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The failure of the Chinese Nationalist government's attempts at national integration in the Nanjing decade 1928 - 1937. SYNOPSIS This essay argues that the Kuomintang (KMT) government of China in the years 1928 to 1937, failed in its attempt at national integration. It shows the KMT's refusal to move beyond political tutelage, lost it the support of political moderates, and was directly responsible for the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek as China's new overlord. That Chiang as a military man, attempted to unify China with military force alone, which left the KMT without the neccessary all-embracing ideology needed to rally the people behind it. That the KMT failed to address the social and land reform needs of the peasants, causing the peasants to turn away from the KMT to the Communists for support, which ultimately undermined both the KMT's attempt at national integration, and KMT rule. The years 1928 - 1937 were the years that the Kuomintang ( KMT ) government had its best chance of reforming, rebuilding, and integrating a fractured China. It was during this decade that the KMT had its greatest potential to create the China envisioned by Sun Yat-sen. To many, it appeared as if the KMT government was in fact the revolutionary and reforming government it claimed to be. Beginning with the apparent success of the Northern Expedition, to the reform of the financial and education systems, the recovery of foreign concessions, and the modest increase in industrialisation, the KMT appeared to be well underway in its attempt to rebuild China into an integrated nation.1 Yet as important as these successes were, the reality was that the KMT, as a politically unifying force, was inherently flawed; so that irrespective of the outward appearances, the KMT's attempt at national integration not only ended in failure, but that its failure was in fact inevitable. The inevitability of the failure of the KMT stems from the fundamental political mistakes it made during the decade. These mistakes were its inability or unwillingness to move beyond the tutelage government to a more open and democratic system, losing it the support of the moderate liberals, and leading to the assumption of Chiang Kai-shek to a position as China's effective dictator. The reliance of the KMT on military solutions to political problems, which left the party with little in the way of an effective ideology. The complete failure of the KMT to initiate the desperately needed social and land reforms, leading to its alienation of the peasants, who then sought political leadership from other groups, particularly the Communists. With the ending of the Northern Expedition, the period of political tutelage began. This political tutelage by the KMT was to have been used to train the people necessary to begin the next phase of Sun's plan; the introduction of democracy. Yet from the very beginning, the KMT made no attempt to train the people it claimed were necessary for the introduction of democracy, making it possible for the KMT to argue for the need to extend the tutelage period. This is shown by Sheridan when he writes: The Kuomintang took no realistic measures to train people in self-government, which would have eliminated the justification for its own monopoly of political power. Instead, it immediately established a five-power government, . . . not as a beginning, but as an end, of the tutelage process.2 In fact, the KMT continuously extended the tutelage period beyond the original six years. In doing so it lost the support of the Liberal moderates, who saw it as nothing less than as a way for the KMT to "prolong their monopoly of power at the expense of constitutionalism".3 Even within the Constitution itself, the KMT deliberately and continuously gave the Executive Yuan much more power than the popular assembly, until the executive's power was "overwhelming".4 As Chang saw it: Tutelage meant in practice the desire of the Kuomintang's followers to perpetuate the conditions which placed political power in their own hands. They merely gave lip service to constitutionalism . . . [So that] the democratic parties which really fought for democracy were then willy-nilly manoeuvred into a position in which they had to side with the communists against the government . . .5 Clearly, the longer the KMT resisted moving to a more democratic political system the more politically isolated it became, and the more unlikely it was able to unite the country. Yet the KMT went beyond delaying the introduction of democracy, as it took clear steps towards ensuring its non-introduction. Support of democracy was never really more than rhetoric as it merely "glossed itself with the phrases" of democracy, while holding no elections.6 In fact, the KMT never legalized or allowed any opposition parties to operate 7, preferring instead to repress criticism, to the extent that, as Eastman shows, "political repression became the primary instrument of Nationalist rule".8 This political repression became intense, which naturally led to further resentment, alienation, and dissipating support for KMT rule.9 Such a situation led not only to one party rule, but by the early 1930s to the emergence of a personal dictatorship by Chiang Kai-shek. Eastman shows this clearly when he writes: Regardless of the formal positions that Chiang Kai-shek held in the party, government or army, he wielded ultimate authority over the regime as a whole. He exercised that authority with minimal concern for formal chains of command.10 With Chiang effectively the dictator of KMT controlled China, the central government eventually became so politically weak as to be virtually irrelevant.11 The civil government became subordinate to Chiang's interests, leaving it unable to generate its own political momentum, while the KMT party itself effectively "atrophied" from Chiang's transformation of it into a "military-authoritarian regime".12 This led to Chiang's KMT regime being supported by only a "tight clique" of interests, what White and Jocoby called "a four-legged stool - an army, a bureaucracy, the urban business man, the rural gentry", but