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Was the American Civil War inevitable or could it have been avoided? SYNOPSIS This essay considers the question; was the American Civil War avoidable or inevitable. It shows that there was a fundamental gulf between the North and the South that could not be bridged. This led to a sense of alienation between the two sides, which underscored all dealings between them. The growing hard-line stance of both sides, combined with an increasing irrationality of decision making, made avoiding war that much more difficult. Only through Lincoln moderating his House Divided strategy was compromise even slightly possible. After secession, the inability of both sides to take no further actions likely to provoke the other, seriously undermined the avoidance of war. If both sides had waited for the political temperature to cool, the situation could have ended peacefully. Yet, as this essay will show, the war was unavoidable as neither side could, or would, act in a responsible, and democratic way. This essay considers the question of whether the American Civil War was inevitable, or whether it could have been avoided. It will analyse three aspects of this question; whether the sectional and social differences of the Northern and Southern states were too large an obstacle, making understanding each other, and therefore the creation of a compromise, all but impossible; the increasingly hard-line stance of the North and South, and whether this led to their decisions being based on rationality or paranoia; and finally whether the war could have been avoided by the simple case of both sides taking no further actions after the secession. This essay will conclude with the assertion that the war was indeed inevitable, due to a combination of hard-line self interest; militant, paranoid, and irrational decision making; and an inability to truly understand the needs, fears and driving forces of the other side. Underlying all the decisions and actions leading up to the war is the fact that there were fundamental social and perception differences between the Northern and Southern states. The South saw the North's growing movement against slavery as a direct attack on Southern society. Slavery, more than any other economic or social factor in the South, determined the social hierarchy of Southern society. Slave-owning created an aristocratic style upper class; abolition of slavery would have swept this class away, and it was this class which held much of the political power of the South. Thus, as Brock shows, " . . . for the Southerner abolition was no mere attack upon Southern manners but aimed at the subversion of society.1 To the extent that many Southerners believed " . . . that an overthrow of Southern society was the real object of Northern policy".2 This perception by the South, naturally led to there being a sense of distinct difference and disdain between the Southern and Northern states; at least in the minds of the Southerners. One reason for this is the geographic separation between the South and North.3 The distances between them created not only a sense of separateness and distinctiveness, but also limited their ability to communicate. Brock shows this clearly when he writes: Between the various leading groups in America there was surprisingly little communication; the most obvious and most striking gulf was fixed between Southern and Northern leaders who met hardly at all save in the artificial atmosphere of Washington, but in each state the local hierarchy was autonomous and often suspicious of external influences.4 So it can hardly be surprising then, that there was a dearth of understanding between the North and South. If the only time they really met to discuss important questions was at Washington, then any possibility of gaining any real understanding of each other would have been undermined considerably by the need to engage in politics. So when the real crunch point came just before and after the secession, the 'striking gulf' of misunderstanding between the two sides, made their ability to avoid a war by coming to an agreement or 'understanding' all but impossible. Yet this sense of separateness by the South may only have been more of a perception, or subjective view, than a fact based on reality. As Johnson shows, "The Southern leaders assumed there were absolute differences between the peoples of North and South. In fact allegiances were divided".5 This can be seen in the fact that when the war came, men from the South fought in the Union army, and Northerners fought for the Confederacy, and at the time of the secession there was strong support for the Union from many people in some Southern states.6 A sense of real difference between the North and South may only have been in the minds of the Southern elites, those with a direct interest in maintaining slavery. For others in the South and North, maintaining the Union may have been more important than abolishing slavery, since its abolition would not have directly affected their economic or social position. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether a distinctive difference between the North and South existed in reality, it did exist in the perceptions of many powerful Southerners. This perception at least, must have made avoiding war all that more difficult, as it would have influenced their decisions and actions to a larger or lesser degree. The growing perception of differences between the North and South oversaw a hardening of their respective positions over slavery. The belief in the South, of a Northern plan to destroy Southern society through the abolition of slavery, naturally led to anguish and fear. This was not helped by Lincoln's House Divided strategy, which declared that the Union would soon have to decide whether slavery was to be allowed in all states, or abolished in all states. Lincoln stated: I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall. But I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. [Original emphases] 7 This was clearly a very hard-line attitude. Lincoln was telling the nation, 'decide now', knowing full well the nation was still divided on the issue, and the effect this would have in the South. It was this sort of attitude and actions which led Johnson to state, "Here was a case of unbridled and inflammatory Northern words provoking reckless Southern aggression - a paradigm of the whole