The distinctiveness of Christian social theory and social research is something which will have to be shown by the results of the scientific analysis of society. It is not automatic. It is not going to be easy. It is not the logical derivative of some other more basic task. That should be clear from the discussion of Chapter 1.
Christian social theory must remain open to, and learn from, the results gained from scientific and philosophic analysis in other areas. But social theory is not merely the application of theological, ethical, historical or philosophical insights to the study of the ‘social’. Neither is Christian social theory a matter of accumulating relevant logical propositions derived from biblical texts or doctrines.
The distinct scientific focus for social theory and research must be learned by the Christian social theorist. Social theory and social research as theorising and research about `the social’ is scientific work which investigates the real, God-created, social realm of human experience.
In saying this, we will also have to clear up a few misconceptions. Christian social research is not firstly a matter of harmonising the results of our social investigation with biblical teaching. Such a procedure does not justify our use of the term Christian. If the results and recommendations of our research are out of harmony with the Christian world-view then maybe it is our assumptions about science, or what we are studying, that need to be re-examined. Maybe our Christian world-view, our taken-for-granted assumptions, need to be looked at again in relation to the teaching of Holy Scripture. An explicit conceptual approach that gives expression to the God-createdness, the creatureliness, of whatever it is we are concerned with in the social realm, must come to terms with the way in which creatures (in this case social structures and relationships) are constrained by their inner nature, the kind of ‘thing’ they are.
Anyone who choses a vocation in social theory and research must reckon with the fact that this is an area which requires disciplined analytical investigation of social things. This is a difficult scientific arena from which to derive immediate insight, but for starters we should keep in mind the importance of definitions. It was none other than Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) who insisted that the definition of a ‘social thing’ be laid at the base of all sociological conceptualisation.
Our sociological study of the family must mean that we have defined family - that means parents, that means children; that must also mean household, the pre-eminent historical form in our culture in which family life is played out. When we define parents it is also the case that we have to deal with forms of marriage and therefore we will also have to define this institution as well. The task is not easy. The area of family studies is fraught with argument and contention. The conflict within the scientific study of the family is also an expression of the deep ideological differences about marriage, family, sexual relations and gender which are also a preoccupation of the public debates generated by the media and newspapers.
But the analytic task of conceptual definition is unavoidable. It is not possible to have a sociological study of households in Australia without coming to terms with the structures of family life, the structure of marriage, the normative character of gender, the nature of sexuality, the structure of the human person and body. And to engage in social scientific study of all this, the principles by which a family or marriage or friendship is to be defined must be made explicit.
A family, a marriage and a friendship are one thing; the household is an economic arrangement in which these differing normative responsibilities come to expression.
These days discussion about the appropriate definition of the social structures of marriage and family are fraught with controversies like: Is a de-facto marriage to be included in the definition of marriage? Is an homosexual relationship a form of marriage? Is a group of students living together in a house a form of family life?
These questions cannot be resolved without recourse to principles and specifying the norms which govern the social formation of these structures. The hard task of deriving adequate definitions includes specifying the ‘inner principle’ which defines a marriage - making a marriage a marriage - and that which defines a family - making a family a family - as well as that which makes a household a household, or that which makes a friendship a friendship.
When we first embark upon the task of defining one or other social institution we discover, sometimes to our dismay, that we have become imperceptibly involved in social processes which are much, much more pervasive than we originally thought. Our intuitive approach to our study has been shaped in ways which we sometimes find hard to accept or acknowledge.
The task of defining one social structure, includes an exacting process of comparison and contrast. The full range of human relationships comes into view. It seems that we cannot explain any one social thing without also defining and explaining every other social thing and spelling out the normative viewpoint from which we are operating. Our so-called disciplined scientific research is seemingly in constant danger of being swamped by arguments and debates about what is normal, what is moral, what is socially acceptable and what is legal.
So we sort through the entire landscape of social relationships, organisations and institutions. We compare relationships of a legal character with those of an economic kind, with those that are cultic and those that are aesthetic. And all the time we realise we can be talking about the same social setting from different angles.
Family is contrasted and compared with household. Friendship is classified alongside of contract. We build up a picture of all the possible types of relationship, against a background of other concerns. There are comparisons to be made within and between various cultural, historical and national settings. We deepen our appreciation for history. We sense the impact of environment and geography. We note the emergence of technology. We see different forms of the division of labour in different societies, not only in the ‘work-force’ but also in the domestic sphere.
And having confronted the myriad of social relationships and processes in this general way we deepen our appreciation of the vocation of social theory and research. This indeed requires a disciplined approach with sharp analytical tools for investigation. Who can ‘spare the time’ to sort through all that variation?
Well, this may give us an indirect hint about the task of the social scientist. A social scientist has been trained to sort through that variation and describe, analyse and explain social life. The social scientist is also trained to consider the consequences, the social impact, of social action in any given social setting. The social scientist is trained to be aware of the intended and unintended consequences of any social action.
