In writing this article I have followed the explanatory path of objectivity-in-parenthesis. Indeed, I could not have written it following the explanatory path of objectivity-without-parenthesis, because such an explanatory path, by negating the question about the origin of the properties of the observer as a biological entity, is constitutively blind to what I have said. Now I shall end by presenting some concluding remarks also in the same explanatory path, and I shall do so in the form of statements that I shall not further qualify.
The praxis of living, the experience of the observer as such, just happens. Indeed, praxes are valid in themselves; they are as they do. Because of this, explanations are essentially superfluous; we as observers do not need them to happen; but when it happens to us that we explain, it turns out that explanations are not trivial: due to the recursive reciprocal involvement between language and bodyhood the praxis of living of the observer changes as he or she generates explanations of his or her praxis of living. This is why everything that we say or think has consequences in the way we live. We can be aware of this now.
It has been said that we human beings are rational animals, and that it is rationality what makes us human. Along this line we have devalued emotions and exalted rationality, and we have done this so much that whenever we see in a non-human animal some complex adaptive behavior, we immediately want to ascribe to the animal some sort of rational thinking. Furthermore, along the same line, in our daily life of coexistence with other human beings we usually demand from them rational behavior, and we justify our demand with the explicit claim that a rational argument is universally valid because it does not depend on what we do or feel as observers. Indeed, we human beings have created many complex ideologies that justify the destruction or preservation of the other on rational grounds. We are now aware that all this can end. We human beings are not rational animals; we are emotional, languaging animals that use the operational coherences of language, through the constitution of rational systems, to explain and justify our actions, while in the process, and without realising it, we blind ourselves about the emotional grounding of all the rational domains that we bring forth. Notwithstanding this, rationality, as expression of the operational coherences of languaging, and through this of the operational coherences of the flow of recursive consensual co-ordinations of actions that constitutes language, is the condition of possibility of any explaining. So, the logical coherence of an explanation depends on reason, but its contents, as well as the rational domain in which it takes place, depend on the emotioning of the observer expressed in his or her listening as he or she prefers one or another criterion of validation for his or her explaining. Now we can be aware of this.
It has been said that we human beings are ethical animals because we are rational animals. Now we are aware that this is not so. Ethics arises in our concern for the other, not in our compliance with a rational argument, and our concern for the other is emotional, not rational. It is love, the emotion that constitutes social coexistence, that specifies our domains of concern in the communities that we create with other human beings. Therefore, we do not have to justify our concern for the other in a social community because such a concern is constitutive of our social coexistence. At the same time, we do not have to justify our lack of concern for those others with whom we have a non-social coexistence, because that lack of concern is constitutive of the non-social coexistence. It is only when we want the operationality of mutual concern between human beings who are not members of the same social community that we may require a rational argument to bring it forth through the generation of an explicit agreement. We do not have to be afraid that the recognition of this may open a space for the justification of additional human abuse if we are aware of it. We can only act at any moment in a domain of actions specified by our emotioning at that moment. Moreover, what an observer sees as abuse, the actor genuinely may not see as such, and each, the observer and the observed, will act in the domain of actions that his or her emotion specify at that moment. If we recognise abuse we cannot escape the ethical concern that such a recognition entails, otherwise we would not have recognised it. As a result, we cannot avoid acting either according to our recognition of abuse, or to our accepting that we want the abuse that we see under some other emotion that obscures our concern for the other. We are aware of this now.
We human beings exist in language. As such we exist in a world that consists in the flow of our recursive consensual co-ordinations of actions with other human beings in the praxis of living. The lives that we human beings live, therefore, are necessarily always our responsibility because it arises in our languaging: the world that we live is always constituted in our human actions. In these circumstances, responsibility only means that we can be aware that our human life takes place in languaging, and that because awareness takes place in language, we can be aware that our awareness about what we do as human beings has consequences in what we do as human beings. Life happens to us, we find ourselves in it, yet it is not the same for our lives to be aware or not to be aware of what we do, to language or not to language what we language, or to think or not to think what we think as human beings. Now we are aware of this.
From all that I have said it is apparent that the physical domain of existence is one of many domains of reality or cognitive domains that we bring forth as we explain our praxis of living in the explanatory path of objectivity-in-parenthesis. The physical domain of existence, therefore, is an explanatory as well as an ontological domain in the domain of constitutive ontologies. It is, however, a peculiar one because it takes place as the domain in which we as observers explain ourselves as living systems that can give origin to the observer as an operation in a different and non-intersecting phenomenal domain from the one in which they exist as such. Or, in other words, the physical domain of existence as an explanatory domain that we bring forth in the explanation of some aspects of our praxis of living with other aspects of our praxis of living, is a peculiar cognitive domain because it is constituted as the domain of operational coherences in which we observers bring forth (distinguish) our components as living systems through the operation of our components as we interact as living systems. Our usual difficulties of grasping this are mainly twofold:
a) Due to our Western cultural tradition we like to be able to say something about a domain of things or entities that we assume to have an existence independent of what we do. Furthermore, we want to apply to that independent domain all the distinctions that we use in language as a human domain of recursive co-ordinations of consensual actions.
