We have previously discussed the question of whether we always choose to do what will make us happiest, when we are presented with alternatives. Now I want to look at things from the point of view of the whole country - not just the individual person. If we are presented with several alternatives, what if we look for the one which will lead to the greatest overall happiness in the country? This time we don't need to confine ourselves to legal options. Why not?
Owen: Because a country can change its laws if it wants to.
Right. If a country recognises that its people will be happier if the laws are changed, this is a powerful reason to change them. How do we decide what is fair? Would you go as far as to state that a country's laws ought to be such that, overall, the happiness of the people in the country is maximised?
Owen: No. Sometimes it's necessary to make sacrifices in order to do what is right.
What do you mean by "right"?
Owen: Eg paying tax to look after the poor.
But isn't this only "right" because a majority of people are happier when they know provision is made for the poor etc?
Owen: No. What if most of the people have no principles? Then they won't worry about the poor. They should though.
I take your point. That has been much debated. Bentham tried to cover this difficulty by including in his assessment of overall disadvantage the "pains" resulting from awareness of the misfortune suffered by others. He called these the "pains of benevolence". But he didn't consider the situation where people are not inclined to feel "pains of benevolence".
Bentham refused to accept that the sum total of the "pains of benevolence" felt by a community might be insufficient to result in appropriate treatment of some individuals (as judged by some standard other than utilitarianism). He recognised no "other" standard. In his implicit acceptance of overall community standards, whatever they may be, he adopted a position very like that of modern cultural relativists. In the twentieth century, cultural relativism has become fashionable among anthropologists - presumably as a reaction to the paternalistic attitudes of earlier centuries, with their zeal for "converting" communities in Africa, America and Asia to European beliefs and customs. [See Edgerton.]
Do you see any other difficulties with the strict utilitarian philosophy?
Owen: Yes. How do you assess overall happiness? You would somehow have to measure the "total good" resulting from a particular proposal, and balance it against the "total harm".
This is a serious difficulty, particularly if the assessment has to be done in advance, in order to decide whether or not to go ahead with a proposed project or a proposed change in the law. Of course you could say that there is twice as much good in two people receiving a benefit as there is in one person receiving the same benefit (say, one week's supply of food). But what about the relative value of:
Option (b), which gives 20 unemployed people a job but requires closing a kindergarten?
Owen: Neither of those is clearly better than the other.
No. And this example, incidentally, shows that the oft-quoted principle "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers" is unhelpful. This was first enunciated by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746).
["Priestley was the first (unless it was Beccaria) who taught my lips to pronounce this sacred truth:- That the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation." See extracts from Bentham's Commonplace Book in Works, vol X, page 142. C Beccaria's introduction to his Essay on Crimes and Punishments, written in 1764, refers to "la massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero".]
Bentham later used a very similar phrase ["That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers." See Hutcheson, section 3.] although his exposition of the principle of utility does not rely upon it.