camp.
Although the number of arrivals diminished during the next few
years, the reasons for refugees continuing to leave Laos until the
closing of all the refugee camps in Thailand in 1999 remained much
the same since 1975: persecution against former RLG officials,
military offensives directed at resistance groups, heavy rice tax,
military and labour conscription, extreme economic deprivation, and
arbitrary arrests of people suspected political crimes or
disloyalty. Many of the right-wing politicians, army officer and
public servants taken to "seminar" centres have been released, with
some subsequently escaping to join their families in Thailand and
the West. Other internees, including the former King and Queen and
the Crown Prince, are known to have died from hard labour and the
harsh conditions of the re-education camps, and about 200 still
remain in detention.
In June 1999, the
Thai English language newspaper, the Nation, stated that
there were 1,346 Lao in the only remaining camp at Ban Napho, with
1,166 of them classified as non-refugees (Patiyasevi, 1999). With
large numbers resettled in countries such as the USA (400,000),
France (60,000), Canada (20,000), Australia (12,000) and Argentina
(1,200) as well as many repatriated to Laos, only 48 refugees from
Laos were reported to be in Thailand by 2003, with 34 of them in Ban
Napho camp, northeast Thailand
(http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/03/country_reports/EA2JapanToVietnam.pdf).
This does not include many thousands of ethnic Lao refugees who have
merged with their relatives living along the Thai side of the Mekong
river, and more than 30,000 Hmong refugees who left the former UNHCR
camps and “blended” with Thai Hmong villagers in Chiangrai and Tak
provinces, including 16,000 who were living at Tham Krabork Buddhist
temple in Saraburi province under the protection of its abbot. Under
pressure from Lao authorities which accused them of armed liberation
activities in Laos, the Tham Krabork Hmong were resettled in the USA
(15,300) and Australia (77) by September 2007 (http://www.news-star.com/stories/052705/new_20050527012.shtml).
Since the Pathet Lao’s control of Laos in 1975, refugees continued
to flow to Thailand, especially the hilltribes, until well into the
mid-1980s. This is despite many deterrents put in place by the Thai
government such as keeping refugees in closed camps with no access
to resettlement in other countries in order to prevent further flows
from Laos; the tightening of the definition of the term "refugee"
and classifying most Lao as "economic" rather than political
refugees; and forcing people back to Laos after they have crossed
into Thailand. Since 1987, there has been a relaxation in the Lao
government's policy with family businesses and commercial
enterprises being allowed to flourish, more freedom of movements in
and out of the country, and more tourism and trade with Thailand.
This new policy, however, has been affected by the recent political
change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which used to be the
major aid donors and ideological supporters of the Pathet Lao.
During the second half of 1990, the Lao government decided to return
to a stricter rule with many arrests of senior officials suspected
of "liberal" thinking, and a tighter control of population movements
due to increased insurgency activities by resistance groups across
the country. In October 1990, large numbers of refugees still
emerged in Ban Vinai camp looking for UNHCR protection because of
heavy fighting in Xieng Khouang and Vang Vieng provinces in northern
Laos. Since 1992 when Laos signed a border security with Thailand,
the two countries had held a number of high-level meetings to
discuss the repatriation of refugees from Laos, as well as the
closing of all refugee camps in Thailand to prevent them being used
as staging posts to launch armed attacks by refugee political groups
on their old homeland. Today, these insurgent activities have
stopped. With the final closure of Wat Tham Krabork refugee camp in
August 2007, there were officially no longer any refugees from Laos
being given refuge in Thailand.
However, this proves so far not to be the case. As soon as
interviews were undertaken with the Wat Tham Krabork refugees for
resettlement in the USA in 2005, new groups of Hmong escaped from
Laos to seek asylum from alleged political persecution by the Lao
government. Seeing no end to this exodus, the Thai authorities have
refused permission to the UNHCR and willing third countries to have
access to the new arrivals, preferring to repatriate them to Laos as
the only way to stem the flow, now that the two countries seem to be
at peace with each other. Only charity organizations have permission
to visit these refugees. Regardless of this harsh stand by the
Thai, Hmong asylum seekers continued to come to Huei Nam Khao (White
Water) in Phetchaboon, Thailand. By 2008, more than 7,600 of them
are given temporary shelter there, although many are seen as
economic rather than political refugees. This is not to deny that
some of these Hmong have claim to UNHCR protection as genuine
refugees. Given this situation, no one knows what will happen to
them. What is certain is that as long as Lao leaders do not learn
to accept political dissent but only use armed intervention and
arbitrary arrests as solutions to political differences, Lao
refugees will be generated and require international assistance.
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