b) We do not like to accept or we are not aware, that it is the case that the distinctions, such as object or relation, that we make in languaging arise in the constitution of language as a closed domain of recursive consensual co-ordinations of actions, and constitutively do not apply outside it. As a result of this, we usually have difficulties in accepting, and in imagining, that outside language nothing (no thing) exists because existence is bound to our distinctions in language. No doubt a modern physicist may say that quantum physics says that the categories of daily life do not apply in the realm of elementary particles. Yet I am saying much more than that: I am saying that all phenomena, including of course those of quantum physics as well as those of the observer and observing, are cognitive phenomena that arise in observing as the observer operates in language explaining his or her praxis of living; that observing can only be understood as a result of the biology of language, and that observing does not reveal an independent reality, but constitutes the observed as a configuration of consensual co-ordinations of actions in language. Indeed, this is what I indicate as I call the explanatory path of objectivity-in-parenthesis the domain of 'constitutive ontologies' in the ontological diagram presented earlier. Nothing precedes its distinction; existence in any domain, even the existence of the observer themselves, is constituted in the distinctions of the observer in the explanation of his or her praxis of living.
Nothing exists outside language because existence is constituted in the explanation of the praxis of living of the observer, regardless of the explanatory path followed; even the praxis of living of the observer exists only as he or she beings it forth in languaging for explaining or describing. However, if in our search for explanation we ask for the characteristics of the transcendental substratum on which, for epistemological reasons we expect everything to take place, we find from all that I have said above that the ontology of observing shows us that we cannot say anything about it, not even to refer to it as an it, because as soon as we do so we are in language, in the domain of recursive co-ordinations of actions of observers that arise as they operate in language. Outside language no thing exists. We now can be aware that this is a constitutive human cognitive condition, not a circumstantial limitation.
Explanations pertain to the domain of human coexistence, and as such they take place only in conversations that demand a reformulation of the praxis of living of the observer. The same applies to reality: reality is a proposition that arises in a disagreement as an attempt to recover a lost domain of co-ordinations of actions, or to generate a new one. Indeed, in the daily life of the greco-judeo-christian tradition to which our modern scientific and technological culture belongs, reality and the real are argument that we use in our human coexistence whenever we want to compel another human being, without using force, to do something we want, and which the other will not do spontaneously. The same happens in this tradition with the notions of reason and rationality that we use as compelling arguments under the implicit cultural claim that through them we refer to universal, transcendental truths. It happens, however, that we are not usually aware of this because as we grow in this tradition we become members of a culture that entails that most or all the explanations given in it should take place following the explanatory path of objectivity-without-parenthesis. In this explanatory path, reality and the real are also explanatory propositions of the praxis of living of the observer that arise in a breakdown of his or her co-ordinations of actions with an other, but which do not arise as his or her attempt to compel the other to do his or her will. Quite the contrary, in this explanatory path reality and the real arise as invitations of one observer to another to become involved in the constitution of a particular domain of co-ordinations of actions as a domain of coexistence in mutual acceptance. Furthermore, while in this explanatory path the observer is aware of all this, in the other he or she is not. We can be aware of this now.
Awareness of our actions makes our actions objects of our reflections, and opens their consequences to our liking or disliking them. Awareness of our liking or disliking of the consequences of what we do makes us aware that we always do what we do because we want the consequences of what we are aware that we do, even when we claim that we do not want those consequences. In other words, awareness of our liking or disliking of the consequences of what we do constitutes our responsibility for the consequences of what we do because it makes us aware that we do what we do because we want the consequences of what we do. Finally, awareness of our liking or disliking of our liking or disliking of the consequences of what we do constitutes our human freedom by making us responsible for our emotions through being aware of them, as well as our liking or disliking of them. In the recursive involvement between languaging, emotioning and becoming, that our epigenesis entails, we human beings live our lives in a continuous recursive involvement between awareness and becoming. In these circumstances, it is not the same for us to be aware or not to be aware of what we do in our interpersonal relationships, and it is not the same for our body dynamics in all its dimensions because the courses that our lives follow in our continuous body change and transformation, are at every instant contingent on our awareness, or lack of awareness of our actions. We can be aware of this now.
Human life is involved upon itself in the flow of the recursive dynamic coupling of language, emotioning and bodyhood: whatever we language as we flow in our emotioning becomes our bodyhood and the world as we live as human beings, and our recursive consensual co-ordinations of actions in the flow of our emotioning as we live the world we live, constitutes our languaging. Due to this, human life appears open to any historical course that we may imagine in this recursive involvement. Literature, written in novels or stories, or played in theatre or cinema, appears as an indication of what is possible. This wide-openness, however, is possible only in literature; our biology as human beings constitutes the extension of our living by specifying what is possible through the conservation of the manner of living that constitutes us as human: male co-operation in child care, sharing of food, concern for the other, recurrent interactions in sensuality, mutual acceptance as the basic manner of coexistence, and languaging. In other words, we shall remain human only as long as our operation in love and ethics is the operational basis of our coexistence as languaging animals. Indeed, living in the negation of consensuality, of love and of ethics, as the grounding of the different manners of our coexistence, constitutes the negation of humanity. Of this we can be aware now.