conflict".8 Lincoln's statement was the drawing of the line over the slavery issue, one which said, this far and no further, with no further compromise being possible. As Brock saw it: Slavery encouraged men to think in absolute terms and it could not be ignored. The Negro had to be either slave or free and there was no intermediate status upon which compromise could fasten.9 The response by the South was exactly as to be expected; radical, and just as hardline. They wanted Constitutional change. Firstly, the South wanted abolition to be illegal, and slavery legalised, either through an act of Congress or written into the Constitution.10 Secondly, the South wanted recognition of equal powers and majority rights for Southern interests placed into the Constitution.11 As Brock saw it, " . . . at one pole [states could] nullify Federal laws and at the other a dual executive - one Southern and one Northern President - with separate power of veto over national acts . . .".12 In other words, the South wanted major changes to the Federal system, completely changing the way the whole Federal system worked, and all for its own interest in maintaining slavery. This was, understandably, completely unacceptable to the North. This in effect created a stand-off between the North and South. Their policies were completely incompatible, and in order for one of them to get their way, the other had to give up their position. Naturally, neither was willing to compromise or concede. This stand-off led to the Northern abolitionists becoming increasingly militant, which caused the South to react with paranoia.13 Both sides started to lose sight of political reality. Brock called this time, "the mad world of 1861".14 He wrote: One cannot understand the spirit of these years without realizing that there was madness in the air. On the Southern side this madness took the form of a withdrawal from reality. Northern madness was of a different form, less pervasive but more concentrated. It took the form of a monomania which regarded slave-ownership as a sin which outweighed all virtues.15 Clearly, with each side becoming increasingly militant and irrational, any hope of a compromise become most unlikely. It led to a sense of fanaticism taking over both sides.16 As James Buchanan saw it at the time, "Fanaticism never stops to reason".17 In contrast to this, the hardening of the positions of the North and South were not inevitable. Lincoln could have dropped his hard-line House Divided strategy when its effect on the South became clear, for one of simple containment of slavery to existing states. This idea of extinction by containment was in fact both the Republican Party's and Lincoln's policy on slavery.18 As such Lincoln could have changed course without undermining what both he and his party stood for. In fact, as Johnson shows, such an action would have been completely in character for Lincoln as, " . . . his instincts were not for the cause", instead, Lincoln believed that it was better to, "compromise whenever you can".19 As well, Lincoln had taken steps after becoming President to reassure the South that his government would in no way interfere directly with slaveowners.20 It was the South that had moved towards secession before Lincoln's government had even attempted any actions against slavery. In fact, far from being irrational, Brock argues that Lincoln, "seemed to speak for Northern sanity. With a Southern wife, Southern ancestry, and a conservative and conciliatory disposition no man was better fitted to bridge the sectional gulf".21 Moreover, not all the Southern leaders were caught up in paranoia and fear. As Collins argues, their decision to secede was taken with "sobriety rather than abandon".22 Having failed to reach a compromise, there was still one chance remaining to avert a war. This was at the time of the secession. Yet neither side appeared by this time to be interested in a peaceful solution, but continued to maintain their hard-line stance. This can be seen in the fact that immediately after the secession of the South, both sides began to arm themselves in preparation for a conflict.23 To Lincoln, the secession was nothing less than a rebellion by the South.24 He was determined to preserve the cohesion of the Union, even if this meant using force. At the very least he had to "maintain the pretence of his authority over the seceded states".25 Whereas the South, expecting Lincoln's response to be of a military nature, hoped to deter this through a clear show of superior force.26 The decision to use force, its acceptability and utility, can be seen in the two sides reasoning on it. Lincoln believed that war was acceptable because it would be short, and less costly to the nation than two separate governments.27 For the South, there was the gamble that it could gain through war, what it had been unable to gain through the ballot box.28 In fact the path to war was a far from democratic one. On the Northern side, Lincoln made the decision entirely himself, without reference to either his cabinet or the people. To Eisenschiml this was a, "manifestation of one-man government".29 As for the South, there were no referendums, in any state, on the decision to secede, let alone on going to war. The decision was taken by a small group of men who had a personal, and major, interest in a war.30 Clearly then, the decision to go to war was taken by the men who had the most to gain, and lose, from a war. In the case of both sides, they believed that they could gain their objectives from a war, and that the war would be short and successful. This is exactly the kind of war that such men find highly attractive, even desirable. Conversely, the war could have been avoided if, after the secession, both sides had chosen to take no further action against each other. This was possible, as immediately after the secession nothing had happened to actually cause a war. As Eisenschiml shows, with the formation of the Confederacy, " . . . the event had created little excitement", and, " . . . nothing appeared in sight to refoment the diminishing discord".31 In fact, to do nothing was Lincoln's initial reaction to the secession. He undertook what he called, "a programme of 'masterly inactivity' ", in order to allow tempers to cool, and the situation to stabilise.32 As well, both Lincoln and Davis had made clear that neither of them was prepared to begin hostilities.33 When the question over Fort