Japan 1937 - 1941:

The forces that led to Japan's Southern

expansion and war in December 1941.

SYNOPSIS

This essay argues that the decision by Japan to expand into China beyond Manchuria
led to a situation of increasingly critical resource vulnerability for Japan. In order to
overcome this vulnerability, which was seen to threaten Japan's national security, the
Japanese decided to expand into Southeast Asia. This would allow for the seizure of the
East Indies oil which would help make Japan independent of Western imports, which
Japan saw as essential for national defence. It would also overcome the impact of
Western embargoes, which were threatening to emasculate the empire's military power.
Southern expansion would also allow Japan to create its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, which the Japanese believed would make them materially and economically self-
sufficient and militarily equal to the West. Finally, the Japanese leadership's sense of
vulnerability overrode its ability for objective judgement, until only war was seen as the
solution for Japan's problems, and where a mystical belief in 'spirit' could overcome the
awesome power of the United States.

In December 1941 Japan launched a military assault against the Western colonial
possessions of Southeast Asia and began what became known as the Pacific War. This
essay analyses the reasons for this course of action, and how the Japanese saw their
interests being served by expanding the war beyond China. It argues that the war in
China was the prime motivating force for Japan's decision to expand South, as this war
exposed the real limits of Japan's resource vulnerability, particularly to the Western
powers. Oil was another reason for war. Japan's dependence on imported oil made it
militarily vulnerable to the West, so much so that the Japanese feared for their national
security. With the introduction of embargoes the Japanese felt compelled to take matters
into their own hands, and seize the oil of the East Indies before their own supplies ran out.
The decision to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was also a reaction
to Japan's resource vulnerability. By taking over direct control of the East Asian region
the Japanese hoped to become self-sufficient in resources, as well as build a powerful
empire under Japanese domination. Resource vulnerability also affected Japanese
judgement and strategic thinking, which increasingly became based on a limited
conception of Japan's situation, until only one solution, military force, was seen as
acceptable for solving Japan's problems. This was supported with an irrational belief in
the ability of the Japanese spirit to overcome American material power.

Japan's decision to expand militarily into China beyond Manchuria from 1937
onwards, had a direct impact on its decision to expand southward in 1941. The invasion
of China was expected to be a short affair, and to bring an increase in raw materials and
to benefit the Japanese economy. In reality the war in China saw the Japanese bogged
down in a war of attrition, that increasingly used more of Japan's scarce resources than
expected. This occurred because the war ravaged China's economy, causing a fall in
industrial and resource output, so that the Japanese were never able to replace the
resources used for the war from Chinese sources, let alone create an overall increase in
resources.1 This had a major and detrimental impact on Japan's domestic economy, as
the Japanese found that their plans for autarky and economic growth were completely
ruined.2 The 1.6 million Japanese troops in China was placing a severe strain on the
nation's economic ability to sustain it. Defense spending rose from 6 percent in 1936 to a
high of 23 percent in 1938, and 19 percent in 1939.3 The impact of this was made
worse by the fact that the Japanese economy had reached full capacity in 1937, so there
was no corresponding growth in the Japanese economy after 1937 to help fund the
sudden and large increase in military expenditures.4 Such high levels of military
expenditure was damaging Japan's national economic performance, until the effect on the
Japanese domestic economy was staggering.5 Worst still was that the supply
requirements to prosecute the war in China saw an increase in Japan's trade dependence
on the West, particularly the United States.6 As Japan used ever larger amounts of raw
materials to prosecute the war, it found that it needed to import larger supplies of raw
materials from Western sources. This was made even more difficult from a fall in exports
due to the materials shortage, so that it became harder for Japan to pay for the increased
imports.7

Ironically, the war in China, which was to have made Japanese economic autarky
possible, was completely undermining Japan's attempt at economic, and especially raw
material self-sufficiency, which led to Japan having an even greater economic dependence
on imports than before the war began. This unexpected outcome made the Japanese feel
an acute sense of economic and national vulnerability, as the Japanese leadership became
increasingly preoccupied and worried over how Japan's acute economic difficulties would
affect national security.8 This was shown by the Navy Chief of Staff Prince Fushimi, who
asked at the Imperial Conference of September 30, 1940, "What are the prospects for
maintaining our national strength in view of the present situation, which finds our national
resources depleted because of the China Incident?"9

