 |
|
The failure of the Chinese Self-Strengthening Movement. SYNOPSIS This essay analyses the failure of the Chinese Self-strengthening movement of the nineteenth century. It argues that the movements' failure was due to its proponents fundamental ignorance of the requirements for industrial modernisation, due to their continued belief in the institutions and traditions of Confucianism, and their great concern to protect China's sovereignty from Western imperialism. This is shown by the progressives limited vision of modernization, which they saw in terms only of acquiring Western military technology, and not in terms of the reform of Chinese institutions. Nor could they overcome conservative Confucian opposition, which feared that the changes would bring only social disharmony. The Self-strengtheners concern to protect China's sovereignty, led them to reject foreign loans and to rely on domestic resources only. This forced them to rely on a policy of 'slow' modernization, which ultimately failed when put to the test twenty years later. Finally, their lack of technical knowledge, combined with a 'blind faith' in Western experts, created a fundamental contradiction between desires and actions, whereby the Self-strengtheners actually destroyed the very technology they so desperately needed. The Self-strengthening movement in nineteenth century China was the direct outcome of China's humiliation from the 1860 peace settlement, and was predicated on the dictum of Wei Yuan: learn the superior techniques of the barbarians to control the barbarians. With this idea as it's motivating spirit, the Self-strengthening movement began to both advocate, and to carry out, the modernization of China. Yet this attempt at modernization was ultimately unsuccessful. This paper analyses the failure of the Self- strengthening movement and argues that, Firstly, its failure was due to its having a limited vision of modernisation, based on a fundamental ignorance by the progressives to the complexity of industrialisation. Secondly, the opposition of Confucian conservatives also contributed through their concern to maintain their traditions and society, and to reject any changes that would threaten these. A third problem was the lack of Chinese capital and the reliance on slow modernization. Finally, the technological backwardness of China, which contributed to a fundamental contradiction in Chinese thinking, particularly their destruction of the modern infrastructure they so badly needed, further contributed to their failure. The Self-strengthening movement's ideas for the modernization of China were based on a limited vision of which parts of China needed to be modernized. The movement did not see modernization in terms of creating a new modern Chinese nation-state along Western lines. Rather, it was essentially seen as a way to strengthen the existing Confucian order,1 and to be "an intrinsically conservative response to dynastic decline."2 This conservatism was due to the movement's belief that China need only purchase and make modern weapons from the West, particularly warships, and to build the limited industrial infrastructure to support this, in order to defend itself from Western imperialism, and therefore protect it's sovereignty.3 This misconception of the West's power can be seen in the case of Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang) who, as Hsu argues, " . . . believed, somewhat naively, that possession of steamships and guns with explosive shells alone would suffice to stop foreign aggression."4 What Li and many other Self-strengtheners failed to recognise was that the West's power was based not only on modern weapons, technology and industrialisation, but also on the West's modern political and economic systems. By concentrating mainly on weapons for defence, the Self-strengthening movement virtually ignored the need for reform of China's obsolescent political and economic institutions.5 This was because the progressives saw modernization in terms of technology, not in terms of institutions or culture. They had no conception of modern economic development along Western lines.6 The Self-strengtheners only saw Western technology as being superior, while continuing to believe that Chinese and Confucian culture, society, institutions, and thought, were superior to that of the West. A slogan used by the Self-strengtheners affirmed " Chinese learning for essential principles, Western learning for practicable application."7 This belief can be seen in the writings of Li Hongzhang who stated " Everything in China's civil and military system is far superior to the West. Only in firearms is it absolutely impossible to catch up with them."8 This ignorance of the real scope of Western power and Chinese weakness led the Chinese to make only a limited attempt at modernization, one that was fundamentally flawed from inception, and that could never have delivered what the Chinese wanted and needed; the protection of their sovereignty against Western imperialism. To Hsu this was simply a " . . . superficial gesture towards modernization, [as the] finer aspects of western civilization [such as] political institutions . . . went totally untouched. "9 Opposition to the Self-strengtheners came mainly from Confucian conservatives. These were mainly conservative mandarins and Manchu aristocrats who would attempt to undermine the modernization projects of the Self-strengtheners.10 In the case of Li, he and his plans would frequently be denounced at court by inflexible conservative colleagues in an attempt to motivate reactionary opposition within the court itself.11 This appears to have had some success, as the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi used the conservatives to 'checkmate' or limit the activities of the progressives, effectively limiting their success and power.12 This opposition by Confucian conservatives was based on their belief in the need to protect and maintain the existing Chinese culture and society. They believed that increased productivity and consumerism would endanger social harmony by unleashing the evils of greed and avarice.13 In fact Confucian society and officials generally were opposed towards much of the innovative ideas of the progressives, who had very much of an up-hill battle in having their ideas accepted.14 The problem for the Self-strengtheners was that the Confucian ideology of the central government, which the Self-strengtheners shared, saw decline in terms of it's inability to rule well, and that this could be remedied by finding good men of outstanding moral character; instead of decline in terms of inadequate institutions.15 The failure of the Self- strengtheners was in not being able to make the conservatives see the real need for even limited modernization, which was due as much to the limited understanding of the progressives themselves. Additionally, the progressives were undermined by Western imperialism, which threatened China's sovereignty. As Sturdevant points out, when it came to protecting sovereignty, even "Those Chinese officials . . . Who should have been the natural allies of the Westerners in the modernization of China were the very officials who most effectively opposed [it] . . ."16 For the Chinese, protecting their sovereignty become of paramount