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The Response of the Chinese Government to Increased Western Imperialist Pressure 1839 - 1861. SYNOPSIS This essay considers the question of how the Chinese government responded to increased Western pressure between 1839 and 1861. It shows the Chinese government struggled to have the West submit to tributary status, and that this began to breakdown as Western pressure increased after 1839. Between 1839 and 1861 the Chinese government's response went through three phases. 1839-1842 was the period of non-appeasement to Western demands, where the West could only force change through military action. The 1842-1848 phase where the Manchu government was forced to appease the West after its loss of the Opium War, and to protect the dynasty. The 1848-1861 phase where the non-appeasement policy re-emerged, and where the government would only permit minor concessions to the West. Then, a frustrated Britain, finally decided to use military force to install its diplomats in Peking, which the Chinese government was determined would not happen, so as to continue its illusion of the West's tributary status. Between the years 1839 and 1861 the Chinese government was subject to ever increasing pressure by the Western nations, especially Britain, to open up to increased trade and diplomatic contact. The Manchu Government's response to this pressure is the topic of this essay. It will show that the government's overall response was to try and maintain its traditional relationship with other countries, and to make the West accept this as the basis of its relationship to China. In this, it expected the West to accept the status of a tributary nation of the middle kingdom, and that this was used as a defence mechanism connected with the policy of seclusion. When this began to breakdown from 1839, it will be argued that the government went through three distinct phases in its policy position in relation to the West between 1839 and 1861. The first phase, 1839 to 1842, was that of a hard-line policy of non-appeasement to Western demands, and that this began to breakdown after the initial military losses of the Opium war. The second phase, 1842 to 1848, was the period of appeasement of the West, in order to restrain the West from further military action, following the loss of the Opium war. The third phase, 1848 to 1861, is the period of the re-emergence of the hard-line non-appeasement policy, as a reaction to what was perceived as the failure of the policy of appeasement. It will also be shown that irrespective of which policy the court followed, the most fundamentally important requirement for the court, was the maintenance of the Manchu Dynasty's hold on power. Between 1839 and 1861 the Chinese government attempted to maintain the traditional and existing relationship that it had with all other countries, and it attempted to extend this traditional relationship to the Western nations,1 and to have the West fit into and accept tributary status.2 To the Chinese there was no distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.3 They used the tribute system as a diplomatic medium and vehicle for foreign relations, where outsiders were only permitted contact with China on terms set by China. Naturally, this would only be permitted if the outsiders recognised China's universal overlordship, and accepted their Chinese assigned status as mere tributaries to the Middle Kingdom. In this sense China tried to use the tributary system for political security from the West.4 The problem for the Chinese government was the conflict caused from the fundamental incompatibility of the tribute system, and the system of diplomatic representation and intercourse of the Western nations.5 The use of the tribute system was in keeping with China's policy of seclusion. It was a reaction to the lawless behaviour of European traders, and was designed to restrain the Western foreigners, and limit the problems they could cause the Chinese government. Seclusion was also used to stop the West's strange new ideas and forces from entering China, and from the Chinese' fear of foreigners becoming acquainted with China.6 This anti- foreign policy of the Manchu government was designed to protect and maintain the Manchu ruling dynasty, and to eliminate any possible source of danger to their power. The Manchu rulers were well aware of the history of the dynastic cycle, where "danger from without generally coincided with trouble from within".7 As such, the Chinese government was determined to ensure internal peace, by stopping contact between the Chinese people and the foreigners. As well as foreigners gaining any information about China's internal situation which they could use to threaten Manchu rule.8 In essence, the policy of seclusion, and the attempt to make the West fit into the tributary system, shows what Fairbanks called China's "Intellectual unpreparedness for Western contact, so evident in