By the early 1940s the Japanese believed they had two choices open to them. They
could leave China, or they could advance southward in an attempt to find the resources
needed to continue the war in China until victory became possible. For the Japanese
leadership leaving China was impossible, as it would be an admission of failure on their
part, and of Japan itself. For Asia's most advanced, modern, and powerful nation to be
seen to be defeated by a weak and divided China was nothing less than unthinkable.10
This is not to imply that China had the capacity to militarily defeat Japan; it did not.
Rather, that if Japan was forced to pull out of China from being unable to defeat China
completely, then such a move was bound to be seen as a failure of Japanese arms, and a
defeat of Japanese expansionism. For the Japanese military this would be the equivalent
of political suicide. The military regime would have been destroyed, and with it the
military leaders themselves, along with their plans for military expansion. 11 Furthermore,
Japan was a nation on the rise, to give up in China would seriously undermine Japan's
attempt to be recognised as a world power. More ominously, if Japan was seen to fail in
China, the Russians would see it as Japanese weakness, and may attempt to take
advantage of it in Manchuria. 12 To the Japanese leadership, pulling out of China was not
an option.

Therefore to Japan's elite the only option open was to advance South and gain the
resources that would bring success in China. The Japanese knew clearly that such an
advance would be resisted by the European colonial powers and the United States, and
that military force would ultimately be needed. Yet the Japanese accepted the risk of war
with the Western powers as the price that had to be paid if Japan was to attain victory in
China, and thus ensuring Japan's long-term economic security.13

The war in China ultimately became the problem that created the underlying reason
for Japan's southern advance.14 The problems in China began affecting all aspects of
Japan's national interests, and became the fundamental problem for the Japanese nation.
All of Japan's actions and decisions by 1940 - 41 were based on or affected by the
difficulties Japan was encountering in China, as the Japanese found that the war had
created a set of strategic imperatives, from which the leadership were unable to escape.15
This is shown clearly by Barnhart who writes:

The essential element that led to war was Japan's terrible economic vulnerability. [Where the war in
China began] a perverted search for self-sufficiency which would lead ultimately to war with the
West and to ruin for Japan.16

The war in China was making Japan more, not less, dependent on the West for
resources. The Japanese leadership was fully aware that since the mid-1930s Japan's
resource situation was becoming increasingly dire, and the war in China not only
exacerbated this situation, it pushed it to breaking point.17 This was particularly true for
raw materials, especially oil. Japan produced no more than 7 percent of its oil
requirements, all the rest was imported. Of this 10 percent came from the Dutch East
Indies, and a huge 80 percent from the United States.18 This had serious strategic
implications for Japan, particularly militarily. The Japanese feared that with such a
dependence on the West Japan could be crippled militarily in the event of war with any of
the Western powers. As the Navy made clear; self-sufficiency in national security was
only possible with self-sufficiency in oil.19 By 1941 the United States was emerging as
Japan's most serious rival in the Asia-Pacific region, and because of Japan's heavy
reliance on U.S. oil, the Japanese began asking the question; in the event of war, where
was Japan to obtain the necessary oil to fuel it's ships and planes if the West shut off the
supply?20 To Japan's leadership there was only one real possibility, Southeast Asia.

The problem for Japan was that all of the oil in Southeast Asia was in the hands of the
Western powers. To gain control over the oil would mean having to seize it from the
same powers who could shut the supply off, and who would no doubt resist militarily.
Obviously if Japan could secure an adequate supply through peaceful means then more
forceful action would be unnecessary. In fact from 1940 Japan attempted to secure such
a supply from the Dutch East Indies, but the Dutch were not prepared to increase their
supply of oil to Japan. Indeed, the Dutch in may 1941 actually reduced their supplies of
oil, tin and rubber to Japan, in response to Japan's move into Southern Vietnam.21 As
the Japanese realised, the Dutch East Indies was the only source where Japan could
secure additional supplies of oil, and when this was denied them it led to an even more
acute sense of national vulnerability.22 The Japanese leadership concluded that the use of
force was the only alternative left if Japan was to secure the neccessary resources for
national defense. This preparedness to use force was shown in the Imperial Conference
of September 30, 1940 at which War Minister Tojo Hideki stated:

