The observer and observing are operations in language that take place, respectively, as fourth and second-order recursive consensual co-ordinations of actions between organisms (homo sapiens in our case) in language. The observer and observing, therefore, arise in the flow of structural changes that takes place in the members of a community of observers as they co-ordinate their consensual actions through their recurrent structural interactions in the domain of operational coherences in which they realise their conjoined praxis of living. In other words, observer and observing constitutively take place through, and in the course of, the structural changes of the observers as these operate as a structure determined system conserving their structural correspondence with the medium in which they interact. There are some consequences of this which are worth mentioning.
a) The observer is necessarily always in structural correspondence in its domain of existence. Due to this, the observer constitutively cannot make distinctions outside the domain of operational coherences of his or her praxis of living. As a result, the observer necessarily finds itself in the praxis of living making distinctions that are operationally never out of place because they pertain to the operational coherences of his or her realisation as a living system constitutively in structural congruence with the medium.
b) When an observer who operates in the explanatory path of objectivity-in-parenthesis claims that a mistaken distinction has been made, what he or she claims is that a distinction has been made in an operational domain different from the one that he or she expected, and not that the operation of distinction is at fault. And this is so because in this explanatory path the observer is aware that the object is constituted in the operation of distinction. It is only in the explanatory path of objectivity-without-parenthesis, in which the object distinguished is assumed to exist with independency of what the observer does, that the observer can claim that, in a mistaken distinction, the fault is in the operation of distinctions and not in the appreciation of the observer about what took place.
c) Since all the conversations in which an observer anticipates are realised through the structural dynamics of his or her bodyhood, the bodyhood of the observer is a node of intersection of all the conversations in which he or she participates. As a consequence, we move as observers from one domain of languaging to another in the braiding of our languaging and emotioning, as a result of the flow of our structural changes as we operate as such in the realisation of our praxis of living in structural congruence with the medium. Due to this, non-intersecting conversations in the domain of the actions that they co-ordinate may affect each other through the structural changes that they entail in the bodyhoods of the observers that participate in them. And also due to this, any structural change in the observer, whatever its history, is liable to affect the course of his or her languaging and emotioning (see (3) below).
d) The generative relation between languaging and the structural dynamics of the observers that generate it in the flow of their recurrent interactions cannot be directly seen by a naive observer who has not become aware of it through explaining language as a biological phenomenon in the explanatory path of objectivity-in-parenthesis. A naive observer can only see an arbitrary, or even a mysterious, phenomenon when observing in another observer an unexpected change from one languaging domain to another, if he or she cannot propose a direct generative relation connecting the first and second languaging domains in a manner through which one will arise from the other.