MARTIN DUNN
"Third Wave" warfare has washed over the ADF like a tsunami. Everyone is talking about it, writing papers on it or attending conferences on it. But does the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs, the RMA, give anything useful to the Defence policy-maker?
In broad, the RMA is supposedly a fundamental revision of the way warfare is conducted, spurred on by the availability of new technology. But after this simple statement, the RMA becomes amorphous as different authors choose to define it in different, and sometimes contradictory, ways.
A Revolution?
The essence of the RMA concept is that the change is revolutionary rather than incremental. Nevertheless, there are some authors that see scope for mini-revolutions, and even evolutionary change. That a field of human creative endeavour makes progress in fits and starts is hardly surprising, but does it tell us anything?
A significant issue here is the extent to which a "revolution" can be brought on or shaped by deliberate policy decisions. The three Tofflerian waves were presented as part of an immutable historical destiny, but some writers tend to see the most recent wave as one that can be influenced by national policy. However, the RMA appears as a global change of such proportions that only the United States can hope to influence it (and probably only they can afford it). The rest of the world is to be swept along in its wake or left behind.
Military?
One curious issue is the extent to which the RMA represents a military phenomenon. The Toffler model sees the change in the military reflecting the changes in the civil economy. Each of the three waves representing a new industry: agriculture, industry (machinery) and information. To an extent, the Tofflers represent an extreme as other authors recognise lesser revolutions that are purely military. Yet when all discuss what they see as the current RMA, prominently featured is exploiting advances made in electronics, computing and communications - a field at least as much civil as military.
Perhaps just as strange is the fact that RMAs appear to require advances in offensive weaponry and techniques. The castellation of Medieval Europe and the trenches of World War One appear not to be revolutionary in the same way as the Blitzkrieg or Napoleon's grand tactics. If this is the case, what are we to make of emerging defensive capabilities, such as theatre ballistic missile defences?
And what are "Affairs"?
As to what constitutes "affairs", many authors are quick to point out that they do not mean just technology. Depending on their flavour they mean either "technology plus doctrine" or "technology or doctrine". Here I use doctrine to encompass the range of issues that might be described as organisation, application, or even at the broader level the nature of conflict. Despite this, the same individuals when asked to define the elements of what they believe to be the current RMA quickly turn to a hodge podge of emergent technologies: precision guided munitions; command, control and intelligence systems; information warfare and non-lethal weapons.
Some Cautions
In assessing any new concept, three questions are worth positing:
When commenting on what has led to an RMA now, three features are commonly identified: advances in technology, the end of the Cold War and declining defence budgets. This combination is an awfully suspect mix. How is it that declining budgets should lead to a high technology arms race? It rings more of an attempt to intellectualise a defence against further budget cuts, than any defence against a real security threat.
Perhaps more pertinently, many of the key technologies and doctrines started development within the Cold War, and were designed to counter the Soviet foe. They "proved" themselves against Iraq - an inept enemy operating along obsolescent Soviet lines - and hence the argument runs that they represent a vision for the future. Yet it seems hard to conceive of an enemy that will repeat all Saddam Hussein's mistakes; particularly when they have the examples of Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia, and many other guerrilla and terrorist campaigns which successfully confronted more technically advanced states. RMA advocates point out that many of the technologies have applications in Low Intensity Conflict and Operations Other than War (to use the US parlance). Yet a sledge hammer also has utility for cracking peanuts - it is just not the ideal solution. And how does the RMA relate to Australia's concept of short warning conflict?
If the lesson of the RMA is that we need cutting edge technology, then our strategic guidance papers have had a consistent answer for over two decades: technology gives us a number of advantages, but the latest is not always appropriate or affordable. We need to exercise judgement as to what technology we introduce and when, to ensure that we maintain the margins we need in the critical areas.
Yet, if the RMA is not just a technology fixation then it appears to simply be a call for advances in both technology and doctrine, keeping progress in each in mind when reviewing the other. But this simply makes RMA a new buzzword for innovation. As always, innovation remains important, but it hardly needs to be hoisted onto a pedestal.
Originally published in Research & Analysis: Newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Issue 5, Canberra, March 1996.
(c) Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1996 - reprinted with permission.