Sumpter arose, there was no widespread demand in the North that it be defended at all costs. Indeed, the Confederacy had already taken over other Federal properties such as arsenals and naval installations, and the North had grudgingly accepted these without recourse to war. To have handed over Fort Sumpter would have created a little grumbling from the North at most.34 Even the build up of troops on both sides need not have led to war. As Johnson shows, Lincoln reluctantly called for volunteers only because the South was doing so, and he felt he had no alternative.35 Lincoln could have made it quite clear that they were to be used for defensive purposes only, which as Eisenschiml argues, would have created no objections, including, probably, from the Confederates.36 As for the South, even after it had taken Fort Sumpter by force, war could have been avoided, because to have then gone on to attack the North, "would border on insanity".37 In effect, war could have been avoided if both sides had simply done nothing after the secession which was likely to have stirred up the other side. As Eisenschiml put it, "All that was needed for a happy ending to an unhappy situation was to do nothing".38 In conclusion, it is quite clear that the Civil War was inevitable. The gulf of understanding between the elites of the two sides was fatal to its avoidance. The differences in their social structure, their political and economic requirements, and their perception of each other, was simply to large to overcome in the emotionally wrought America of 1861. In fact, their differences were not simply due to a misunderstanding of each sides needs, but to a growing, and ultimately complete alienation from each other. This alienation was to form the foundation to both sides' decisions, actions, and perceptions of each other throughout the entire period, and is fundamental to understanding why neither side could, or would, take the decisions to avoid a war. This was clearly seen in the hardening of the positions of both sides. Lincoln's decision to promote his House Divided strategy was both reckless and inflammatory. He must have known exactly how the South would receive it; little short of a declaration of war! Brock was right when he called it 'the mad world of 1861'. Yet if Lincoln did represent the voice of Northern sanity, then he deliberately chose a course he must have known was likely to lead to conflict. Obviously the dividing line between sanity and madness was becoming very obscure. As for the South, it certainly did not help matters by wanting to change the whole of the constitutional basis of the Union. Not only was it asking for the impossible, but the fact that the South thought that it was possible, and workable, shows exactly how irrational they had become. By this point both sides had very clearly lost sight of political reality. Both sides had dug themselves into an uncompromising and unwinnable position. It comes as no surprise then, that with secession came war. Lincoln's decision to oppose the Confederacy taking over Fort Sumpter, even after they had already taken over other Federal properties, was as irrational as the South using force to take over one small fort. Both sides could have sat back and waited for the political temperature to cool. Rather, Lincoln in the North, and the separatists in the South, took it upon themselves, without any public consultation, to raise armies and start a war. At the point in time that it was most needed, the democratic system appeared to have failed the people of America, or at the very least, their elected representatives had failed them. It is true that war was avoidable, but that would have required the politicians to have been rational at the time. This was not the case. Both sides were out of touch with each other, and with reality. In such a situation war becomes, and in this came became, all but inevitable. ------------------------------------------------ Endnotes 1. W. R. Brock, The Character of American History, (London: Macmillan, 1960), p.120. 2. Ibid., p.131. 3. Ibid., p.119. 4. Ibid., p.117. 5. P. Johnson, A History of the American People, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), p. 380-381. 6. Ibid., pp. 379-381. 7. Ibid., p. 367. 8. Ibid., p. 357. 9. Brock, op. cit., p. 120. 10. Johnson, op. cit., p. 357. 11. B. Collins, The Origins of America's Civil War, (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), pp. 151-152. 12. Brock, op. cit., p. 118. 13. Johnson, op. cit., p. 371. 14. Brock, op. cit., p. 137. 15. Ibid., pp. 129-130. 16. J.G. Randall, "The Blundering Generation", in Edwin, C. Rozwenc (ed.), The Causes of the America Civil War, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 170. 17. B. Levine, Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of the Civil War, (New York: Hill and Wang, the Noonday Press, 1992), p. 227. 18. Brock, op. cit., p. 132. 19. Johnson, op. cit., p. 362. 20. Levine, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 21. Brock, op. cit., p. 131. 22. Collins, op. cit., p. 157. 23. Johnson, op. cit., p. 382. 24. Brock, op. cit., p. 139. 25. Collins, op. cit., p. 152. 26. Brock, op. cit., pp. 137-138. 27. O. Eisenschiml, Why the Civil War. (New York: The Bobbs - Merrill Company, 1958), p. 113. 28. Levine, op. cit., p. 226. 29. Eisenschiml, op. cit., p. 91. 30. Johnson, op. cit., p. 380. 31. Eisenschiml, op. cit., p. 17. 32. Ibid., p. 19. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p.17. 35. Johnson, op. cit., p. 382. 36. Eisenschiml, op. cit., p. 92. 37. Ibid., p. 95. 38. Ibid., p.19. ----------------------------------------------- References Brock, W.R. The Character of American History. London: Macmillan, 1960. Collins, Bruce. The Origins of America's Civil War. London: Edward Arnold, 1980. Eisenschiml, Otto. Why The Civil War. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958. Johnson, Paul. A History of the American People. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997. Levine, Bruce. Half Slave and Half Free: The Roots of the Civil War. New York: Hill and Wang, The Noonday Press, 1992. Potter, David, & Manning Thomas, G. Nationalism and Sectionalism in America 1775-1877. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1965. Randal, James. "The Blundering Generation", in Edwin, C. Rozwenc (ed.), The Causes of the American Civil War. D.C. Heath and Company, 1961. --------------------------------------- |