the . . . thought of China in 1840 . . .".9 Where even after more than a century of contact with the West, the Chinese court had little, if any, real idea of the West's view of the world. This led to what Fairbanks called: . . . one of the fundamental reasons for the collapse of the Confucian state. [Where] Tribute continued to dominate Chinese official thought after trade had begun to predominate in the practice of Chinese foreign relations. . . . the Confucian bureaucrats tried to treat the new trading nations of the West as mere tributaries. When this proved impossible, they were incapable of changing their immemorial theory to fit the new situation.10 Clearly, the Chinese government's response between 1839 and 1861 to the West was not simply a policy to maintain their traditions. It was predetermined by a traditional mode of thought, that the Chinese appeared unwilling, even unable, to break free of. In the period 1839 to 1842, the court followed a policy of non-appeasement, which began to break down after 1840.11 This hard-line policy of the government began with their decision to ban opium use and importation. Although mainly directed at the domestic opium trade, it harmed Western interests by reducing the demand for opium.12 This toughening stance against opium was then directed against the Western traders, when Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu ordered the surrender of all opium, then proceeded to destroy it, without compensation to the British.13 The hard-line stance of Lin can be seen in the fact that although he did not want war with Britain, he was prepared to start one if necessary, to stop the opium trade in China.14 Nor was the government unprepared to fight. As Wakeman shows, in order to protect their ruling position, the Manchu Government ". . . went to war unhesitatingly".15 This uncompromising attitude of the court began to fade with the British military victories in 1840. As the war progressed the government's attitude began to change from ". . . firmness to oscillation and ultimately to compromise"16 This can be seen in the emperor losing faith in Lin after the fall of Chusan, and the appointment of Chi-shan to begin talks with the British.17 Yet the court was not yet prepared to accept the idea of defeat. The emperor was enraged by the so called 'Chuan-pi Convention', removing Chi-shan from his position and recalling him to Peking for trial.18 At this stage the hard-line policy was still very much alive, the Chinese government still prepared to continue the war, as seen by their policy of "advancing and exterminating".19 This is seen by the appointment of I-shan, who Hsu calls a "barbarian-suppressing general" as the new Imperial Commissioner.20 Nevertheless, the court was not as sure of its position as it had been. This shifting between first war, then negotiations, then war again, showed the courts' uncertainty in the correct position to take. This vacillating between war and peace was due to the court's inability to solve the dilemma it now found itself in. If it surrendered it would be tantamount to an admission of weakness and failure on the part of the Manchu Dynasty, which could then open the door to possible internal rebellions. On the other hand the court feared further military defeats, which would show even more boldly the dynasty's weakness. With the British military victories in 1841-42 the court was finally forced to see the need for a settlement of the war. This was because the court was in a state of fear and uncertainty, as it was now beginning to realise the strength and superiority of the British forces.21 In this situation the court again reconsidered its hard-line policy, finally admitting its failure with the appointment of Ch'i-ying as Imperial Commissioner to begin negotiations.22 For Ch'i-ying there was only one option for the court, "Aside from getting them [the British] under control [through negotiations], there is no other policy to follow . . .".23 Yet even now, in 1842, with negotiations begun the court still continued its bellicose attitude. It was extremely reluctant to accept the need for complete surrender. In fact Ch'i- ying was initially instructed by the court to negotiate a victory, for the Chinese that is, or at the very least a compromise acceptable to the court. Even while he was undertaking the negotiations, the court was prepared for continued military resistance if necessary.24 Nevertheless, this bellicose attitude was as much a fearful bluster as anything else. It was now clear to the court that they could not defend China from the barbarians, let alone defeat them. In this situation the court recognised the futility of further resistance. Its first priority now became the survival of the Manchu Dynasty itself, and how to prevent a further lose of face before the Chinese, so as to prevent any revolts against the Manchu rule.25 This attitude, and Chinese military weakness, made it inevitable that the court