having no mass support of the people or other political groups.13 In such a situation, any attempt by the KMT to create true national integration was doomed to failure, if for no other reason than all other political and social groups, being effectively left out, or forced out, of political participation, knew what KMT national integration actually meant; national political dominance by the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek. With Chiang in dictatorial control of the KMT, the chances of the Nanking government affecting nation integration actually became less, not more. This was because of the way Chiang saw the problems of China generally, and integration in particular. Chiang was first and foremost a soldier, to him China's problems were best solved through military means, rather than through social or political means.14 This can been seen in Chiang's decision to use force after the KMT Third National Congress in 1929 had failed to achieve the amalgamation of all military forces into a centralised command.15 This had failed because Chiang by this time was not prepared to share power with any other groups or individuals. As Clubb saw it: The nominal problem up for consideration was demobilisation; but the real issue was that of power. Success could have been achieved only by [Chiang] permitting the principal leaders to share in the fruits of victory through an equal voice in government. . . . however [Chiang] proposed no sharing of power; and that his "demobilisation" plans were aimed at . . . the augmentation of his own forces.16 This led Chiang to rely primarily on force in his attempt to unify China, so that the KMT government increasingly based its claim of political legitimacy on military force and occupation.17 Chiang chose force partly from his inability to move beyond his military mentality 18, and what Tang called, his "narrow conception of his, his government's, and China's interests".19 Clearly, while the KMT party and government continued to be dominated by Chiang, any attempt at national unification was bound to fail, as Chiang's conception of unification was based purely on his own narrow interests. Schurman and Schell summed up Chiang's leadership well when they wrote: [Chiang] saw the unification of China as a military task, and never stopped to ask what would hold China together after his armies had done their job. He ruled China with his armies, not with ideas . . .20 With the decision of the Chiang dominated KMT to base its rule on the use of force, the place and use of ideology within the KMT began to be less important, even unnecessary. Officially at least, the ideology of the KMT was based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, but with the rise of Chiang to the leadership, Sun's ideas became little more than rhetoric, a poor second to Chiang's interests.21 As such, the interpretation and use of Sun's ideas "became a highly selective performance".22 As Schurman and Schell argue: After the death of Sun Yat-sen the Kuomintang became an ideological vacuum . . . [as] Chiang never succeeded in endowing it with a dynamic and persuasive ideology. 23 Instead of a real philosophical and ideological base that could be used to unite the disparate groups of China, all that was left for the KMT was "the cult of Sun's memory".24 This lack of an all embracing, widely understood and supported ideological base, seriously undermined the KMT's ability to forge a new political and social order out of the chaos of 1930s China. Without this base the KMT had no clear political direction or purpose, no overall plan on how to unite China, and no ability to inspire people to put their own personal interests second to those of the Chinese nation. Indeed, KMT ideology had degenerated to nothing more than an instrument to serve the personal interests of Chiang. At the heart of national unification was the desperate need of the peasants for social and land reform. Yet the KMT simply ignored the plight of the peasants, effectively opening up the possibility for other political forces to support them. Throughout the 1927-1937 period the KMT saw political unification as being of the first priority, and that other socioeconomic reforms, including land reform, would have to wait until the political unification of China was complete.25 Yet within the KMT itself there were strong forces that opposed any land reform. This opposition came from the land-owning class, on whom the KMT was heavily dependent for political support.26 As Schurman and Schell saw it: The officials upon whose initiative land reform depended were the very men to whom land reform was anathema. [Where] . . . officials who have a vested interest in the status quo make very poor reformers. [So that] . . . as a whole the Nanking government was not reform-orientated. 27 Even when the KMT appeared to be doing something to help the peasants, such as creating progressive legislation, it never actually applied such legislation, so that many saw it as nothing more than "window dressing".28 In fact to many, the KMT's inability to help the peasants was due less to political limitations, and had more to do with disinterest, even contempt of the peasants. This is shown by two writers, Kuo Ping-chia and Mao Tse-Tung. Kuo writes: The degree to which the government remained fixed in its indifference to the needs of the masses was indeed astonishing.29 While Mao writes: The right wing of the Kuomintang says, 'The peasant movement is a movement of the riffraff, of the lazy peasants'.30 It is therefore no wonder that the KMT alienated the great mass of the peasants, and that the peasants sought help from other political groups. Unfortunately for the KMT the peasants turned to the Communists, who had a completely opposite policy to that of the KMT; that being a policy of social revolution first.31 Such a policy was far more in tune with the needs of the peasants. As well, unlike the KMT who shunned the peasants, the Communist movement under Mao was built around the peasants. This can been seen in the Communists asking; in whose interest should China be reconstructed? Their answer; for the interests of the peasants. So that it became the