concern after 1860, especially in regards to modernization. As China was a poor country with limited funds at its disposal, it decided that slow development, based on its own resources, was preferable to taking out foreign loans that may ultimately undermine its sovereignty. The Self-strengtheners shared this view. This can be seen in the attitude of Shen Baozhen (Shen Pao-chen), who was prepared to see projects such as railway construction slowed down, in order to support this policy of using only Chinese capital and materials.17 The extent that the Chinese were prepared to wait is shown by an English writer: Ten years would not seem to China a long time for the completion of the Peking-Hankow line, although foreign engineers and foreign capital might complete it in a year. She believes that she can wait and gradually do this work in small pieces.18 Yet this attitude, shared by the Self-strengtheners, appeared to ignore reality; that China could only defend its sovereignty by modernizing quickly. This attitude by the progressives, was the complete opposite to that formed by the Japanese. They realised that for Japan to ensure its independence they had to make radical changes to their political and economic institutions, based on Western ideas, and to do so quickly.19 For the Self-Strengtheners, the folly of this 'go slow' attitude became abundantly clear in 1884-85. When after twenty years of military and industrial modernization, China was unable to successfully defend its territory from French imperialism, and later still, from Japanese imperialism.20 This fundamental misunderstanding by the Chinese Self-strengthening movement to the complexities of industrialisation, also led to a contradiction between their desired goals and their actions. Due to their technological backwardness the Chinese had no knowledge of the modern technical, management, and administration procedures necessary for modern industry.21 This led to Chinese over-reliance on Western technical experts and workers, and to what Hsu called ". . . a blind faith in the ability of foreigners, regardless of their training and experience."22 In fact many of the advisers were very inexpert.23 This was the opposite of the Japanese who used foreigners only as teachers, not as workers, where as Hunter points out ". . . their experience and expertise were tapped for all they were worth.", then replaced by Japanese.24 This lack of technical knowledge on the part of the Self-strengtheners led to the contradiction of them actually destroying the very infrastructure they were trying to build. An example of this is the purchase, then destruction, of the Shanghai to Wusong railway in 1877-78 by Shen Baozhen.25 This was clearly a retrograde and un-necessary step. Not only did they spend scarce resources in purchasing the rail-line, they then spent more in its destruction, after which expense they ended up with nothing. More importantly still, the Self-strengtheners did not recognise the training potential of the rail- line. Arguably it could have been used much like the Tomioka silk reeling mill in Japan; not as a profit making enterprise, but as a test bed and training centre for future rail workers and managers.26 This is all the more remarkable when the military potential of railways in a country the size of China is considered. In conclusion, it can be seen that the failure of the Self-strengthening movement was based on a fundamental misunderstanding, even ignorance, of the requirements for, and the scope of changes necessary, to modernise China in order to defend it from Western imperialism. This led the Self-strengtheners to make the mistake of thinking that modern weapons alone could protect China, while failing to see the need for wider reform of the Chinese state, especially its political, economic and educational institutions. Even while Chinese sovereignty was under pressure from Western imperialism, the Self-strengtheners still believed they could develop slowly, which was a complete contradiction to their recent experience. Their lack of technical knowledge of how to manage a program of modernization not only made them overly reliant on foreign know- how, but actually caused them to make fundamental and retrograde mistakes, that had the real effect of undermining their attempt at modernization. As if all this wasn't enough, the Self-strengtheners had to struggle against the opposition of the conservative Confusion officials, who saw the solution to China's problems, not in terms of obsolescent institutions, but in the moral failure of the officials themselves. Ultimately, the failure of the Self-strengtheners was in trying to combine and reconcile two incompatible and opposing forces; the old traditional Confucian state, and the building of a modern industrialised state; all while trying to keep the barbarians at bay. ------------------------------------------ ENDNOTES 1. I.C.Y.Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th Ed, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 288. 2. J. Grasso, & J. Corrin, & M. Kort, Modernization and Revolution in China, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), p. 54. 3. Ibid., p. 53. 4. Hsu. op. cit., pp. 279-280. 5. Ibid., p. 10. 6. Grasso et al, op. cit., p. 55. 7. Ibid., p. 53. 8. Hsu. op. cit., (quote sited in footnote, no. 30), p. 281. 9. Ibid., p. 262. 10. Grasso et al, op. cit., p. 53. 11. Ibid., p. 56. 12. Hsu. op. cit., p. 282. 13. Grasso et al, op. cit., pp. 53-55. 14. Hsu. op. cit., p. 282. 15. Grasso et al, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 16. S. Sturdevant, in P.A. Cohen, and J.E. Schrecker, (ed), Reform in Nineteenth-Century China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p.69. 17. R. Lee, " Tool of Empire or Means of National Salvation: The Railway in the Imagination of Western Empire Builders and their Enemies in Asia ", Class Reading from Imperialism in Asia Subject, (As supplied through university, 1997), p. 5. 18. Ibid. 19. J.E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan, (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 109. 20. Hsu. op. cit., p. 287. 21. Ibid., p. 283. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 289. 24. Hunter, op. cit., p. 110. 25. Sturdevant, op. cit., p. 64. 26. Hunter, op. cit., p. 110. ------------------------------------------ BIBLIOGRAPHY Cohen, P.A. and Schrecker, J.E. (ed). 1976. Reform in Nineteenth-Century China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Grasso, J. & Corrin, J. & Kort, M. 1991. Modernization and Revolution in China. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Hsu, I.C.Y. 1990. The Rise of Modern China. 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Hunter, J.E. 1995. The Emergence of Modern Japan. New York: Longman. Lee, R. 1997. " Tool of Empire or Means of National Salvation: The Railway in the Imagination of Western Empire Builders and their Enemies in Asia ". Class Reading from Imperialism in Asia Subject. As supplied through university. p. 5. Thomas, S.C. 1984. Foreign Intervention and China's Industrial Development 1870-1911. Boulder: Westview Press. Wright, M.C. 1967. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration 1862-1874. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ------------------------------------------ |