would be forced to accept whatever the West imposed. To Wakeman, the Manchu government's decision to sign the Treaty of Nanking was nothing less than having ". . . sold out China to a foreign power".26 The signing of the treaty began the period of Chinese appeasement and compromise which lasted from 1842 to 1848. The loss of the Opium War rocked the hard-line anti- foreign policy to its foundations.27 The court grudgingly recognised that management of the barbarians was the only real alternative open to it with the failure of the hard-line policy.28 This was not only due to China's military weakness, but barbarian management was seen to be able to work. This can be seen when Chi-shan was able to negotiate the removal of British troops from Northern China, without a fight.29 Yet it should not be assumed that the court became completely servile to British demands. The signing of the treaty was not selling out China to the foreigners. Rather it was forced on China. As Hsu makes clear, "This treaty was imposed by the victor upon the vanquished at gunpoint . . .".30 In this sense then, the Chinese court began a policy of mollifying the West, in order to stop them from further military action.31 This can be seen with the signing of the further Treaty of the Bogue with the British. In fact the court still saw itself as being both in charge, and in control, of relations with the West. An example of this is the signing of the Treaty of Wanghsia with the United States, and the Treaty of Whampoa with France. The treaty stipulation of extraterritoriality was seen by the court as being granted to show the court's magnanimity. The most-favoured-nation status was seen as being granted to show that the court treated all men, even barbarians, with equal tolerance, if not benevolence.32 Still, compared to the earlier stance of hard-line non- appeasement, these treaties were definitely a turn around, and it was clear that only the Chinese thought they were really in control. This was seen by Wakeman as the court further selling out China to the West. He writes, "The various treaties signed between 1842 and 1844 showed that, . . . the Manchu government ungrudgingly made a series of concessions [to] the capitalist countries". [emphases added]33 The reality was somewhat different. The court did not 'ungrudgingly' make these treaties. It attempted to resist the West wherever possible. The emperor himself encouraged Ch'i- ying to resist British demands to enter Canton,34 nor would the court allow foreign diplomatic representatives to go to Peking,35 even though these were within the terms of the Treaty. As well, the Chinese attempted to practice a policy of buying off the West with concessions,36 combined with a policy of playing off the Western powers with each other.37 The Treaties of Wanghsia and Whampoa were examples of this policy. Through buying off the U.S. and France with these treaties, the Chinese hoped to gain their good will, even help, in the future. As well, as the Western nations were trading competitors in China, the Chinese hoped to use this situation to cause conflict between them, thereby undermining any united action against China. If this just happened to undermine British profits, then the Chinese would not shed any tears over it, to say the least.38 Unfortunately for the Chinese, the most-favoured-nation clauses effectively stopped the possibility of conflicts between the Western nations, effectively undermining China's policy.39 Clearly, the court had little option but to follow a policy of appeasement. With its stunning military losses, and fear of the consequences, the court did the only thing left to it. It bought time: in an attempt to regain at least some control of the situation, and to protect the Manchu Dynasty. Further military resistance would have been pointless, and would have seriously threatened the dynasty's ability to survive. Not only would this have been against the interests of the dynasty itself, but would also have been against British interests. It would also have been against the interests of China as a whole, including its people, both of whom Wakeman accuses the Manchu government of selling out. How the threat of serious political turmoil, with the fall of the Manchu government, would have been better, is difficult to see. This period of appeasement was only short lived. By 1848 the advocates of the hard-line policy of non-appeasement began to re-emerge and regroup to gain influence. This beganwith the resignation of Ch'i-ying, and the appointment of the xenophobic officials Hsu Kuang-chin as Imperial Commissioner, and Yeh Ming-ch'en as governor of Kwangtung. Both ofthese men had an arrogant and unyielding attitude to foreigners, while secretly encouraging the people to have an anti-foreign attitude.40 The re-emergence of the hard-liners was due to the courts realisation that appeasement was unable to change the basic demands of the foreigners.41 As well, there was a growing