MARTIN DUNN
A new Government brings with it a new policy regime. Here, I do not just mean specific initiatives; although the Government announced a number relating to the reserves, land mines, conditions of service and so forth. Rather, they can bring new objectives and a new framework for assessing how the organisation should respond to its environment.
At the time of writing, the Government has not made a decision about writing a new Defence white paper (or policy information paper). Recent media reports[1] indicate that the Minister is even considering the option of first preparing a green paper (a policy discussion paper) - serving the same purpose as the 1986 Dibb Report did. It would be a fair bet to expect the new Government to want a white paper, green paper or strategic review soon (possibly after the completion of the Foreign Affairs white paper, already announced).
In substance, the new Government's defence objectives, as expressed in their pre-election policy statements, do not appear to vary significantly from those in their predecessor. The box on the next page shows the most succinct statement of Coalition policy.
The Coalition identifies the following goals to be central to Australia's security
interests:
Source: Australia's Defence, paragraph 1.1 |
Defence of Australia - Still on Top
Significantly, the new Government does not plan to overturn the fundamental tenets of our Defence policy - the primacy of defence of Australia and self-reliance as planning concepts. It states that "the Coalition places in paramount position the defence of Australia, its territories and people".[2] Similarly, it argues that "since the Coalition Government's 1976 Defence White Paper we have advocated a policy of defence self-reliance within an alliance framework".[3]
In broad, the Government does not appear to have challenged the notion of short-warning conflict as the basis for defence planning, although the policy prefers the terminology of low-level and medium level conflict. For more substantial conflict, it simply calls for "greater emphasis to the need for mobilisation policy and plans".[4]
As to how the defence task might be managed, the Defence policy is largely silent. Some of the discussion implies that defence in depth, and the dual aims of preventing and defeating aggression remain intact. Nevertheless, there remains considerable scope here for reinterpretation in the context of a new white paper.
Extension of the Roles?
One area of increased focus is on maritime communications. The policy identifies this as a particular vulnerability, identifies the need to protect "proximate sea lanes" and suggests that protection of trade might become a focus for regional defence cooperation.[5]
The approach to the US alliance is not substantially different to that of the previous government. It continues to emphasise the tangible benefits that the alliance provides, and the broader need for US engagement to promote the stability of the region.[6] If there is a change here, it is in being more enthusiastic in identifying the role for the US in regional security, explicitly indicating a willingness for US prepositioning of stores in Australia.[7] It identifies an Australian role in cooperative Anti-Ballistic Missile research,[8] but beyond this no particular commitments are made to other US policies.
Similarly, there are no fundamental changes to the approach to regional security. The Asia-Pacific is identified as the focus for foreign policy. We will continue to build on our bilateral security ties in South-East Asia - perhaps now slightly emphasising the formal dimensions to these links. The potential role of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a multilateral security mechanism is highlighted. Reference is made to security assistance to Papua New Guinea, although some concern is expressed about the efficiency of past assistance to PNG and the South Pacific. Throughout the broader region, more emphasis is placed on the need to engage China and on dialogue with North-East Asian countries.[9]
One area where Defence involvement is unlikely to increase is peacekeeping. Here the Government made clear that commitments were made on a case-by-case basis, and that open-ended commitments and those unlikely to succeed were to be avoided. It stated explicitly that peacekeeping was not a force structure determinant.[10]
Where Now?
While for the most part the new Government's policy is - at the broadest level - a matter of business as usual, there remains scope for further refinement and clarification in the (almost) inevitable white paper to come.
1. The Australian, 11 April 1996, p 2 and The Canberra Times, 12 April 1996, p 5.
3. Australia's Defence. paragraph 4.4.
4. Australia's Defence. paragraph 4.7.
5. Australia's Defence. paragraphs 1.1, 2.2 and 3.15.
6. Australia's Defence. paragraphs 3.20 and 3.21.
8. Australia's Defence. paragraph 3.22.
9. A Confident Australia. sections 5.1 and 5.2.
10. Australia's Defence. paragraph 3.28.
Originally published in Research & Analysis: Newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Issue 6, Canberra, April 1996.
(c) Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1996 - reprinted with permission.