It is apparent that there is a great diversity to social structures and processes and so an overview of social life, with basic categories and classifications, needs to be developed. It should be approached in a self-conscious and rigorous manner. As we have noted, this basic classification does not ‘fall out of heaven’; it needs to be worked out.
Within the sociological discipline there is a great variety of social theories which at times seem to exhibit semi-tribal characteristics. In response to this tribalism, social researchers who do not see themselves as deeply involved in ‘theory’, will often adopt an eclectic approach to the investigation of society. They will draw whatever they deem to be useful from the various theoretical currents of social theory and often bring together some very useful insights in this way. Not all those involved in the vocation of social research specialise in ‘general theory’ or the historical analysis of social theory. And those who are associated with social theory, either as commentators or researchers applying abstract theoretical concepts, do not necessarily refer to themselves as social theorists.
Perhaps there is nothing inherently wrong in an eclectic approach. But though the vocation of social research cannot be subsumed under the social theory heading, nevertheless the contribution which Christian social research makes to the Christian world-and-life-view will require a more disciplined and systematic Christian social theory. Systematic social theory may not be the specialist social research undertaken by the Christian scholar, but this does not mean that systematic social theory is not necessary. The Christian social theorist or social researcher also relies upon historical and philosophical insight as a necessary part of social research.
Social science as a human cultural task exhibits the same variety we encounter in any social activity. Social researchers have different customary ways by which their investigations are undertaken. This needs to be kept in mind from the outset of social research. Social research takes place in a social context and therefore the person pursuing such investigation needs to understand the norms and mores that are taken-for-granted when this occurs.
Social theory and research manifests its distinctiveness in its confessional orientation. A Christian approach is not alone in this. A Christian sociology gives expression to its view that society exists in total reliance upon God, from whom all reality makes sense and finds its true place and meaning. But this confession is not a finding of social research, although the research may indeed assist the researcher and those considering the findings to better understand social reality.
In Marxian social theory the confessional dimension is also prominent in a relentless and determined effort to ground all reflection in terms of ‘man the supreme being for man’. Not all strands of social theory manifest such consistent humanistic confession, although some aspects of post-modern feminism match Marxist in explicit confessional formulations. The Marxist presumption is that such a vision necessarily dis-illusions all confessional orientations including the revolutionary humanistic one of Feuerbach (1804-1872). However it has never been able to avoid the confession implicit in its own dis-illusioning project.
In Talcott Parsons’ ‘structural-functional’ social theory the confessional dimension emerges as a theoretical ‘wonder’ directed at the all-encompassing ‘ultimate reality’ which manifests a serendipitous convergence between all actors, social processes and institutions, in an ongoing and evolving equilibrium. Social theory is viewed as a dependent and independent variable in the development of science and the connections made between concept and data indicate a process of human action which though ungraspable in any ultimate sense is nevertheless independent and, in the final analysis, non-dependent reality.
A task suggests itself here. What are the various confessional orientations found within sociology? Here, in our focus upon Christian social theory, we note that social structures are creaturely. Negatively we say they are not divine. Our sociology is neither divine nor autonomous. All social structures have their own integrity; sociology too has a scientific task of its own. Social structures are to be analysed in terms of their dependent and inter-dependent character. Human society is not a reality sui generis; it is the corporate (global) shape of our being created in the image of God.
Social structures are creaturely, called to serve God. Each renders service according to its kind (Genesis 1:24-25). They participate as historical parts of the entire dynamic of a redeemed creation in which humans are restored to their true place. Social structures are (re)new(ed) ways of expressing love to the neighbour, dynamic avenues for justly caring and sharing, for extending love and generosity, to find new peoples to share with. Social structures develop new ways of meeting and sharing together in the global historical cultural process. This is society’s vocation for as long as God decides. The Gospel tells us that this created human condition has received the good news of redemption. It is within the created structures of society, which are still historically unfolding, that we express our thanks having found ourselves again, and being restored we walk again, Coram Deo.
We suggest then that a Christian calling in social theory and research focuses concertedly upon the ‘social dimension’ of human social experience. It does so as it actively seeks way of making a good profession of ‘the faith once for all delivered unto the saints’ (Jude 1:3). Social theory and research also finds great blessedness in reflecting upon what is (still) good and noble and righteous and true in human society as we now experience it (Philippians 4:8).
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August 2004 © A
Christian Calling in Social Theory and Research is a work written by Bruce
C Wearne (PhD), 29 Lawrence Rd., Point Lonsdale Vic 3225 AUSTRALIA,
61-3-5258-3913. Each chapter may be photocopied or retransmitted in its
entirety only with full acknowledgement of the author and the source. It shall
not otherwise be reprinted or transmitted without permission. This
personal project aims to encourage a positive Christian student
engagement in universities around the world which need to better understand the
vocation of science as an expression of our love for God and our
neighbour. Your comments are welcome. Email can be sent to bcwearne@ozemail.com.au
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~bcwearne/index.html