Penpoint, Sept. 1996, Vol. 7, No. 8


Follow-Up
Response to Michael Martin"

By Michael Butler


EDITOR'S NOTE: Some thoughtful questions have been raised in response to Mr. Butler's article in last month's Penpoint critiquing Dr. Michael Martin's "Transcendental Argument for the Non- Existence of God" (TANG). In this issue some of the questins raised are addressed. Mr. Butler begins his discussion with a few further comments about the nature of transcendental arguments.

Let me try to further clarify what we mean by a transcendental argument. A transcendental argument (TA hereafter) is one which attempts to prove what the necessary precondition is for something to be the case. It takes the general form:

For X to be the case, Y would have to be the case, because Y is a precondition of X. X is the case. So, Y is the case.

Let me illustrate this with a pedestrian example. Take the statement. "For Jones to have a prize winning rose garden, there has to be water in his soil and carbon dioxide in the air surrounding the roses." Assuming that Jones indeed has a prize winning rose garden, we can conclude that there is water in his soil and carbon dioxide surrounding his garden. Water and carbon dioxide are preconditions for rose bushes. [NOTE: Though this is really not a TA, since the scope is so narrow, its form is roughly the same as that of legitimate TAs.]

When we turn to larger matters, we can ask what the necessary preconditions of our everyday experience are. In our experience we, among other things, use principles of logic, make moral decisions, and attempt to understand the world around us by means of science. This is the X of the example above. We then ask, what would need to be the case in order for X to come about? That is, what worldview(s) can account for such experience. Notice we are not asking, what worldviews assume such experiences, but rather what worldview(s) can make sense of these experiences (logic, science and morality, etc.).

At this point we must take note of the different worldviews. Since there is only a finite number of worldviews with different metaphysics (egs.. monisim, dualism, Christian theism, pantheism) and different epistemologies (egs. empiricism., rationalism, pragmatism. intutionalism. supernatural revelation) we can test them all and find out which ones give the necessary preconditions of our experience.

We do this by internally critiquing each one. For example, does naturalistic empiricism account for morality? Can this worldview make sense of ethical norms? If it cannot, then a person espousing this worldview will make use of ethical norms only by borrowing from another worldview that does. Thus he is inconsistent. He asserts his worldview to be true, but belies this by making use of principles (in this case moral ones) that do not comport with it. To be consistent he would have to give up on ethics or change his worldview.

The "Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God" (TAG), as formulated by Dr. Van Til, Dr. Bahnsen and others, says that only the Christian worldview can account for human experience. To demonstrate this, TAG internally critiques other worldviews and shows them to be inconsistent and thereby unable to give the necessary preconditions for human experience. It then shows that human experience is possible on the Christian worldview and this, in turn, proves that it is the only worldview that can account for human experience.

Note also that since the Christian worldview claims that it is the only true worldview (the only worldview that can account for human experience) it follows that if it can account for human experience then it is the only worldview that accounts for human experience. We might note in passing that Dr. Martin's TANG is really not a transcendental argument at all, but merely an internal critique of the Christian worldview-and a completely abortive one at that.

Q: If one grants for the sake of the argument that the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience how does that show that other worldviews cannot do the same? There is no logical contradiction in asserting that multiple worldviews could provide the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience.

A: That is true. Because one worldview can provide the necessary preconditions of human experience does not mean it is the only one that can. Other things must be said in order to demonstrate its exclusivity. But as I wrote above, there are only a finite number of possible worldviews and if they are all refuted, while at the same time the Christian worldview is proven to give an account of experience, it follows that it is the only worldview that can do so.

One may object by observing that there are better and worse forms of, say, the materialistic worldview. How do we know that if one variation is refuted, the whole materialistic worldview is refuted? Could not the Christian simply create a strawman version of materialism and refute it? To do so would not only be fallacious, but also deceptive.

This is not what TAG does, however. Rather, it takes the materialist's contention that matter can account for ethics, the mind, etc. and shows that, in principle, regardless of how sophisticated the materialistic worldview is, it cannot make sense of such things. The Christian theist seeks to refute materialism per se, not simply this or that particular version of materialism. This does not mean, however, that there is no need to refute specific versions of materialism one by one. Intellectual honesty requires us to do so. For example, if I were to debate W. V. Quine on the existence of God, I would examine his behavioristic-semantical version of materialism and not simply investigate materialism in general.

One may further object that there may be possible worldviews that have not been discovered or invented. In answer we note that unknown but possible worldviews are not helpful to our non-Christian opponents. It is an act of desperation for non-Christians to say, "Although our worldviews have been refuted, there could possibly be one out there that holds water." To use Dr. Bahnsen's example, this would be like me saying that I can possibly beat Michael Jordan in basketball one-on-one and yet refuse to take the court when he tells me to put my money were my mouth is. Would anybody take my challenge seriously?

TAG does not need to refute all possible worldviews directly. It merely has to refute the possibility of there being another worldview that can account for human experience. TAG refutes the negation of Christianity. We contend that no worldview that denies the fundamental tenants of Christian theology (e.g., the Trinity, God's sovereignty, providence, creation, revelation. etc.) can make sense out of experience. Since all other worldviews (actual or possible) are negations of Christianity it follows that they are false.

Q: If we grant for the sake of argument that science does not comport with atheism, it appears that Butler has only demonstrated that science would be impossible without a theistic worldview. Has he shown that only Christianity can justify science-that all other theistic worldviews (Islam, Hinduism, Scientology, Mormonism, etc.) cannot justify science?

A: Since Hinduism and Scientology are not theistic (nor is Mormonism for that matter, but I do not wish to defend this assertion here) they can be dismissed out of hand. As for theistic religions such as Islam and Judaism, it can be readily shown that these cannot account for science since there are internal contradictions within these worldviews.

In Islam, Muslims teach that Allah is absolutely transcendent and unknowable to human minds. However, the Koran repeatedly speaks of Allah. But if Allah is truly unknowable then how could it say anything about him? Indeed how can it refer to Allah as "him" rather than "it?" If Islam were consistent it would say nothing about Allah. But if it had nothing to say about Allah, it would be an entirely vacuous religion.

There are other problems with Islam. For example, the Koran teaches that Jesus is a prophet. According to Islamic theology, prophets cannot lie. The problem with this is that a contradiction is generated from these two propositions. Jesus claimed to be the Son of God while the Koran declares that nobody is begotten of God. Thus if Jesus is the Son of God then the Koran is in error since it said there is nobody begotten of God. And if Jesus is not the Son of God the Koran is still in error since it called Jesus a prophet.

More can be said of Islam (and Judaism), but this is sufficient to make my point. Only Christian theism can account for science (or logic, or ethics) since only Christian theism is internally consistent.


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