belief that the appeasers had not only failed in foreign policy, but were also to blame for domestic problems, such as the Taiping Rebellion.42 This hard-line stance became official policy with the coming to power of a new emperor. Emperor Hsien-feng (1851-1861) was "violently hostile to foreigners", and was seen to be even more uncompromising in his dealings with the West.43 He also continued the half-hearted policy of appeasement of the previous emperor.44 This change to a hard-line policy was complicated by the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion. From the loss of the Opium War onwards, the defence of the Manchu Dynasty became central to the policy making of the government. Its primary policy became ". . . to follow a course of action calculated to ward off the most imminent danger, at the given time, to the interests of the Manchu rulers".45 To the Manchu government the rebellion was the most imminent danger to its survival. As such, it was not prepared to compromise with the Taipings. In fact, Wakeman goes as far to argue that, " even after the fall of the capital and the emperor's flight to Jehol, the Manchu government preferred to accept the humiliating peace terms dictated by the foreign aggressors . . . ", rather than stop fighting the Taipings.46 In this situation it was forced to be more lenient with the West than may otherwise have been the case, but unlike previously, was only prepared to make partial and minor concessions.47 In this way the government played a double game between the West and the Chinese people. It was prepared to ignore the people to appease the foreigners, as Ch'i-ying did in Canton in 1846.48 Yet if it felt threatened by the people the government would use this as a reason to deny British demands. This can be seen when in 1849 commissioner Hsu Kuang-chin denied the British entry into Canton claiming, as Hsu shows " . . . that the emperor could not ignore the spontaneous and unanimous opinion of the people of Canton".49 This hard-line attitude was put to the ultimate test in 1856 with the outbreak of the Arrow War. As in the First Opium War, China quickly suffered stunning military defeats, and was forced to negotiate. To James, this war was simply "an exercise in intimidation".50 It was a reaction by the British to the increasingly hard-nosed attitude of Commissioner Yeh Ming- chin, who had done everything possible to keep them out of Canton. It was used by the British to settle outstanding differences between them and the Chinese, and to make the Chinese government more servile.51 Again, as in 1842, the Chinese did not want to surrender, but were forced to with, as Hsu states " a Knife at their throats . . .", in the form of British threats of going to Peking itself, to force the signing of the new treaty.52 This was the one thing the court would not accept. Since the signing of the Treaty of Nanking this had been a bone of contention between China and the West, as the court had continuously denied Western diplomats the privilege to reside in Peking. As such, the diplomats had been forced to stay in the treaty ports and deal through Chinese intermediaries. In this way they were kept at arms reach by the court, the intermediaries being used as a hostile buffer between the foreigners and the court.53 Chinese resistance to this was unwavering, as the court was well aware of the significance of Western diplomats in Peking. This is shown by Hsu who states, "The emperor, who viewed diplomatic representation as the end of the tributary system and a denial of China's universal overlordship, remained violently opposed to it".54 Clearly, even after everything the Manchu government had been forced to cede to the Western powers, they were not prepared to give up the only thing they really had left; their illusion of greatness. The court's determination to resist this, the final humiliation, saw them go to great lengths to keep the British Envoy, Fredrick Bruce, out of Peking. It ultimately required the British to militarily occupy Peking, inflicting the ultimate humiliation on the court; being seen to flee in the face of the barbarians. This, finally, destroyed both the tribute system, and the illusion of China's universal overlordship. Robert Swinhoe, an interpreter for the British forces in Peking, summed it up best when he wrote, "Poor heathens! They little know our strength, although they have show themselves brave fellows".55 In conclusion, the years 1839 to 1842 marked the final years of China's traditional way of handling foreign relations. The Manchu Dynasty found itself in an increasingly unsolvable dilemma. How could it give the Western foreigners what they wanted without causing internal problems in China, and thereby threaten the dynasty's rule? If it gave in to the West it risked being seen as weak by its own people, who might then take it into their heads to revolt. Yet if it tried to resist the West, then the West's military superiority