In its simplest form problem solving involves four activities:
surveying the environment,
identifying the objective,
identifying a range of options, and
selecting the best option from those available.
For many Servicemen, these steps will be very familiar. The appreciation process
embodies them (in a slightly different order) under the headings: Aim, Factors, Own
Courses and Plan.
Within Defence, several planning processes operate in parallel. The best known, most
formally documented, and probably the most complex is the force development process.
The force development process is essentially a more sophisticated version of the
generic problem solving technique described earlier, completed in up to five stages. The table at the top of the page shows the relationship between the steps
and the problem solving activities. The five step comprise:
The strategic guidance papers (white papers and strategic reviews), which are typically
endorsed by the Security Committee of Cabinet, form the basis of the subsequent analysis.
Strategic Concepts (or STRATCONCEPTs) identify the specific tasks to be performed and
are endorsed by the Concepts and Capabilities Committee (CCC).
Capability studies further analyse the tasks, and each identifies a range of broad
options suitable for performing the tasks. A program of these studies is designed to cover
each key role in a five year cycle. At this stage the first cycle is not yet complete. The
program and the papers are considered by the CCC.
Defence Force Capability Options Papers (DFCOPs) may follow capability studies and can
further refine the range of options. Despite being agreed in principle almost two years
ago, not one has yet been developed for CCC consideration.
Major Capability Submissions (MCSs) represent the final step where a fairly narrow range
of options is identified. This range of options may be derived through the preceding two
steps, although commonly one or both of them are omitted. The Force Structure Policy and
Planning Committee (FSPPC) will select the best of the options to be the basis for the
source selection process (usually through a Request for Tenders or RFT). This option is
presented to Cabinet for Government agreement as part of the Department's Budget
submission. The relationship of the force development process to the more generic model
presented earlier can be seen in the following table.
This process presents a number of problems, some of which are intractable:
The environment cannot be known completely, even for today. Yet we are providing
solutions which could have in-service lives of around thirty years.
The tasks themselves are imprecise. For example, how many key assets should be
protected? What constitutes an appropriate level of protection? The tasks represent
judgements which usually defy any attempt to quantify their significance.
The range of options can be contentious. At each stage, the range could be unmanageably
large and is reduced through further judgement.
The criteria for selecting the best option are not always clear. Cost and performance
are two obvious criteria, but options typically have varying level of uncertainty (or
risk) associated with each criterion. Some specific inputs are inflexible, such as skilled
manpower. In other cases, our program and appropriation structures mean that often
specific cost components, such as capital equipment, are more significant than the full
cost. We worry more about the cost of acquisition than the cost of supporting a
capability. And often programming considerations drive us to look at options with
particular expenditure profiles, spending more or less in particular years to suit the
available funds. Performance also has a range of dimensions, including the impact of
different assumptions about an adversary's force mix and concept of operations,
sustainability and readiness.
The links with other planning systems - such as for personnel and preparedness - are not
well developed.
Finally, there is no clear mechanism for determining priorities across the different
capabilities. This is usually only addressed as part of the programming process after the
MCS options have been selected. It can lead to the scope of the proposals developed later
in the year being tailored to the available resources to a much greater extent than those
finalised early in the year.
One mechanism for determining capability priorities in the different roles is the
Defence Long Term Plan (DLTP), the replacement for the Ten Year Defence Plan. This
attempts to draw on the different planning systems within the Defence Organisation and
acts as the link between the analysis performed in each.
The following diagram provides a model of how that might work
once the DLTP reaches maturity.
In addition to the role of the DLTP, this model is unconventional in the way it depicts
the white paper. In the past white papers have been developed by dedicated teams, to be
adopted as Government policy. While ostensibly original work, much is in fact drawn from
the results of the ongoing planning processes, together with an update from the previous
strategic review. This model shows the white paper (or policy information paper) more as
it really is, yet drawing on the coordinating role provided by the DLTP.
Undoubtedly there will be a need for the Defence planning system to evolve further. The
development of the Defence Long Term Plan 1996 and the revision of DI(G) ADMIN
05-1 The Force Development Process will generate some changes, probably taking the
system closer to model depicted above. Whether it will it reach this model or take a
different direction is yet to be seen.
Originally published in Research & Analysis: Newsletter of the Directorate of
Army Research and Analysis, Issue 5, Canberra, March 1996.
(c) Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1996 - reprinted with permission
![[DLTP Model]](iss05_1.gif)