The government has a policy: it desires to obtain materials peacefully from the Netherlands East
Indies, but depending on circumstances, it could use force.23

This thinking was echoed by the President of the Privy Council Hara Yoshimichi who
stated at the same meeting, "I think it will be impossible to obtain oil from the Netherlands
East Indies by peaceful means."24

By going to war Japan would secure direct control over the oil and other resources of
the Netherlands East Indies. This would reduce both Japan's reliance on raw materials
imported from non-Japanese producers, and Japan's resource vulnerability to the West,
particularly the United States. This last point was very important for Japan. By directly
controlling the East Indies resources Japan would not only increase its own national
defense position generally, but it would also increase it relative to the West. This would
occur because the resources seized would be taken from the West. So that as Japan's
resource position was strengthened, that of the West would be correspondingly
weakened.

The war in China was accompanied by a deterioration in relations with the West,
particularly the United States, which further exacerbated Japan's shortages of resources,
of which oil was a casualty. As the United States and Britain opposed Japanese
expansion into China, and gave limited support to the KMT, the China war cast a cloud
over relations between Japan and the Western powers.25 This led to the gradual placing
of embargoes on resources to Japan by the Western nations. This began with the
embargo on aviation fuel and some types of scrap iron and steel in July 1940, followed by
a total ban on scrap iron and steel in September 1940.26 With the Japanese occupation
of Southern Indochina in July 1941 the U.S. government placed further restrictions on oil,
which resulted in a virtual total embargo of oil exports to Japan.27 This was Roosevelt's
way of both warning the Japanese not to expand further South, and as a way of dealing
with aggressive nations by shutting off the oil they needed to make war.28 In effect the
United States was using the embargos in an attempt to either force Japan out of China, or
at least contain Japan to Northeast Asia.

The embargos were a clear indication that the United States intended to stand in the
way of Japan's Southern ambitions. The Japanese saw the embargoes as "an
everstrengthening chain of encirclement" by the Western powers 29, which was designed
to keep Japan in the position of a second-rank nation. 30 As the Japanese government
told their people; it was nothing less than a conspiracy by the Western powers to deny
Japan the resources it so badly needed, and was thereby an attempt by the West to
strangle the Empire into submission.31 Paranoia was starting to gain hold of Japan's
leadership.

The Japanese leadership fully realised that the embargoes were designed to hit Japan
at its economic weak points. As the Director of the Planning Board Hoshino Naoki
made clear in 1940, the "American economic action against Japan is aimed at certain
crucial points, where it hurts Japan the most and the United States the least."32 By
November 1941 the pressure of the embargoes was pushing Japan into a corner as Tojo,
as Foreign Minister, made clear, "Since the United States is applying economic pressure
on us, which is even stronger than military pressure, we may have to act in order to
defend ourselves."33

Yet if Japan was to act it had to do so while it still had the strength. From July 1941
the Japanese realised that without replenishment Japan's oil reserves would last only two
years at the most. This had very serious implications for national defense. As the navy
made clear; if Japan was unable to maintain its supply of oil, Japan's warships would
become "nothing more than scarecrows." 34 Clearly, with time running out, if Japan was
to go to war it had to do so while it still had the resources to fight. Every day it delayed
made Japan weaker relative to the Western powers. This concern was reflected in the
briefing materials of the Japanese leadership in September 1941:

At present oil is the weak point of our Empire's national strength and fighting power . . . As time
passes, our capacity to carry on war will decline, and our Empire will become powerless militarily.
Vital military supplies, including oil, are dwindling day by day.35

Clearly, the Japanese had reached crunch point. When this was combined with the failure
of diplomatic talks between Japan and the U.S., the Japanese leadership knew that force
of arms was all that was left to them. This was made clear by Prime Minister Tojo at the
Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941, where the final decision to go to war was
made:

[As the Western powers] increase their economic and military pressure against us; . . . we have now
reached the point where we can no longer allow the situation to continue, from the point of view of
both our national power and our projected military operations. Moreover, the requirements with
respect to military operations will not permit an extension of time. Under the circumstances, our
Empire has no alternative but to begin war . . . in order to resolve the present crisis and assure
survival.36