would then be used against it, positively showing the Chinese people the dynasty's weakness. At first the government chose the hard-line approach, as much out of ignorance of Western power, as out of a need to be seen to be in control. Yet this hard-line attitude was no match for modern weapons. With the first military losses the court began to vacillate between war and peace, finally seeing the need to stop the fighting to save the dynasty. Having effectively 'surrendered', the court tried a different, more pragmatic, approach. Appeasement now became the name of the game, where the court would give up what it had to, in order to protect the dynasty. While at the same time trying to buy itself some Western friends, even while trying to play them off against each other. Unfortunately for the Manchu, this policy failed, as the basic desires of the West could not be changed merely by smooth talking. Again the court did a policy "U-turn", returning to its earlier, and it appears preferred, stance of non-appeasement. Having created a hostile buffer between it and the foreigners, it effectively created the stage for another show-down. The British were more than prepared to take up the challenge, and effectively dispatched the Chinese military with the ease that they had previously. Only now the British wanted that which the court was determined not to allow: Western diplomatic representation in Peking. The court saw clearly that this would effectively put an end to its security arrangement: the tribute system. Finally, the British were able to rid the court of this quaint notion, by the thorough application of the "policy of the big stick". --------------------------------------------------------- ENDNOTES 1. J. Chesneaux, & M. Bastid, & M.C. Bergere, China From the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977), p. 61. 2. J. K. Fairbank, 1953, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854, vol.1, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p.33. 3. Chesneaux, et. al, op. cit., p. 61. 4. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 5. I.C.Y.Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th Ed, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 192. 6. F. Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 9-10. 7. Ibid., p. 9. 8. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 9. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 20. 10. Ibid., p. 33. 11. J. K. Fairbank, and S. Teng, et al, China's Responce to the West: A Document Survey 1839-1923, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 37. 12. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 180-182. 13. Ibid., pp. 180-183. 14. Ibid., pp. 179-180. 15. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 13. 16. Ibid. 17. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 185-186. 18. Ibid., p. 187. 19. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 94. 20. Hsu, op. cit., p. 188. 21. Fairbank, op. cit., p. 90. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 94. 24. Ibid., pp. 86-96. 25. Hsu, op. cit., p. 189. 26. Wakeman, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 27. Ibid., p. 14. 28. S. Hu, Imperialism and Chinese Politics, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 140. 29. Hsu, op. cit., p. 186. 30. Ibid., p. 190. 31. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 37. 32. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 191-192. 33. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 16. 34. Hu, op. cit., p. 141 35. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 17. 36. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 37. 37. Hu, op. cit., pp. 139-140. 38. Hsu, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 39. Hu, op. cit., p. 140. 40. Hsu, op. cit., p. 201. 41. Ibid., p. 198. 42. Chesneaux, et. al, op. cit., p. 77. 43. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 44. Fairbank, and Teng, op. cit., p. 40. 45. Wakeman, op. cit., p. 23. 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. Ibid., p. 29-33. 48. Hsu, op. cit., p. 201. 49. Ibid., p. 202. 50. L. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 238. 51. Ibid., p. 238. 52. Hsu, op. cit., p. 210. 53. Hu, op. cit., p. 141. 54. Hsu, op. cit., p. 210. 55. James, op. cit., p. 240. ---------------------------------------------------- BIBLIOGRAPHY Banno, M. 1964. China and the West 1858-1861: The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen. Rainbow-Bridge Book Co. Chesneaux, J. & Bastid, M. & Bergere, M.C. 1977. China From the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution. Sussex: The Harvester Press. Epstein, I. 1956. From Opium War to Liberation. 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"Decline and Humiliation: The Nineteenth Century". in Imperial China. Melbourne: Penguin Books. pp. 125-156. Wakeman, F. 1975. The Fall of Imperial China. New York: The Free Press. ---------------------------------------------------- |
