Clausewitz wrote that a major battle in a theatre of operations is a collision between
two centres of gravity. The greater the force that can be concentrated on the centre of
gravity of either contending force, the more certain and massive the effect will be. The
centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force
derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. It is the hub of all
power and movement. In essence, the commander must employ his force to destabilise the
centre of gravity of the enemy, ideally through superior intelligence and manoeuvre.
MLW 1-1-1, The Fundamentals Of Land Warfare, para 3.19
The concept of a centre of gravity is starting to creep into Australian doctrine from
American and British sources. Nevertheless, its meaning and how it might be applied are
still poorly understood.
To gain a better insight into the centre of gravity,
it is necessary to go back to its original source - the great Prussian military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz. In fact, doctrinal publications tend to lift Clausewitz's words and
ideas without a great deal of elaboration. In his unfinished tome, On War,
Clausewitz made several references to the concept. Unfortunately, as with much of that
work, his ideas were ambiguous and at times contradictory. But also, as is common of his
writings, they contain a gem. Rather than attack the whole enemy organisation, the most
vital parts should be identified and disabled.
What is this Centre of Gravity?
Defining "centre of gravity" is not an easy task. To start with, the physical
analogy is at best imperfect. Clausewitz offers some contradictory definitions. In Book 6
the centre of gravity relates solely to armies. He observes that:
The fighting forces of each belligerent - whether a single state or an alliance of
states - have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the
analogy of the center of gravity can be applied. Thus, these forces will possess certain
centers of gravity... and those centers of gravity will be found wherever the forces are
most concentrated.[2]
In Book 8 he takes a broader view. While identifying the army as the most usual centre
of gravity, he goes on to state that:
In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the
capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of the
protector. Among alliance, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings
it is the personality of the leaders and public opinion.[3]
Clausewitz leaves it unclear whether he had changed his mind, whether he envisaged two
different concepts to which he had assigned the same name, or whether he countenanced the
concept having different implications at the strategic and operational levels. Whichever
is the case, it is supposed to represent the source of strength - "the hub of all
power and movement, on which everything depends".[4]
In Clausewitz's view, a single centre of gravity can usually be identified. He does
admit the possibility of exceptions, but these he sees only in coalitions of powerful
partners. Clausewitz presents a challenge:
The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's centers of
gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.[5]
This task is not easy, particularly if the all-encompassing definition is used.
And how do you use it?
Even the most precisely defined term becomes nothing more than a philosophical
curiosity if it has no practical application. In Clausewitz's arguments, the maximum
possible force should be directed against the opponent's centre of gravity. Only in few
cases will other objectives warrant the diversion of forces. In his words:
A major battle in a theater of operations is a collision between two centers of
gravity; the more forces we can concentrate in our center of gravity, the more certain and
massive the effect will be. Consequently, any partial use of force not directed towards an
objective that either cannot be obtained by victory itself or that does not bring about
victory should be condemned.[6]
This becomes one of the central points of confusion surrounding the concept. Surely
Clausewitz meant for you to attack your opponent's vulnerabilities rather than his
strengths? Certainly he did not see concentration as being the last word on tactics. He
followed with the immediate caveat:
The basic condition, however, does not consist merely in the greatest possible
concentration of forces; they must also be deployed in a way that enables them to fight
under most favorable circumstances.[7]
Thus he argues that the it is the strength which must be attacked, but that it is
possible to do so with ingenuity.
Clausewitz's views were challenged on precisely this
point by the English theorist B.H. Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart portrayed the Prussian as
the "Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre", and offered as an alternative to
Clausewitz' direct approach his strategy of the indirect approach.[8]
Rather than apply force on the centre of gravity, Liddell Hart called for exploitation of
the line of least resistance and line of least expectation. It is physical and
psychological dislocation that leads to victory.
Yet here neither Clausewitz nor Liddell Hart offer a theory that is useful for limited
conflict. In limited conflict, incapacitation of your enemy may not be an achievable aim
for any number of reasons. Thus strategies designed with this solely in mind are not
helpful.
A systems approach
The problem with the centre of gravity as a doctrinal tool is that they are already
obsolete. In part, Clausewitz himself sewed the seeds that led to its passing; but even
without this the advances in technology and industry would have eventually consigned it to
the dustbin of history.
During the era in which Clausewitz wrote, war was determined essentially by force of
arms on the battlefield. It was the number and quality of troops that could be
concentrated, and the skill with which they were employed, which decided the issue. Today,
war is not fought on a single battlefield under the gaze of the respective commanders. War
is now a fluid affair, fought in three dimensions, with engagements spread over great
frontages and often equally great depths. The physical destruction of the enemy's army
remains important, but war is just as bitterly fought in the electromagnetic spectrum,
international marketplaces, diplomatic circuits, and in hearts and minds. Clausewitz's own
contributions also helped make war infinitely more complex. He emphasised the importance
of drawing on the national support base and the important interrelationship of politics
and war.
It is possible to see the armed forces, and the state that provides them with their
wherewithal, as a system. The different elements of the system interact in a complex way,
with parts depending on each other to varying degrees for their existence and
capabilities. Such a system provides a range of means by which pressure can be brought
against another state-system - armed force, economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, etc.
Thus we should first ask ourselves what effect we wish to cause on the enemy
state-system. Do we wish to disable it as an actor capable of exerting force (as implied
in attacking the centre of gravity), or are we interested in some lesser goal? Second, to
assess the vulnerability of the state as a whole we would be best served to look at each
of the individual elements and ask: how vulnerable is it to the tools we have that can
apply pressure? how important is it to the system as a whole? how easily can it be
replaced, repaired or the linkages changed to avoid reliance on it? (Most often, each
element is itself a system, and could be assessed in the same way by operational and
tactical commanders.)
When we answer all these questions, we may have a single source of strength (centre of
gravity) that needs to be disabled and a single vulnerability to exploit (which may be the
centre of gravity itself). But in the complex world of today, the chances are that neither
will be represented by a single element.
To gain a better insight into the centre of gravity,
it is necessary to go back to its original source - the great Prussian military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz. In fact, doctrinal publications tend to lift Clausewitz's words and
ideas without a great deal of elaboration. In his unfinished tome, On War,
Clausewitz made several references to the concept. Unfortunately, as with much of that
work, his ideas were ambiguous and at times contradictory. But also, as is common of his
writings, they contain a gem. Rather than attack the whole enemy organisation, the most
vital parts should be identified and disabled. 