Time had effectively run out for Japan. The war in China combined with the
embargoes by the Western powers pushed Japan to war. To the Japanese this was a
preventative war, in that it was neccessary to prevent the empire from being slowly
strangled to death by the Western powers. 37 The Japanese attitude to the situation was
best reflected by Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, who
believed that it was better to die fighting than be forced to bow to American pressure. 38

The resource pressures on Japan bought on by the China war forced the Japanese to
seek ever larger supplies of strategic raw materials. With the emplacement of embargoes
by the Western powers the Japanese leadership realised that it was no longer a question
of finding increased supplies of raw materials, what was needed were sources under
direct Japanese control. Thus the war in China forced the Japanese leadership to realise
that their military and economic objectives, based on then current resource supply, were
incompatible. Japan could no longer continue to expand militarily or geographically unless
it could secure far larger supplies of raw materials directly under Japanese control. This
realisation led to a shift in Japanese thinking from an empire based in Northeast Asia, to
the more ambitious concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere extending well
to the South.39 As such the war in China became the catalyst for a change in direction for
Japan's imperialist expansion.

To the Japanese Southeast Asia was in their natural sphere of influence. As Japan
was the most powerful and modern Asian state, there was naturally a belief in the
superiority of Japanese culture and institutions. This, according to Tokyo, meant that
Japan had special responsibilities in East Asia.40 This even extended to claims to a
'mission' in Asia. Since the European colonial possessions were the illegal property of
outside powers, Japan had the right, even the responsibility, to rescue Southeast Asia
from European oppression. For some this was Japan's 'Manifest Destiny'.41 As
Benedict argues, these ideas were based on the Japanese belief of hierarchy. The
Japanese believed that the absolute sovereignty and independence of nations could only
result in anarchy. Therefore the only solution was an international hierarchy of nations.
Since Japan was the only nation that was truly hierarchical and understood both the taking
and acceptance of one's proper place, Japan therefore had the responsibility of elevating
and directing its backward younger brother nations in East Asia.42 What this meant in
practice was that Japan was to be at the apex of an East Asian regional hierarchy, while
its younger regional brothers were to be under Japanese guardianship and control. With
the fall of France in June 1940 the Japanese realised that here was an historic opportunity
to realise these ambitions in East Asia. The war in China and the resulting increase in
Japan's resource vulnerability gave these ideas a new and more urgent appeal, until the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept became central to Japanese economic
and military policy. As Kupchan argues:

By 1940 . . . the Co-Prosperity Sphere had become an unquestioned goal, an integral part of how the
decision-making community . . . defined national security. Imperial expansion was no longer a means
to an end . . . but had become an end in itself.43

As the Western embargoes on Japan tightened, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere became increasingly seen as essential for the very survival of the Japanese empire
itself.44

In effect, the Co-Prosperity Sphere was about restructuring Asia under direct
Japanese control. Where the Western powers would be excluded from the region, or at
most allowed limited admittance under Japanese terms. 45 The Co-Prosperity Sphere
represented nothing less than Japan's intention to create its own closed trading bloc in
East Asia. Such a trading bloc would allow Japan to rid itself of its dependency on the
West. No longer would Japan be vulnerable to Western embargoes, especially on oil.
Japan hoped to be able to achieve economic and raw material independence from the
West. 46 The Co-Prosperity Sphere would also have military implications. With direct
control over a large supply of resources, Japan believed it would have the material
needed to successfully complete the China War. It would also give Japan the capacity to
fight a war against any of the Western powers without the fear of Western embargoes.
No longer would the Western powers be able to limit Japan's military power or threaten
Japan's defense through closing off supplies of raw materials. The Co-Prosperity Sphere
would also act as a defensive buffer against Western military power. It would give Japan
a defense in depth in the Asia-Pacific region, pushing Western power back into the
Eastern and Southern Pacific Ocean (around Australia) and the Indian Ocean.47 Finally
the Co-Prosperity Sphere would make Japan a major imperial power. Japan would no
longer be a mid-sized regional power. It would become a world power equal to the
Europeans and the United States in terms of world influence and military capacity, and
would no longer be at the mercy of the more powerful nations.