Communists, not the KMT, who represented the peasants first ever own political leadership.32 Clearly, this was not something the peasants would then be willing to give up for empty KMT promises of a better future, if only they would wait. The peasants now preferred to make their own future. In effect, the loss of support of the peasants left the KMT without the mass support it needed if true national integration was to be achieved. The loss of peasant support was to prove fatal for both KMT inspired integration, and ultimately KMT rule. In conclusion the KMT's attempts at national unification were nothing less than a failure. Irrespective of structural reforms, the party failed to recognise that political and social reform are the most fundamental reforms, and that failure in these areas completely negates all others. Unless a nation is united politically and socially, then integration becomes impossible. The KMT's deliberate policy to stop the move to democracy, effectively closed the door on the necessary wider political participation which is a fundamental requirement for national integration to succeed, which opened the door to the political dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's reliance on the use of military power and occupation to unite China, while effectively ignoring the need for political and social reforms, was fundamentally flawed. Military occupation to control a region or area was limited to essentially policing duties, and contributed nothing in the way of building the necessary wide base of popular support required to maintain long term stability. Without undertaking the clearly needed political and social reforms, the KMT effectively created a vacuum for other groups to fill, particularly the Communists. So that KMT military control was for many Chinese virtually indistinguishable from being controlled by other non-Communist Chinese military forces, as all the social and political ills of Chinese society remained unchanged. Essentially, the KMT failed to unify China because it ultimately became the very thing it was supposed to be against; an exclusive, repressive, authoritarian regime. ----------------------------------------------------------- Endnotes: 1. I. C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 566 - 569. 2. J. E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: the Republican Era in Chinese History 1912 - 1949, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 208. 3. Hsu, op. cit., p. 573. 4. T. Tsou, "Contradictions between Program and Practice", in P. P. Y. Loh, (ed.), The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?, (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1965), p. 33. 5. C. Chang, "Chiang Kai-shek and Koumintang Dictatorship", in Loh, op. cit., pp. 37 - 38. 6. T. White, and A. Jacoby, ( an excerpt from ) "Thunder Out of China", in F. Schurmann, and O. Schell, (eds.). Republican China, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 144. 7. Chang, op. cit., p. 36. 8. L. E. Eastman, "Nationalist China During the Nanking Decade, 1927 - 1937", in L. E. Eastman, & J. Chen, & S. Pepper, & L. P. Van Slyke, The Nationalist Era in China 1927 - 1949, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23. 9. Sheridan, op. cit., p. 210. 10. Eastman, op. cit., pp. 20 - 21. 11. Sheridan, op. cit., p. 211. 12. Eastman, op. cit., p. 21. 13. White and Jocoby, op. cit., pp. 134 and 144. 14. F. Schurmann, and O. Schell, op. cit., p. 133. 15. O. E. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 153 - 154. 16. Ibid., pp. 152 - 153. 17. Ibid., p. 190. 18. T-S. Ch'ien, "Military Rule and National Ruin" in Loh, op. cit., p. 42. 19. Tsou, op. cit., p.34. 20. Schurmann, and Schell, op. cit., p.133. 21. Sheridan, op. cit., p. 216. 22. T. Mende, The Great Revolutions: The Chinese Revolution, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. 87. 23. Schurmann, and Schell, op. cit., p.133. 24. Mende, op. cit., p.87. 25. Clubb, op. cit., p. 185. 26. Schurmann, and Schell, op. cit., p.134. 27. Ibid. 28. White and Jocoby, op. cit., p. 146. 29. P-C. Kuo, "Failure in Land Reform" in Loh, op. cit., p. 49. 30. T-T. Mao, ( an excerpt from ) "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan". in Schurmann, and Schell, op. cit., p. 131. 31. Clubb, op. cit., p. 185. 32. White and Jocoby, op. cit., p. 143. -------------------------------------------------------- References: Chang, C. "Chiang Kai-shek and Koumintang Dictatorship". in Loh, P. P.Y. (ed.). 1965. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. pp.35 - 41. Ch'ien, T-S. "Military Rule and National Ruin" in Loh, P. P.Y. (ed.). 1965. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. pp. 41 - 45. Clubb, O. E. 1964. Twentieth Century China. New York: Columbia University Press. Eastman, L. E. "Nationalist China During the Nanking Decade, 1927 - 1937". in Eastman, L. E. & Chen, J. & Pepper, S. & Van Slyke, L. P. 1991. The Nationalist Era in China 1927 - 1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1 - 52. Hsu, I.C.Y. 1990. The Rise of Modern China. 4th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Kuo, P-C. "Failure in Land Reform" in Loh, P. P.Y. (ed.). 1965. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. pp. 48 - 51. Mao Tse-Tung. ( an excerpt from ) "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan". in Schurmann, F. and Schell, O. (eds.). 1968. Republican China. London: Penguin Books. pp. 125-132. Mende, T. 1961. The Great Revolutions: The Chinese Revolution. London: Thames and Hudson. Schurmann, F. and Schell, O. (eds.). 1968. Republican China. London: Penguin Books. Sheridan, J. E. 1975. China in Disintegration: the Republican Era in Chinese History 1912 - 1949. New York: The Free Press. Tsou, T. "Contradictions between Program and Practice". in P. P. Y. Loh, (ed.). 1965. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Collapse or Conquest?. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. pp. 33 - 34. White, T. and Jacoby, A. ( an excerpt from ) "Thunder Out of China". in Schurmann, F. and Schell, O. (eds.). 1968. Republican China. London: Penguin Books. pp. 135-150. -------------------------------------------------------- |