To the Japanese leadership the Co-Prosperity Sphere was of such importance that
Japan was fully prepared to use force to achieve it. This is shown by Tojo who stated at
the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941:

. . . the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would assure the existence of
our Empire and lay the foundations for stability in East Asia. To achieve these objectives, our
Empire must be prepared to sweep away any and all obstacles.48

Obviously, the 'obstacles' to be swept away were the Western powers, and just as
obviously they would not go willingly. Force would have to be used to achieve the
objective of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was in fact the very willingness of the Japanese
to use force to build the Co-Prosperity Sphere that made war inevitable.49

For the Japanese leadership, objective judgement was becoming increasingly scarce,
and a thing of the past. As the war in China became a quagmire and the embargoes bit
more deeply, Japan's sense of vulnerability saw the emergence of an increasing state of
irrationality among the Japanese leadership. This led to the situation were Japan's
strategy to deal with its problems were no longer based on hard-headed strategic
calculations. This occurred because the Japanese leaders had an emotional commitment
to expanding the empire, and they were therefore unable to tolerate any scaling back of
their imperial plans.50

The failure of the leadership's objective judgement is clearly shown in their inability to
view Japan's strategic position logically. Because of their commitment to a particular set
of strategic conceptions, the leadership became unwilling to accept information that
contradicted those conceptions. The leadership, knowing only too well the extreme risks
of their plans, refused to undertake comprehensive studies, as these would invariably
show the contradictions of the plans which the leadership did not want pointed out.
Knowing the risks, Japan's leaders were not prepared to change their plans to take into
account the reality of the situation. This extended to the point were individuals who tried
to make the leadership see sense were demoted, and any analyses that contradicted the
official line were buried.51 Even those individuals who supported a Southern advance,
and who knew that the chances of winning a war against the Western powers was slim at
best, still chose to support the decision for war instead of submitting to Western pressure
or giving up their plans.52 In effect the Japanese leadership refused to accept reality, and
found itself caught in an illusion of its own making. This is shown by Kupchan who writes:

[The] . . . elites had become so wedded to the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
that they preferred to perpetuate this illusion and incur the associated costs rather than to adapt their
goals to strategic realities.53

This is very similar to the response of the American elites to the Vietnam war. They too
had their own version of reality, and their own prejudged world view, that shaped their
decisions and into which all information had to fit or be rejected. As Kolko argues:

Immune to critical analyses out of choice, and ignoring those few sceptical studies it inadvertently
sponsored, [Washington was left with] . . . very little comprehension of the larger meaning of [the
Vietnam war].54

This statement could easily have been written about the Japan of the early 1940s, as it
clearly reflects the attitude of the Japanese leadership, and its tunnel-vision view of its
own interests.

This type of thinking led to an irrational world view. The Japanese knowing of their
material limitations compared to the United States, were prepared to put their trust in a
mystical national 'spirit' to defeat U.S. military superiority. It would be, said the Japanese,
"a victory of spirit over matter."55 This sort of thinking was later reflected in China in
Mao's emphases of ideology over expertise. This was clearly an irrational expectation,
especially so when based on Japan's position. If spirit could overcome material
shortages, then why had it not done so in China, and therefore why the need to expand
the war to the South? The fact that the Japanese leadership were willing to put their trust
in such nebulous concepts, appeared to undermined all that Japan had learnt since the
1850s, when it realised that it was technical knowledge and material resources combined
that produced military power. Such notions appeared to influence some individuals in the
leadership to advocate throwing caution to the wind. As Matsuoka Yosuke, as Foreign
Minister, said in June 1941, "From the point of view of diplomacy, I would like to go on a
sudden rampage, but I won't because the Supreme Command tells me not to."56

Ultimately though, the Japanese did go on a sudden rampage. The fact that they did
so shows how irrational the leadership had become. Instead of continuing their policy of
piecemeal expansion, as in French Indo-China, the Japanese chose instead to try to take
everything at once, which was clearly beyond their capacity to hold. In doing so they
chose to fight the very nation they knew they could not defeat. Such thinking and
decision making was not simply irrational, it was nothing less than self-destructive.

In conclusion, Japan's decision to expand the war in 1941 was based on its problems
in China. The extension of Japanese control in China beyond Manchuria saw Japan
expand to the limit of its resource supply. With the failure to reap the expected dividends
from China the Japanese discovered that it had pushed its imperial expansion beyond its
material base. Therefore Japan had to find additional sources of raw materials if it was to
have any hope of finalising the war in China. This unexpected outcome jolted the
Japanese leadership into the realisation that their venture in China was putting national
security at risk. It showed the Japanese leadership the absolute limits to Japan's power
based on its then current resource supply. The result was an increasingly acute sense of
resource and therefore national vulnerability. This sense of vulnerability lay at the heart of
Japan's actions from 1938 onwards, and led directly to its decision to go to war in 1941.

Oil supply posed the most significant problem for the Japanese, as it was intimately
linked to national security. Without oil Japan was effectively defenceless in terms of its
navy. National security dictated that Japan have a secure supply of oil under its own
direct control. The only possibility of this was in the Dutch East Indies. Yet when the
Dutch refused to provide additional supplies of oil to Japan, the Japanese realised that
their national security needs overrode Dutch sovereignty.

The institution of Western embargoes showed the Japanese even more starkly their
resource vulnerability, particularly to the Western powers. The China war, by making
Japan more reliant on Western sources of raw materials, highlighted the need for sources
independent of Western control. Obviously, with Japan dependent on Western imports,
the West had a very powerful lever of control over Japan. For the Japanese, removal of
that lever was of the utmost importance. This is what the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere was designed to accomplish, as well as raise Japan up to the top rung
of powerful nations. Since the war in Europe had weakened the European's hold on their
Asian possessions, there would never be a better time to build a new Southern empire.
At this point time constraints, due to oil supply, became crucial to the decision for war. A
war could only be fought while Japan still had the resources to do so. To delay meant a
slow decline to powerlessness, until Japan become militarily impotent.

This fear of impotence undermined the judgement of Japan's leadership. It led to a
narrowing of strategic thinking, where the solutions to Japan's problems were increasingly
seen in a more limited fashion. Anything that did not fit the perceived solution to the
strategic situation was rejected, until the only solution became a desperate gamble of
pitting national spirit against overwhelming material power.

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ENDNOTES

1. J . C h e s n e a u x , & M . B a s t i d , & M . C . B e r g e r e ,

C h i n a F r o m t h e O p i u m W a r s to the 1911 Revolution,

(Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977), p. 61.

2. J. K. Fairbank, 1953, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast:

The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854, vol.1,

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p.33.

3. Chesneaux, et. al, op. cit., p. 61.

4. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

5. I.C.Y.Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th Ed,

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 192.

6. F. Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China,

(New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 9-10.

7. Ibid., p. 9.

8. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

9. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 20.

10. Ibid., p. 33.

11. J. K. Fairbank, and S. Teng, et al, China's Response to the West: A Document

Survey 1839-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 37.

12. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 180-182.

13. Ibid., pp. 180-183.

14. Ibid., pp. 179-180.

15. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 13.

16. Ibid.

17. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

18. Ibid., p. 187.

19. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 94.

20. Hsu, op. cit., p. 188.

21. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 90.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 94.

24. Ibid., pp. 86-96.

25. Hsu, op. cit., p. 189.

26. Wakeman, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

27. Ibid., p. 14.

28. S. Hu, Imperialism and Chinese Politics,

(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 140.

29. Hsu, op. cit., p. 186.

30. Ibid., p. 190.

31. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 37.

32. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

33. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 16.

34. Hu, op. cit., p. 141

35. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 17.

36. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 37.

37. Hu, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

38. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

39. Hu, op. cit., p. 140.

40. Hsu, op. cit., p. 201.

41. Ibid., p. 198.

42. Chesneaux, et. al, op. cit., p. 77.

43. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

44. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 40.

45. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 23.

46. Ibid., p. 37.

47. Ibid., p. 29-33.

48. Hsu, op. cit., p. 201.

49. Ibid., p. 202.

50. L. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire,

(London: Abacus, 1994), p. 238.

51. Ibid., p. 238.

52. Hsu, op. cit., p. 210.

53. Hu, op. cit., p. 141.

54. Hsu, op. cit., p. 210.

55. James, op. cit., p. 240.

----------------------------------------

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